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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-
l 02(3)G). See Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)G). However, the Utah Supreme Court 
has transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, PRESERVATION CITATIONS, 
AND REVIEW STANDARDS 
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court erred in denying Defendants' Motion for 
Leave to Amend ("Motion to Amend"), on the grounds that the proposed amendment was 
untimely and not justified, when the case had only been pending for approximately 
eighteen (18) months but ten (10) months of the delay was caused by the non-movant's 
delay in producing documents, the non-movant would not experience undue prejudice 
including because not trial was scheduled, and the amendment sought leave to add 
meritorious claims. 
Standard of Review: "The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is 
abuse of discretion." See Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). 
The Issue was preserved. [R.1284-1378, 1673-1681]. 
Issue No. 2: Whether in this deficiency action case under Utah Code Ann. section 
57-1-32, the district court erred in concluding that the fair market value of the subject 
property as of the foreclosure sale date of May 22, 2012, was no greater than 
$10,568,000.00, by finding that Plaintiff and Appellee SA Group Properties, Inc. ("SA 
Group" or "Appellee") met its burden of proof and by entering findings of fact that were 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unsupported, contradicted by other of the trial court's findings, or contrary to the 
evidence offered by SA Group's own expert witnesses (which experts also contradicted 
each other as to the proper valuation methodology). 
Standard of Review: Utah's appellate courts "review the trial court's findings of 
fact for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if [the court] otherwise reach[es] a firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, err 17, 80 P.3d 553. "However, that deference 
is not absolute: [ w ]hether the findings were made by a judge or by a jury is an important 
distinction because an appellate court must indulge findings of fact made by a jury that 
support the verdict, while no such indulgence is required of findings made by a judge." 
In re S.Y.T., 2011 UT App 407, err 36,267 P.3d 930 (internal alterations and quotations 
omitted). The issue was preserved. [R.3740-3764, 4168-4170]. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Whether an amended pleading should be allowed is determined by Rule 15(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A deficiency action is determined based on Utah Code Ann. section 57-1-32, 
which requires the determination of the fair market value of the subject real property. 
STATE:MENT OF CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves two issues, the trial court's finding of the fair market value of 
certain property, and· whether Defendants should have been allowed to amend the 
pleadings to bring a counterclaim based upon the failure of the lender First Community 
2 
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Bank ("PCB") to honor certain construction draws. 
n. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSmON BELOW 
On August 20, 2012, SA Group, a company affiliated with US Bank, filed its 
Complaint against Defendants, seeking money damages based on an alleged deficiency. 
[R.1-54]. 
A two day bench trial took place on May 26-27, 2015. On August 12, 2015, the 
final day of the bench trial took place. On August 24, 2015, the Trial Court issued its 
Findings and Order. [R. 3740-3764]. The Trial Court entered the Judgment Against 
Defendants on December 2, 2015. [R.4150-4152]. 
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on December 10, 2015. [R. 4168-4170]. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT 
TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7), Appellants set forth their Statement of Facts, including 
where appropriate under Rule 24(a)(9), a marshalling of all record evidence that supports 
any challenged finding. 
I. THE LOAN 
This case arises out of a September 5, 2007 loan made by PCB to Defendants and 
Appellants Highland Marketplace, L.C. ("Highland"), High Noon, L.C. ("High Noon"), 
and Solana Beach Holdings, L.C. ("Solana") ( collectively the "Highland Entities"), in 
relation to a $28,000,000 line of credit (the "Loan") secured by real property located in 
Highland, Utah (the "Highland Marketplace" or "Property"). [R. 10-18]. In connection 
with the Loan, the Highland Entities executed a Promissory Note, dated September 5, 
3 
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2007, in favor of First Community and in the principal amount of $28,000,000 (the 
"Note") and Appellants Thomas A. Hulbert ("Mr. Hulbert") and Bret B. Fox ("Mr. Fox") 
also entered into commercial guaranties with FCB. [R. 20-22, 24-26, 28-30]. 
The Highland Entities used the Loan to develop the project, including by 
constructing a number of buildings, obtaining multiple leases with local and regional 
tenants, and a build to suit lease from the Walgreen Co. ("Walgreen's"), a $34.5 billion 
market cap company as of 2012. [R.3743-44, R.3673]. The Property is located at the 
northwest comer of the intersection of the Alpine Highway and Timpanogos Highway in 
Highland, Utah. [R. 3743]. Its location has good visibility and good linkage to I-15 on 
the Timpanogos Highway and the Alpine Highway runs into American Fork. [R.3743-
3744]. 
The Highland Marketplace was fully entitled for retail and commercial use as of 
May 2012 and contained the following horizontal improvements: utilities, water, sewer, 
gas, power, curbing and gutters, sidewalks, and roadways. [R.3744]. The Highland 
Marketplace also had various vertical improvements, including completed buildings on 
Lots 3, 7, 8, 9, & 10. [R.3744]. The buildings in the Highland Marketplace are good 
quality buildings, were new construction built between 2008 and 2010, are architecturally 
pleasing, and typical of what is built today for good quality retail and office type 
buildings. [R.3744, 4187 at 18.17]. The construction quality of the buildings is good and 
the condition of the buildings is also good. [R.3744]. By comparison to the 2008-2012 
brand new construction in Highland Marketplace, properties used by SA Group's expert 
were 20, 30, or even 50 years old. [R.3454-3457, 3530-3536, 3554, 3275-3303]. 
4 
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The Highland Marketplace is uniquely located, as it is at the only commercial 
intersection in Highland City. [R.3744-3745]. Although there is competition from a 
Kohler's across the street, and Highland has Sunday closing laws, if someone wants to do 
business in Highland, they have to be at the Highland Marketplace. [R.3744]. 
II. THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, DEFAULT AND TRUSTEE'S SALE 
In 2008 the economic downturn struck. FCB failed to fund certain draw requests 
which FCB had previously approved.1 As a result of FCB's failure to fund the draw 
requests, mechanic's liens were filed against the property, the second-position lender 
declared a default, Defendants were unable to complete a workout agreement and make 
payments on the Loan and-ultimately-the Property was lost. [R.1320-21]. 
Ultimately FCB failed, the FDIC took over the assets of FCB (including the 
Loan), and US Bank made a bulk purchase of FCB's assets. [R.3741-42]. US Bank 
assigned the Loan to a related company, SA Group. [R.3741-3742]. 
On May 22, 2012, the Trustee of the Highland Marketplace sold the Property to a 
third party at a foreclosure sale for $8,650,000. [R.3742]. At the time of the foreclosure 
sale, the amount owing to SA Group by Defendants under the Loan Documents was 
$14,685,370.37. [R.3742-3743]. 
1 These facts are taken from the Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Jury 
Demand submitted in conjunction with Defendants Motion to Amend, [R.1284, 1314-20], 
which are taken as true for purposes of the motion to amend. See _Arnett v. Arnett, No. 
2:13-CV-01121-DN, 2014 WL 2573291, at *1 (D. Utah June 9, 2014); Russell Packard 
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, '1I 3, 108 P.3d 741. Notably, the trial court never found 
that these facts were insufficient to state a claim, unsupported, or that the resulting claims 
would have been futile. 
5 
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ill. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND. 
On March 10, 2014, Defendants filed their second2 Motion for Leave to Amend 
("Motion to Amend"), which sought to add three counterclaims against SA Group and 
related affirmative defenses. [R.1280-1284]. Specifically, Defendants sought to add 
three claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
and declaratory judgment based on the failure of SA Group's predecessor in interest to 
fund certain draw requests which FCB had previously approved.3 [R.1313-1324]. 
As explained to the trial court - in great detail - the timing was caused by SA 
Group's delay of ten (10) months, to produce approximately 29,000 pages of documents. 
2 Defendants filed their first motion to amend on December 23, 2013, but, after 
talcing the deposition of SA Group's 30(b)(6) witness and Darrin Liddell, one of SA 
Group's experts, and receiving additional productions from SA Group, Defendants 
determined that they had mistakenly identified the wrong draw requests in their first 
proposed counterclaim. As a result, Defendants voluntarily withdrew their first motion to 
amend. [R.1180-1182]. 
3 Typically, the Highland Entities would submit the draw requests after work had 
been performed and receive the requested funds to pay the contractors. However, with 
Draw Request 23, FCB reorganized the allocation of funds and, although the Highland 
Entities requested $402,058.53, FCB only authorized $376,063.39. [R.1314-1315]. 
However, after authorizing $376,063.39, First Community refused to fund the entire 
amount and instead funded only $250,211.63. [R.1316]. First Community's failure to 
fund the entire amount of Draw Request 23 left contractors unpaid, who then filed 
mechanic's liens against Property, and also forced the use of funds to pay property taxes. 
[R.1317-1320]. The failure to fund damaged the Highland Entities because it interfered 
with their ability to negotiate with the second-position lender and prevented the Highland 
Entities from securing take-out financing in order to save the Property. [R.1320-1321]. 
This interference caused the Highland Entities to default on the Loan, because they were 
unable to work out an arrangement with the second-position lender or obtain funding to 
prevent foreclosure. [R.1320-1321]. Thus, if the Highland Entities had been able to 
proceed with and prevailed upon these claims, the impact on the case could have been 
significant. 
6 
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[R.1287-904]. Almost one year earlier on March 13, 2013, Defendants served their first 
set of requests for production of documents on SA Group. [R.429-430]. After serving 
the requests, SA Group began to slowly trickle out its document productions. Between 
April 9, 2013 and February 20, 2014, SA Group produced over 29,000 pages of 
documents in nine separate productions. [R.1287-1290]. 
Although the Motion to Amend was filed after the expiration of fact discovery 
under the then-existing schedule, [R.899-902], Defendants requested a short extension of 
fact discovery until June 30, 2014 ("Motion to Extend"), based upon the delays in SA 
Group's document production. [R.1185-1188]. 
On May 20, 2014, the trial court issued its Ruling on Motion for Leave to Amend 
and Motion to Extend Fact Discovery ("Motion to Amend Ruling") and denied 
Defendants' request to amend and extend fact discovery. [R.1673-1681]. In denying 
leave to amend, the trial court relied on the timeliness and justification prongs, finding 
that the Defendants were aware of the bases for the proposed counterclaims "as early as 
201 O" and that Defendants "acted with unreasonable neglect" when they did not assert 
their counterclaim in an earlier pleading. [R.1677, 1680].5 However, the trial court did 
not find the proposed amendments defective or futile. [R.1673-1681]. 
4 It took four pages just to summarize the repeated delays by SA Group in 
producing documents. 
5 The trial court recognized that SA Group would not suffer undue prejudice if 
leave to amend was granted. [R.1678-1679]. This was born out, when trial was not 
scheduled until over a year later. 
7 
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IV. TRIAL 
On February 25, 2015, the trial court scheduled a two-day bench trial to take place 
on May 26-27, 2015. [R.3116-3117]. 
The first day of trial took place on May 26, 2015. [R.3159]. Although trial had 
been scheduled for three months, one of SA Group's expert witnesses, Kerry Jorgensen 
("Jorgensen") indicated with no advance notice (to Defendants, anyway) that he would 
have to leave at 3:00 p.m. on the then-final day of trial. [R.3186-3187]. Jorgensen did in 
fact leave the trial early, requiring a third day of trial to be scheduled months later, on 
August 12, 2015. [R.3653; R.3739]. 
The final day of trial took place on August 12, 2015. [R.3765]. 
A. SA GROUPS EXPERT WITNESSES 
SA Group called two expert witnesses, Jorgensen and Darrin Liddell ("Liddell"), 
to testify on the single, disputed issue at trial: the fair market of the Highland 
Marketplace. [R. 3161]. 
1. Kerry Jorgensen 
Jorgensen is the principal of Jorgensen Appraisal, Inc. and has a bachelor's degree 
from the University of Utah in finance with a real estate emphasis. He is also MAI 
certified and is a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah. [R.3187-3188]. 
Jorgensen has been an appraiser for approximately 36 years. [R.3189]. 
Jorgensen initially submitted an expert report opining that the fair market value of 
the Highland Marketplace was $9,800,000. [R.3761]. However, Jorgensen subsequently 
changed his opinion of the Highland Marketplace's fair market value to $10,568,000 after 
8 
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he discovered SA Group failed to provide him with information regarding an executed 
Walgreen's lease. [R.3760-3761]. 
Despite finding that Jorgensen used older shopping centers that were inferior in 
appearance, the trial court adopted Jorgensen's second valuation of the Highland 
Marketplace at $10,568,000, which included the additional value for the Walgreen's lease 
on Pad D, as the fair market value of the Property. [R.3760-3761]. 
2. Darrin Liddell 
Liddell is the owner of the Integra Realty Resources franchise in Salt Lake City, 
Utah and has a bachelor's degree in finance and a master's degree in business 
administration, both of which come from the University of Utah. [R.3338-3340]. 
Liddell opined that the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace was 
$9,240,000. [R.3745]. However, during trial, Liddell admitted and the evidence 
established that Liddell's valuation was not reliable because he had followed the client's 
instructions, and thus had not applied his own, independent judgment on how to value the 
property, and if he had done so the valuation would have been higher (the "Client's 
Instruction Flaw"). [R.3688-94]. The trial court found additional flaws, including his 
failure to give value to a signed 'Jack in the Box' Letter of Intent ("nB LOI"), use of the 
wrong capitalization rate, failing to conduct a sales comparison approach on income 
producing properties, and improperly applying a bulk sale discount to the Property. 
[R.3751-3755]. The trial court also concluded: 
9 
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70. The Court :finds that each of Mr. Liddelrs judgments regarding the property were 
conservatively made resulting in an appraised value that is not credible. [See Trial Transcript, at 
299:17-300:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
[R.3751 (emphasis added)]. 
B. DEFENDANTS'EXPERTWITNESS 
Defendants called Philip Cook ("Cook") as an expert witness to testify regarding 
the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. Cook is a commercial real estate 
appraiser with approximately 35 years of experience and is the principal of J. Philip Cook 
and Associates, LLC. [R.3755-3756, 3438]. Cook obtained his bachelor's degree in 
finance from the University of Utah in 1980. Cook completed an MBA in 1982 at the 
University of Utah. [R.3756]. 
Cook has taught appraisal classes on Real Estate Appraisal Principles and Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice for the Appraisal Institute, which 
promulgates education and standards for appraisers and sponsors the MAI designation. 
[R.3756]. Cook has served in all the local office positions for the Appraisal Institute, 
including as the President of the Utah Chapter of the Appraisal Institute. Cook has also 
served as a regional representative and sat on the National Board of Directors for the 
Appraisal Institute. [R.3756]. Cook has served as a board member and as Chairman of 
the Utah State Appraiser Board, which works with the Utah Division of Real Estate to 
oversee the licensing and professional oversight of appraisers in the State of Utah. 
[R.37 56]. Cook has been qualified as an expert witness on real estate appraisal related 
issues in both federal and state courts, and has appraised such shopping centers as Provo 
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Towne Center, University Mall, the Riverwoods development, Fashion Place Mall, the 
City Creek project in downtown Salt Lake City, the Gateway mall, and numerous other 
big box, neighborhood, and strip centers. [R.3756]. 
Cook opined that the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace was 
$14,710,000. [R.3757]. Despite Cook's extensive qualifications and experience as an 
appraiser, his inclusion and analysis of all the relevant leases and letters of intent, the trial 
court rejected Cook's opinion. [R.3757-3759]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Defendants' Motion to Amend 
because the Motion to Amend was timely and justified. 
Although the trial court found that the Motion to Amend was not timely filed, in 
reaching this conclusion the trial court improperly ignored the fact that it took SA Group 
nearly a year to produce over 29,000 pages of documents requested by Defendants. This 
involved nine separate productions over approximately a one-year period, with the final 
production coming only eight days before the end of fact discovery. These delays caused 
the filing of Defendants Motion to Amend after the close of fact discovery. However, at 
the time the Motion to Amend was filed the case was not yet in the advanced procedural 
stages. In fact, Defendants also filed a motion to extend the fact discovery deadline by a 
few months to accommodate for the proposed counterclaim. Additionally, the Motion to 
Amend was timely because it was not filed years into the case but was instead filed a 
mere eighteen months into the case, ten (10) months of which were spent waiting for SA 
Group to comply with its discovery obligations. 
11 
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The trial court also committed clear error in concluding the fair market value of 
the Property was no more than $10,568,000 by making numerous findings of fact that are 
not only unsupported by the record but are, in many cases, directly contradicted by the 
testimony of both Defendants' expert witness and SA Group's expert witnesses. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND. 
A. LEA VE TO AMEND SHOULD BE FREELY GIVEN 
Although perhaps glossed over because it is so familiar, it is important to note that 
the general purpose of Rule 15(a) is to enable a party to assert new matters and to allow 
parties to have their claims fully adjudicated on the merits. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 
P.2d 1178, 1183 (1993); Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205,211, 381 P.2d 86 (1963). In 
determining whether to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend, the Utah appellate 
courts have considered several factors, but in particular whether there was (a) undue 
delay, (b) prejudice to the opposing party, and (c) whether the amendment is justified. 
See Swan Creek Vill. Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, ff[ 20, 134 P.3d 1122; 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the liberal policy of allowing amendments in 
Timm, holding that 
rule 15 should be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their 
claims fully adjudicated: "[The rules of civil procedure] must all be looked 
to in the light of their even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both 
pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege 
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute." 
Id. at 1183 (emphasis added). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, DEPRIVING DEFENDANTS 
OF MERITORIOUS COUNTERCLAIMS AND DEFENSES TO MILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS IN CLAIMS 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion because the Motion to Amend was 
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timely filed in light of SA Group's untimely document productions, the procedural 
posture of the case (including no trial date), and the uncontested fact that the amendment 
was justified (i.e., not futile).6 
1. The Motion to Amend Was Timely Filed 
The trial court abused its discretion when it found that Defendants' Motion to 
Amend was not timely filed. In denying leave to amend, the trial court identified two 
bases for finding that the motion was untimely: that Defendants had "knowledge of the 
failed draw requests and the completion of significant procedural stages in the case." 
[R.1677]. 
However, in making these findings, the trial court ignored SA Group's failure to 
timely produce documents, failed to acknowledge the complicated nature of the issue, 
and failed to recognize that Defendants were entitled to vet their claims through the 
documents before alleging a counterclaim. Indeed, such is the responsible course of 
action, and counsel and client should not be punished for seeking discovery before filing, 
instead of a "shoot [file] first, ask questions later" approach. 
Despite being served with Defendants first set of requests for production of 
document on March 13, 2013, SA Group took nearly a year to produce more than 29,000 
pages of documents, by way of nine separate productions. [R.1192-1195, 1677]. The 
final production was not until February 20, 2014, only eight days before the close of fact 
discovery. [R.1195]. In reviewing all this information and in taking the deposition of SA 
6 The trial court properly found that SA Group would not suffer prejudice. 
[R.1678-1679]. 
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Group's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Defendants were expeditious and did all within their 
power to act timely. 
Furthermore, the Motion to Amend was filed less than two years into the litigation 
process and the case was not yet in the advanced procedural stages of the litigation 
process. It is well-recognized that "Utah appellate courts have consistently refused the 
invitation to establish a bright line rule regarding how far into the litigation process a 
motion to amend must be filed in order to be deemed untimely." Kelly v. Hard Money 
Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, <J( 28, 87 P.3d 734. Instead, motions to amend are 
deemed untimely in only two circumstances: "when they are filed in the advanced 
procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of discovery, on 
the eve of a scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been entered .. 
. [or] when they were filed several years into the litigation." Id. fll 29-30 (emphasis 
added). 
In this case, neither circumstance was present and thus, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to deny Defendants' Motion to Amend. 
First, the Motion to Amend was not untimely because it was not filed "several 
years" into the litigation process. In Kelly, this Court compiled a list of cases holding that 
motions to amend filed between three and twelve years into the litigation process were 
deemed ''untimely." See Kelly, 2004 UT App 44, <J( 30. But see Swan Creek, 2006 UT 
22, <JrI[ 22-23 (affirming the trial court's decision to grant leave to amend where the 
motion came three years after the start of litigation and on the eve of trial). In contrast, 
this case had only been pending for a little over eighteen months, of which ten ( I 0) 
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months were consumed with SA Group's document production, and no trial date had 
been set at the time the Motion to Amend was filed. 
Second, the trial court's decision to deny leave to amend was an abuse of 
discretion because the delay in the case up to that point had been caused by SA Group's 
failure to promptly produce documents. In fact, to illustrate this point, SA Group's final 
document production came on February 20, 2014, only eight days before the end of fact 
discovery, and after Defendants had already deposed SA Group's 30(b)(6) witness on the 
issues relevant to the Motion to Amend. Thus, any delay caused in bringing the Motion 
to Amend was caused by SA Group. 
Finally, the motion was timely because it was not filed in the advanced procedural 
stages of the litigation process. Although fact discovery had recently expired and expert 
discovery had already begun, it was only in its initial phases and could have easily been 
postponed for the four months requested in the motion to extend fact discovery. [R.1195-
1200]. Moreover, Defendants concurrently moved for a short extension of fact discovery 
based on SA Group's failure to timely provide requested documents, which extension 
would have allowed for more than sufficient time to address the new counterclaim. 
[R.1185-1279]. Indeed, in light of SA Group's failure to produce relevant documents 
until the eve of the close of fact discovery, combined with the fact that this case was not 
tried until almost a year after the Motion to Amend was denied, the trial court's refusal to 
grant leave to amend - and to grant the short extension of fact discovery - was an abuse 
of discretion. The trial court could have easily allowed for the requested extension, 
which would have provided Defendants with the opportunity to have their claims tried on 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the merits and not be summarily dismissed on a procedural technicality. See Richards v. 
Baum, 914 P .. 2d 719, 723 (Utah 1996) (noting that Utah has a "strong policy in [the] rules 
of civil procedure in favor of deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural 
technicalities."). In light of these facts, the trial court's finding that the Motion to Amend 
was not timely was an abuse of discretion. 
2. The Motion to Amend was Justified 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendants' Motion to Amend 
because the motion to amend was not the product of dilatory motive, bad faith 7 or 
unreasonable neglect. This Court has recognized that 
a party can establish justification for the delay in bringing a motion to 
amend pleadings where the party can demonstrate that the delay was not 
due to a dilatory motive, a bad faith effort, or unreasonable neglect in terms 
of pleading preparation, or that the party had minimal prior knowledge of 
the events prompting the desired amendment. 
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2008 UT App 454, 'I[ 3 (citing Kelly, 2004 UT App 44, 'I[ 38). 
While the trial court found that Defendants had knowledge of the draw requests as 
early as 2010 and that Defendants unreasonably neglected to bring their counterclaims 
based on this knowledge,8 this finding fails to acknowledge that a "party's decision to 
hold off on pleading those allegations until reliable confirmation could be obtained 
should not serve as grounds for procedural default." Swan Creek, 2006 UT 22, 'I[ 22. 
What the trial court failed to properly consider is that Defendants were entitled to obtain 
7 The trial court correctly found that the Motion to Amend was not brought with 
dilatory motive or in bad faith. [R.1680]. 
8 [R.1676-1677, 1679-1680]. 
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the relevant discovery regarding the unfunded draw requests before seeking leave to 
amend and add a counterclaim. While Defendants believed that certain draw requests had 
not been funded, whether the failure to fund those requests was in violation of the Loan -
or was somehow justified by FCB' s accounting or other reason - was not confirmed to 
Defendants until late 2013 and early 2014, after SA Group finally completed producing 
documents in response to the March 2013 document request from nearly a year prior. 
The trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend was, in effect, a punishment for 
Defendants' decision to exercise caution in seeking to vet its claims before asserting them 
against SA Group. 
Defendants' decision to wait to file a counterclaim is further explained - and 
justified - by the events regarding the first motion to amend. Defendants initially moved 
to amend and add counterclaims against SA Group on December 23, 2013, approximately 
two months before the close of fact discovery, based upon inf onnation contained in the 
documents and reflecting the failure of US Bank to fund certain "August Draw 
Requests." [R.0907-0921, 0934-0935]. However, it was only during the deposition of 
SA Group's Rule 30(b)(6) representative9 that Defendants discovered that their first 
motion to amend was based on incorrect facts and needed to be withdrawn. [R.1180-
1182]. Simply put, there were a lot of documents, and a good deal of resulting confusion; 
so much so that during the deposition of SA Group's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, counsel had 
to - literally - point out information to the witness showing that the draw requests had 
9 The Rule 30(b)(6) witness was deposed on February 11, 2014. [R.1480-1482, 
1496]. 
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been paid: 
Q, (BY MR. MAGLEBY) Mr. Waterman has pointed 
something out to you on a document. Can you tell me what 
you are looking at there? 
[R.1497-1500]. Until then, SA Group's representative him.self had believed the August 
Draw Requests had not been paid. [R.1500-1501]. 
Notably, after the deposition, Defendants returned to the documents and identified 
that the unfunded draw request was Draw Request 23, not the August Draw Requests, 
and filed the new Motion to Amend. [R.1280-1283]. SA Group did not contend in 
opposing the motion to amend that these draw requests had been paid. [R.13 81-1411]. 
Notably, if SA Group had timely produced documents and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition 
could have taken place earlier, then Defendants could and would have amended sooner. 
Stated otherwise, if SA Group had timely provided Defendants with a complete 
production of documents, including those relating to the failure to fund draw requests, 
Defendants would have been spared the needless exercise of filing and withdrawing their 
first motion to amend, and Defendants could have confirmed their counterclaims at a 
much earlier stage in the litigation and could have easily avoided the exact arguments 
made in opposition to Defendants' motion. 
Nor does the trial court's rejection of the proposed amendment based on 
Defendants' prior knowledge of the denied draw request adequately address the 
justification prong standard set forth by this Court in Kelly. This Court established the 
proper analytical framework for trial courts to address the justification prong, noting that 
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"although the extent to which the moving party had prior knowledge of the proposed 
amendment should be a relevant factor in the court's analysis, the analytic thrust should 
actually be focused on the reasons offered by the moving party for not including the facts 
or allegations in the original complaint." Kelly, 2004 UT App 44, '1[ 38 (emphasis added). 
The trial court's analysis plainly misapplied this guidance, focusing only on 
Defendants belief 10that draw requests had been improperly unfunded in 2010, without 
properly considering the legitimate reasons for the delay. 
In light of these circumstances, Defendants' decision to seek confirmation from 
the documents was not, as the trial court incorrectly found, unreasonable neglect. To the 
contrary, rather than make broad and conclusory allegations in the counterclaim, 
Defendants properly chose to investigate and seek documents, to establish which specific 
draw request had not been funded, and confirmation that FCB' s refusal to fund was 
improper (and not an accounting mistake or misunderstanding by Defendants). Simply 
put, Defendants' decision to exercise caution in alleging its counterclaims by obtaining 
confirmation from the documents regarding which draw request(s) was not funded by 
PCB was not an appropriate basis upon which the trial court could find that Defendants 
had unreasonably neglected to plead a counterclaim. 
10 Indeed, at oral argument counsel for Defendants explained that Defendants did 
the right thing by waiting to bring the second Motion to Amend until SA Group produced 
all the documents relevant to the unfunded draw requests. [R.1621-1623, 1630-1631, 
1666-1667]. Obviously, this was done to avoid another scenario where Defendants 
would have to withdraw the request to amend, as they were required to do based on the 
discovery obtained only eight days before the end of fact discovery. 
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Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it incorrectly found that 
Defendants' Motion to Amend was untimely and was not justified. 
n. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN REJECTING 
COOK'S FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE IDGHLAND MARKETPLACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is a tall order for an appellant to challenge a trial court's findings of fact under 
any circumstances. It is particularly difficult in this appeal from a deficiency judgment, 
not because the evidence ( or lack of evidence) does not establish that the trial court 
clearly erred, but rather because the record is dense and it is difficult to explain the 
numerous mistakes made by the trial court in a few written pages. Indeed, a 
comprehensive review of the details can come only from reading the trial transcript. 
Nonetheless, Appellants attempt to detail the many errors in the trial court's 
factual findings, starting with "big picture" flaws, and then getting into the minutia. 
Taken in isolation, one or two of the individual errors might not justify a finding "against 
the clear weight of the evidence" or lead to the "firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Covey, 2003 UT App 380, 'I[ 17. But, even in isolation, mistakes such as the big-
picture, obvious and improper failure of the trial court to consider the third day of trial, 
the reliance upon the foreclosure sale price or the conclusion created-from-whole-cloth 
by SA Group's lawyers and adopted by the trial court that Cook did not do an "as is" 
appraisal, demonstrate error. When combined with the details, showing that the trial 
court's findings were without any support, were internally inconsistent, and were 
contradicted by SA Group's own experts, the evidence commands a reversal. Simply put, 
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SA Group failed to carry its burden of establishing the fair market value of the Property. 
B. THE DEFICIENCY STATUTE AND PlJBLIC POLICY 
Under the Deficiency Action Statute the trial court was charged with finding the 
"fair market value of the [Highland Marketplace] at the date of sale." Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-32. The fair market value of property is defined as "the amount at which property 
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." 
Mallinckrodt v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1999 UT 66, <J[ 10, 983 P.2d 566. In making this 
determination, the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USP AP") 
requires an appraiser to analyze the "probable and legal use of vacant land or an 
improved property that is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially 
feasible, and that results in the highest value." [R.3217, 3448 (emphasis added)]. 
The Deficiency Action Statute is based upon an important public policy concern, 
incorporated into the statute. "[T]he purpose of [the fair market value defense] is to 
protect the debtor, who in a non-judicial foreclosure has no right of redemption, from a 
creditor who could purchase the property at the sale for a low price and then hold the 
debtor liable for a large deficiency." Capital Assets Fin. Svs. v. Jordanelle Dev., UC, 
2010 UT App 385, <J[ 8,247 P.3d 411 (emphasis added). This case exemplifies the 
importance of these policy concerns, as the Defendants, and in particular Mr. Fox and 
Mr. Hulbert as personal guarantors, are facing approximately $5 million as a result of SA 
Group's decision to sell the Highland Property for millions of dollars below the amount 
of the debt. 
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c. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARY ERRED BY IGNORING THE THIRD DAY OF 
TRIAL, THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JORGENSEN, AND ADOPTING SA 
GROUP'S PROPOSED FINDINGS SUBMITTED BEFORE THE FINAL DAY OF 
TRIAL 
Much to the surprise of Defendants, it was disclosed for the first time (to 
Defendants anyway) literally during trial that SA Group's expert witness Jorgensen 
would have to leave at 3:00 p.m. on the then-final day of trial. [R.3186-3187]. Jorgensen 
did in fact leave the trial early, requiring a third day of trial to be scheduled months later, 
on August 12, 2015. [R.3653, 3739]. 
However, the parties were requested to submit, and did submit, their proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law before the final day of trial. [R.3662-3723, 3724-
38]. During the final day of trial, SA Group's expert witness Jorgensen was vigorously 
cross-examined, including on many of the issues that had been included in SA Group's 
proposed findings. [R.3845-3936]. As explained, infra, in the "minutia" discussion, 
Jorgensen made important concessions, contrary to the "findings" proposed by SA 
Group, including for example a concession that Cook did not use a "disfavored" land 
residual method of valuation. [R.3854-3856]. 
Notwithstanding this evidence, the trial court adopted nearly verbatim the 
proposed findings submitted by SA Group before the last day of trial, which findings are 
contradicted by the evidence. [Compare R.3732-3734 with R.3757-3759]. When a trial 
court's findings implicate a material failure in the proceeding, litigants are entitled to turn 
to the appellate court for consideration not only of whether a finding is "against the clear 
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weight of the evidence," but also where circumstances lead to a "firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." Covey, 2003 UT App 380, <J[ 17. The trial court's failure to 
consider the third day of evidence leads to such a conviction. 
D. THE QUALITY AND DETAIL OF THE PROPOSED FINDINGS SUPPORTS A 
FINDING OF ERROR 
It is axiomatic that a trial court's findings of fact must be based upon evidence. 
In support of its proposed findings, Defendants' counsel provided very detailed 
findings, walking chapter-and-verse through the appraisals, the trial exhibits, and the trial 
testimony of each witness. Every material finding in Defendants' proposed findings 
included a citation to evidence, including verbatim clips of testimony and relevant 
portions of the exhibits. [R.3662-3723]. The result was over 62 pages of findings and 
conclusions, demonstrating the reliability of Cook's valuation of $14,710,000. [R.3662-
3723]. 
By contrast, SA Group submitted only 13 pages of findings and conclusions, many 
of which were cursory and literally lacking in any citations to the evidence in the record. 
[R.3732-3735]. As explained, infra, in the minutia discussion, others were based on 
citations that did not actually support the proposed findings, and which were actually 
contradicted not only by the evidence, but by SA Group's own expert witnesses. See, 
infra, Section G. As just one glaring example, the proposed findings asserted the 
incredible conclusion that Cook, a licensed and qualified MAI appraiser with more than 
35 years of experience, had utterly departed from appraisal standards and failed to 
actually conduct an "as is" appraisal. See, infra, Section G. 
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The trial court adopted nearly verbatim the proposed findings submitted by SA 
Group, despite the lack of citation to the record or evidentiary support, and then copied 
and incorporated some portions of Defendants' proposed findings. [Compare R.3726-
3738 and R.3662-3723 with R.3740-3764]. 
Appellants recognize that asking the appellate court to compare the proposed 
findings submitted by the parties is an unorthodox argument. However, the comparison 
demonstrates another big picture point, and supports a "firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." Covey, 2003 UT App 380, <j[ 17. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED THE FORECLOSURE SALE 
PRICE IN DETERMINING FAm MARKET VALUE 
It is also axiomatic that under the Deficiency Act, the foreclosure sale price is not 
a proper measure of the fair market value of the property. Indeed, such a conclusion 
defeats the entire point of the Deficiency Act. Indeed, the statute might as well not exist 
if the sale price were the equivalent of fair market value, and allowing such a 
consideration would run counter to the important policy considerations of protecting the 
debtor. 
Although the price paid at the foreclosure sale is not relevant to the actual fair 
market value of the Highland Marketplace, the trial court expressly referenced the 
amount obtained at the foreclosure sale in deciding to discount Cook's expert opinion. 
[R.3757]. Indeed, after noting that Cook's valuation was "approximately $6 million 
more than the price paid by an independent third party bidder at the foreclosure sale," 
the trial court erroneously concluded that "Cook's valuation of the Highland Property 
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was artificially inflated .... " [R.3757 (emphasis added)]. 
However, by statute, the price at the foreclosure sale is irrelevant. The price could 
be $1, $100, or $1,000,000, but in no event does a foreclosure sale price equate to a "fair 
market value." It is well-established that "a foreclosure sale is not an arm's length 
transaction involving a willing buyer and a willing seller" and, as a result, "is not 
evidence of fair market value." United States v. 79.95 Acres of Land, More or Less, in 
Rogers Cty., State of Okl., 459 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). Indeed, 
the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
[M]arket value, as it is commonly understood, has no applicability in the 
forced-sale context; indeed, it is the very antithesis of forced-sale value. 
The market value of a piece of property is the price which it might be 
expected to bring if offered for sale in a fair market; not the price which 
might be obtained on a sale at public auction or a sale forced by the 
necessities of the owner, but such a price as would be fixed by negotiation 
and mutual agreement, after ample time to find a purchaser, as between a 
vendor who is willing (but not compelled) to sell and a purchaser who 
desires to buy but is not compelled to take the particular piece of property) 
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1994) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations and ellipses omitted). 
Tellingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the trial court did not cite to any case law 
or testimony to support its conclusion that the foreclosure price was relevant. [R.3757-
3759]. 
This rationale is reinforced by the purpose of the Deficiency Statute, which allows 
the "fair market value" defense for the "purpose of protect[ing] the debtor, who in a non-
judicial foreclosure has no right of redemption, from a creditor who could purchase the 
property at the sale for a low price and then hold the debtor liable for a large deficiency." 
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Capital Assets, 2010 UT App 385, <j[ 8 (emphasis added). 
By expressly including and relying on the amount paid at the foreclosure sale to 
disregard Cook's opinion, the trial court disregarded the purpose of the Deficiency 
Statute and was improperly influenced in its determination of the fair market value. Such 
disregard for the guiding principles of the governing statute once again supports the "firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made" in this case. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, <J[ 17. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT COOK DID NOT 
CONDUCT AN "As Is" APPRAISAL 
The trial court cursorily and erroneously concluded that Cook failed to appraise 
the property in its "as is" condition, as required for a fair market valuation. [R.3758-
3759]. The flaws in the trial court's description of the evidence relied upon for this 
conclusion are discussed, infra, Section 0(4). 
But, as another big picture matter demonstrating a "firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made," Covey, 2003 UT App 380, <j[ 17, there is no evidence or applicable 
analysis to support this conclusion. It is simply wrong to conclude that Cook, a licensed 
and qualified MAI appraiser with more than 35 years of experience, decided in this case 
to place his professional reputation and integrity on the line by utterly departing from 
appraisal standards and failing to actually conduct an "as is" appraisal. Indeed, this Court 
would have to conclude that Cook simply lied, repeatedly, when he wrote in his 197-page 
appraisal that he had concluded an "as is" value: 
AS IS 
-
FOURTEEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND DOUARS 
($14,710,000) 
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[R.4187 at 18-2, 18.63-18.66, 3491, 3547-3550, 3568]. 
No less important, there was no testimony from SA Group's two experts that Cook 
had failed to conduct an "as is" appraisal. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN REJECTING COOK'S 
VALUATION OF THE HIGHLAND MARKETPLACE 
Appellants now turn to some of the minutia, demonstrating that the trial court 
clearly erred in both its rejection of Cook's valuation and acceptance of Jorgensen's 
valuation. In its Findings and Order, the trial court cursorily found "Cook's valuation of 
the Highland Marketplace [to be] artificially inflated and less credible than the valuations 
of Liddell and Jorgensen." [R.3 7 57]. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court 
identified three reasons - in bullet point format - for deciding to reject Cook's opinion on 
the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. Upon analysis, each is devoid of 
evidentiary support, and in fact contrary to the only evidence presented at trial-
including evidence presented by SA Group's experts 
First, the trial court incorrectly found that Cook's valuation was based on 
"unsupported and unreliable facts and data," that he gave "too much value to the Jack in 
the Box' Letter of Intent," and that Cook valued the Anchor Pad of the Highland 
Marketplace "using the condition[] that the Anchor Pad would function as multi-family 
housing." [R.3758]. However, the trial court cites nothing in the record to support this 
finding, and SA Group's proposed finding to this effect, which the trial court apparently 
copied, is equally devoid of evidence supporting this finding. [R.3731-3732]. 
Second, the trial court erroneously found that "Cook's valuation was based on 
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[the] un-established and unreliable valuation" methodology called the "land residual 
method." [R.3758]. Once again, the trial court cites nothing in the record to support this 
finding, and SA Group's proposed finding similarly failed to cite to any evidence. 
[R.3733-3734]. 
Finally, the trial court mistakenly determined that "Cook did not value the 
Highland Property in its "as is" condition as of the May 22, 2012 foreclosure date." 
[R.3758]. The trial court made this finding based on the erroneous belief that Cook's 
opinion relied on the following hypothetical conditions to determine fair market value of 
the Highland Marketplace: 
(1) the relied-upon letter of intent would be executed and that a 'Jack in the 
Box' would be constructed; (2) the zoning of the anchor pads would be 
changed; (3) a Walgreen's would be timely constructed; (4) Pad I would be 
subdivided into two parcels; (5) the fitness club lease would be terminated; 
( 6) the fitness space lease would be converted to retail space; and (7) the 
entire project would be leased to stabilized occupancy. 
[R.3758-3759]. However, the trial court again failed to include any citation to the record 
that would support this finding, and the proposed finding upon which this is based also 
lacks citation to any evidentiary support. [R.3734-3735, 3758-3759]. 
1. Summary of Property and Valuation Differences 
The trial court's fair market value conclusion for the property was erroneous. 
Defendants presented a single valuation opinion from well-respected appraiser Phillip 
Cook, who concluded a fully supported value of $14,710,000. By contrast, SA Group 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
presented five different, ever increasing, valuations, 11 concluding with Jorgensen's last 
valuation, adopted by the trial court, of $10,568,000.00. 
Because Liddell's valuation was unreliable, including due to his departure from 
accepted appraisal practice (i.e., the Client's Instruction Flaw),12 the trial court was left 
with one appraisal and valuation from Cook, concluding a fair market values of 
$14,710,000 [R.3757], and Jorgensen's valuation which- after adjustment to account for 
his mistaken failure to value the Walgreen's lease - was $10,568,000. [R.3761]. 
The valuation testimony focused primarily on six (6) portions of the project, 
Building A, Building-DI Lot 6 (Walgreens), Building E (Taco Time), Buildings F 
through H, Pad I/ Lots 11 & 12 (Jack in the Box), and Lots 1 & 2 (Vacant Land). For 
context, these components are reflected on demonstrative Exhibit 101: 
11 
• In the Complaint, SA Group contended the fair market value of the Property 
was $8,565,000. [R.0005]. However, in an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, 
SA Group subsequently claimed the fair market value of the Property was $9,240,000. 
[R. 93]. During expert discovery, SA Group advanced two differing opinions on the 
value of the Property, claiming the fair market value was either $9,240,000 or 
$9,800,000. [R.2085, 2341]. At trial, after SA Group's expert witness conceded he had 
failed to value an existing W algreens lease, the final value advanced by SA Group 
increased from $9,800,000 to $10,568,000. [R. 3730]. 
12 [R.3751-3755]. The details of the Client's Instruction Flaw were summarized in 
Defendants' proposed findings. [R.3688-94]. 
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Lot Lot1 & 2 Lot3 Lot 6 Lot7 Lot 8 Lot 9 Lot 10 Lot 11 Lot 12 
Building Bldg A Bldg Bldg BldgD Bldg E Bldg F BldgG BldgH Pad I Pad I 
B C 
Tenant(s) Vacant Newport NIA Nii\ Wal greens Taco T- Barbacoa 1 Hr. Jack in Vacant 
Sports Sold Sold Time Mobile 
Martinizing Box 
Little Roxberry Dollar 
Caesars Juice Cuts 
SV1eet UPS 
Tooth Store 
• 
EXHIBIT 101.1 
• 
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The primary differences between the two valuations 13 follow: 
Cook Jorgensen 
Building A 14 $1,934,51615 $1,181,329 
PadD-Lot6- $2,601,39i16 $995,000 (land) 
Walgreens $1,763,000 (lease) 
Building E-Taco $1,454,37917 $837,004 
Time 
Buildings F-H $3,928,745 18 $3,423,124 
13 These figures are taken from Exhibit 12-21, except that Jorgensen changed his 
valuation for the Walgreen's, once flaws in his analysis became apparent. [R.4187 at 12-
28, 12-31]. 
14 Notably, SA Group's expert Liddell agreed with Cook's highest and best use 
methodology, that the proper method to value Building A was through an income 
approach that disregarded the actual, non-arm's length lease with the fitness club and 
appraised the building as office space. [R.4187 at 106.1, R.3350, 3411-3412]. In doing 
so, both arrived at a virtually identical value of price per square foot of Building A. 
[R.4187 at 106.1 (noting Cook's value at $21 per square foot and Liddell's value at $20 
per square foot]. Jorgensen's value is substantially lower, giving only a value of $11.50 
per square foot based on the non-arm's length lease. [R.4187 at 106.1]. Jorgensen's 
approach was also internally inconsistent - when it suited his purpose to lower the value 
he kept the non-arm's length lease for the fitness club, but then rejected the arm's length, 
actual leases for the other retail property. [R.4187 at 20.15, 3288, 3450-3451, 3453, 
3519-3520]. 
15 Cook's testimony regarding his analysis of Building A is found at R.3450-3451, 
3453-3456, 3488, 3519-3522, 3525-3530, 3586-3587, and the cross examination of 
Jorgensen is found at R.3294-3316, 3912-3925. 
16 Cook's testimony regarding his analysis of Building -D / Lot 6 (Walgreens) is 
found at R.3458-3460, 3474, 3488-3489, 3491, 3504, 3506, 3509-3513, 3516-3517, 
3541-3550, 3579-3580, 3586, and the cross examination of Jorgensen is found at R.3257-
3265, 3273, 3328, R.3857-3858, 3866-3870, 3878-3879, 3888-3894, 3897-3912. 
17 Cook's testimony regarding his analysis of Building E (Taco Time) is found at 
R.3475, 3506-3507, 3530-3541, and the cross examination of Jorgensen is found at 
R.3277-3289, 3322-3323, 3325-3329, 3929-3933. 
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Cook Jorgensen 
Pad I - Lot 11 - JIB $961, 17919 $600,000 
Anchor Pad - Lots 1-2 $3,830,00020 $2,753,000 
Total Valuation (with $14,710,000 $9,800,000 (land) 
final adjustments): $10,568,000 (lease) 
The trial court did not squarely attack Cook's detailed analysis, instead relying 
upon "big picture" critiques, taken from SA Group's cursory proposed findings, many of 
which were lacking in citations to the record, and - where citations were included -the 
citations did not support the proposed finding and were in fact contradicted by the 
evidence and SA Group's own experts. Thus, the trial court's rejection of Cook's 
valuation was in error and must be reversed. 
2. The Trial Court's First Critique is Contrary to the Undisputed 
Evidence That Cook Did Not Value the Anchor Pad as Multi-
Family Housing and Properly Attributed Value to the Jack-in-
the-Box Letter of Intent 
The trial court clearly effed in finding that Cook's valuation was based on 
unsupported and unreliable facts and data. 
18 Cook's testimony regarding his analysis of Buildings F through His found at 
R.3519-3522, 3523-3524, 3545-3548, 3585-3587, and the cross examination of Jorgensen 
is found at R.3289-3294. 
19 Cook's testimony regarding his analysis of Pad I/ Lots 11 & 12 (Jack in the 
Box) is found at R.3474, 3479, 3517-3519, 3530-3541, 3547-3549, and the cross 
examination of Jorgensen is found at R.3267, 3273, 3855-3856, 3866-3867, 3869-3870, 
3881-3888. 
2° Cook's testimony regarding his analysis of Lots 1 & 2 (Vacant Land) is found at 
R.3478-3479, 3492-3497, 3550, 3553-3561, 3579-3584, 3654-3656, and the cross 
examination of Jorgensen is found at R.3323-3325, 3858-3865, 3875-3877. 
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a. The Trial Court Clearly Erred in Finding That Cook Valued 
the Anchor Pad as Multi-Family Housing 
The trial court's first finding that Cook valued the anchor pad of the Highland 
Marketplace as multi-family housing, is clearly contradicted by the evidence. Indeed, 
this finding is expressly contradicted by the testimony of Cook, Jorgensen, and the 
appraisals of both Cook and Jorgensen's appraisal. During the second day of trial, Cook 
plainly testified that he valued the anchor pad as commercial property, not as multi-
family, and that the value, whether commercial or multi-family, was identical. [R.3653-
3654, 3493-3495, 3616-3617]. Cook's appraisal also confirmed that he appraised the 
anchor pads as commercial property, which is how the anchor pad was zoned at the time 
of the foreclosure sale. [R.3654-3656]. 
On the third day of trial, Jorgensen also conceded that Cook did not value the 
anchor pad as multi-family housing, testifying that Cook "did it correctly for the 
anchors": 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
That's an acknowledgment that Mr. Cook did 
not solely rely upon his multifamily unit analysis, 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
anchors. 
Q. 
For the anchors, yes. 
Yes. For the anchors, yes. 
I think he did it correctly for the 
Yeah. And, indeed, Mr. Cook's report 
acknowledges that fact, does it not? 
A. Yes. 
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[R.3858-3859 (emphasis added)]. Jorgensen further confirmed that his second appraisal 
actually recognized that Cook appraised the anchor pads correctly. [R.3858-3859]. 
Despite the fact that all the evidence in the record established that Cook used the 
correct approach to value the anchor pads, the trial court erroneously rejected Cook's 
expert opinion on the baseless finding that Cook appraised the anchor pad as multi-family 
housing. Indeed, it appears the trial court's error arose from its virtually verbatim use of 
SA Group's proposed findings, which were submitted to the trial court before the final 
day of trial in which SA Group's own expert witness established the falsity of SA 
Group's proposed finding number 26(a). [R.3724-3738]. Simply put, the trial court 
committed clear error in finding that Cook's opinions were based on unsupported and 
unreliable facts and data because the trial court's finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Consequently, this Court should reverse the trial court's Findings and Order. 
b. The Trial Court Clearly Erred In Finding That Cook Should 
Not Have Given Value to the JIB LOI 
The trial court's second finding that Cook gave too much value to the JIB LOI21 is 
against the clear weight of the evidence, including the methodology employed by SA 
Group's own appraiser pre-litigation, and is also inconsistent with the trial court's other 
findings. 
As an initial matter, the trial court recognized that the JIB LOI added value to the 
Property, although it found that such value was "marginal ... because the Defendants did 
not have title to the property." [R.3753]. However, in addressing the various expert 
21 [R.3758]. 
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opinions, the trial court properly rejected Liddell's opinion, at least in part, on the basis 
that Liddell gave "no credence[ ] at all" to the existence of the JIB LOI. [R.3752-3753]. 
Curiously, after recognizing that the JIB LOI added at least some value to the Property, 
the trial court subsequently critiqued - and rejected - Cook's opinion, at least in part, 
because it gave "too much value to the 'Jack in the Box' Letter of Intent." [R.3758]. 
Inconsistently, the trial court determined that Jorgensen's valuation was more 
credible despite being subject to the same critique the trial court applied to Liddell's 
valuation: failure to include any value for the IlB LOI. Moreover, the trial court's 
erroneous finding is further compounded by the fact that Jorgensen not only gave no 
credence at all to the IlB LOI, but also because Jorgensen conceded on cross-examination 
that the JIB LOI "reflect[ed] on the potential for the property," i.e., the Property's value. 
[R.3267, 3841-3842, 3884-3885]. 
It is also telling that Cook was the only expert to conduct any due diligence on the 
proposed tenant. Cook did not simply take the JIB LOI at face value or ignore it as did 
Jorgensen and Liddell; instead, Cook performed due diligence on the nB LOI and found 
that the potential tenant was a franchisee of Jack in the Box, that the base terms of the 
lease were determined, and that the probability that the Letter of Intent would tum into a 
lease was high. [R.3518]. In stark contrast, Liddell22 and Jorgensen admitted they did 
22 Despite doing no due diligence on the JIB LOI or even including it in his 
appraisal, Liddell had previously given value to letters of intent when valuing the 
Highland Marketplace in appraisals performed prior to foreclosure and litigation, thus 
conceding that Cook's inclusion of value was within acceptable appraisal standards. 
[R.3407-3408; R.4187 at 15.173 and 16.90]. It is also telling that the appraisal method 
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zero due diligence on the IlB LOI. [R.3267, 3886-3888]. Testimony from Mr. Fox 
confirmed that validity of the IlB LOI, including the quality of the tenant, which had 
developed numerous Jack-in-the-Box restaurants and that this would have been the first 
Jack-in-the-Box in Utah outside of the St. George area. [R.3771-3774, 3786-3788, 4187 
at Exs. 43, 75-76]. This failure to conduct any due diligence is particularly condemning 
of Jorgensen's appraisal, because Jorgensen admitted on cross examination that a rational 
seller would try and get value for a signed letter of intent, and a rational buyer would do 
due diligence on the potential tenant. [R.3881, 3400, 3887-3888].23 
As a result, the trial court's rejection of Cook's opinion was clearly erroneous for 
at least two reasons. First, the trial court inconsistently applied its own standard, 
rejecting one valuation because it provided no value, but adopting a valuation despite it 
also providing no value. Second, the trial court inconsistently rejected the opinion of the 
only expert who attributed any value to the IlB LOI, which value was not arbitrary 
because it was based on due diligence performed on the tenant. 
The trial court's failure to consistently apply its own standard, particularly where 
changed once the litigation was filed, including as reflected in the Client's Instructions 
Flaw. 
23 Obviously, as this Court knows, the fair market value analysis requires an 
appraiser to value "the amount at which property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both 
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Mallinckrodt, 1999 UT 66, <J[ 10. 
Jorgensen's concession regarding the actions of a reasonable buyer and a reasonable 
seller highlight his failure to properly appraise the fair market value of the Property with 
the goal of determining what actions a willing buyer and a willing seller would take. 
Instead, Jorgensen discounted and cut value at every turn in order to arrive at the lowest 
possible value. [R.4187 at 20.15]; [S~e, infra, Section ill(B) 
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the weight of the evidence establishes that the JIB LOI was with a superb franchisee and 
had a high likelihood of becoming a tenant, establishes that the trial court's Findings and 
Order are clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
3. The Trial Court Clearly Erred When it Found that Cook 
Applied Unestablished and Unreliable Valuation Methodologies 
Reflecting the trial court's misunderstanding of the valuation methodologies used 
by all of the experts, the trial court concluded that Cook's appraisal - which was in 
compliance with all the applicable MAI and other standards and which applied the same 
methodologies as SA Group's own experts -relied upon unestablished or unreliable 
valuation methodologies. 
a. Cook Did Not use the Land Residual Method to Value the 
Anchor Pad 
In finding 102(b) the trial court incorrectly found that Cook used the land residual 
method to value "the Anchor Pad .... " [R.3758]. However, this finding, like many of 
the trial court's incorrect findings, is based on SA Group's proposed findings which were 
submitted before the final day of trial and are contrary to the evidence. 
The trial court's finding that Cook's valuation of the anchor pad "was based on 
un-established and unreliable valuation" methodologies is clearly erroneous because it is 
contradicted by the evidence in the record, including the expert testimony of SA Group's 
own expert witness, Jorgensen. As discussed supra, Jorgensen testified that Cook "did it 
correctly for the anchors." [R.3858]. This testimony, standing alone, contradicts the trial 
court's finding that Cook used unestablished and unreliable valuation methodologies to 
value the anchor pad. 
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However, this is not the only evidence that directly contradicts the trial court's 
finding that Cook used the land residual methodology on the anchor pad. To the 
contrary, both Cook and Jorgensen acknowledged that Cook did not use the land residual 
methodology as the trial court erroneously concluded. During cross examination, Cook 
clearly testified that he did not use the land residual method to value the anchor pads but 
used the sales comparison approach: 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
Q. Ancl yo u d o n' t u se th e la nd r es idu a l 
met l1 o cl o l ogy o r t h eo r~y t o p rov id e yo ur o pini o n of 
va lu e ; in steacr, y o u r e l y o n the sa l es c omp a ri so n 
a p p r o ac l1 ? 
A. Co r~rec t . 
[R.3616-3617 (emphasis added)]. Instead, Cook explained that his land residual analysis 
was to simply double check his sales comparison approach. [R.3614-3615]. 
Jorgensen also expressly aclmowledged that Cook did not use the land residual 
method, testifying that Cook "correctly used the land value by direct sales comparison" 
approach and that Cook did not use the land residual method: 
6 
7 
8 
Q. 5 o 11 e cl i cl 11 o t v a l u e t l1 e a 11 c h o r p a cl s u s i 11 g 
t h e l a 11cl r e sid u a l met ll o cl . 
A. Ri g h t. Cor r ect. 
[R.3804-3806 (emphasis added)]. Despite this clear evidence, the trial court erroneously 
concluded that Cook used the land residual method to value the anchor pad. Because the 
trial court's finding is not only against the weight of the evidence, but wholly 
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unsupp01ted by the evidence, the trial court's Findings and Order should be reversed. 
b. Cook Did Not Use a Disfavored Land Residual Technique 
The trial court clearly erred when it found that Cook used a specific type of land 
residual methodology that is disfavored by courts because Cook did not actually utilize 
the disfavored methodology. [R.3758]. One of Jorgensen's principal critiques of Cook's 
expert opinion was that Cook improperly used a type of land residual methodology for 
which "[c]ourts have shown a clear disdain." [R.3802-3803]. Although the trial court 
adopted this critique in finding 102(b ), the finding ignored - and was contradicted by -
Jorgensen's testimony on the third day of trial. In particular, Jorgensen had to concede 
he had made a mistake on cross examination, and that the methodology employed by 
Cook was not the same as the methodology courts disfavor. It became apparent upon 
cross-examination that Jorgensen had not read the definition of the disfavored 
methodology, or had not done so carefully. [R.3854-3856]. When his mistake was 
exposed, Jorgensen conceded that Cook's was "a slightly different technique" and that he 
"acknowledge[d] the point ... that they've said the land residual technique, [that] the 
Courts have disdain [for] ... is not precisely the technique Cook used." [R.3854-3856]. 
Despite Jorgensen's admission, the trial court's findings make no mention of the 
distinction between the disfavored methodology identified by Jorgensen and Cook's 
actual methodology in analyzing the Highland Marketplace. The trial court's failure to 
recognize the distinction between these two methodologies - and the fact that Cook did 
not actually use the disfavored methodology- undermines the trial court's findings and 
establishes that the trial court clearly erred in its rejection of Cook's appraisal. 
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IJP 
v;fp 
Moreover, although there was a dispute regarding what methodology to use for 
Pad I, both Cook and Jorgensen used the same methodology to determine the value of 
Pad D, which had a lease signed by Walgreen's. Indeed, despite Jorgensen's general 
critique of the land residual method, which did not apply to Cook's methodology as 
established supra, Jorgensen admitted that he used the same methodology as Cook in 
valuing Pad D (Walgreen's) and that any critique of Cook's approach also applied to his 
approach: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
Q. (By Mr. Magleby) But, sir, did you not 
use the exact same technique that Mr. Cook used, for 
example, with Walgreens? You forecast out the income 
using the lease that was amended, you deducted 
expenses and made some other deductions, you came out 
with a number at the bottom, and then you applied a 
cap rate with it to come up with your value. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it was similar. 
Oh, okay. All right. 
So for whatever critique you have for 
Mr. Cook's approach, then might it similarly apply to 
yours? 
A. Yes. To that incremental value 
enhancement, it would. 
Q. And so a minor adjustment by you of one of 
these other values could also result in a big 
difference in value. 
A. Yes. 
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[R.3857-3858 (emphasis added)]. Despite this evidence, the trial court incorrectly found 
that Cook's valuation was unreliable, and in doing, so completely ignored the established 
fact that Jorgensen used the same valuation methodology and was therefore subject to the 
identical criticism. 
However, the trial court's disregard of Cook's opinion is even more confusing 
given its finding that Jorgensen's valuation of the Property was "based on established and 
reliable valuation methodologies," which included Jorgensen's use of the same residual 
methodology as Cook regarding the Walgreen's lease. [R.3760]. While Jorgensen's 
testimony makes clear that he used the identical methodology as Cook in valuing Pad D, 
the trial court inconsistently labeled this methodology as being "un-established and 
unreliable" when applied by Cook, but "established and reliable" when used by 
Jorgensen. [R.3758, 3760]. 
4. The Trial Court Clearly Erred by Finding That Cook Did Not 
Value the Property in Its "As Is" Condition 
The trial court erroneously concluded that Cook failed to appraise the property in 
its "as is" condition, as required for a fair market value. [R.3758-3759]. In doing so, the 
trial court cursorily listed seven (7) reasons why Cook purportedly failed to perform an 
"as is" valuation of the Property.24 Astonishingly, in making this sweeping finding, 
24 Another flaw is that none of the reasons given by the trial court as support for 
the conclusion that Cook's appraisal was not "as is," actually relate to this issue - they 
are just critiques of Cook's valuation methodology. Cook met the definition of "as is". 
[R.4187 at 18.187 ("Market Value 'as is' on appraisal date means an estimate of the 
market value of a property in the condition observed upon inspection and as it physically 
and legally exists without hypothetical conditions, assumptions, or qualifications as of the 
date the appraisal is prepared.")]. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
neither the trial court nor SA Group's proposed findings upon which the trial court' s 
finding was based, cite to evidence supporting the conclusory findings. Indeed, there is 
not a single citation to an exhibit or a line of testimony to support this finding.25 Instead, 
it appears that SA Group simply included one of its arguments in the proposed findings 
and the trial court, without properly determining whether it had evidentiary support, 
e1Toneously adopted the finding. However, as discussed below, the trial court's finding is 
wholly unsupported by the record and against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Therefore, this finding should be reversed. 
a. In the First Instance, Cook Clearly Concluded an "As Is" 
Valuation 
The trial court's conclusion that Cook did not reach an "as is" valuation is stark 
and troubling, and casts the remaining balance of the analysis into question. Cook 
indisputably applied MAI and other appraisal standards, and reached an "As Is" 
valuation, as described in his appraisal: 
AS IS 
FOURTEEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($14,710,000) 
[R.4187 at 18.2 (redlines added) and 18.63-18.66, 3491, 3547-3550, 3568]. Notably, 
Cook's appraisal is consistent with "as is" appraisals that are done every day for 
25 Although SA Group's proposed findings included a single footnote ci ting to 
page 18.3 of Cook's report [R.3734-3735], this citation does not support the proposed 
finding and actually ignores page 18.2 of Cook's appraisal, which expressly sets forth the 
"as is" value of the Property [R.4187 at 18.2]. 
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borrowers, lenders, banks, or litigation, and is consistent with the methodologies, 
standards and approach of SA Group's own experts. [R.4187 at 11-11 to 11-14, 10-7].26 
Furthermore, the details upon which the trial court relied are also unsupported or 
contradicted by the evidence, as seen in the following discussion. 
b. Cook's Valuation Was Not Based on the Assumption That the 
JIB LOI Would Be Executed 
In finding 102(c)(l), the trial court found that Cook did not value the Highland 
Property in its "as is" condition because it relied on a letter of intent that "would be 
executed." [R.3758-3759]. However, this finding is clearly erroneous because the 
evidence irrefutably establishes that the JIB LOI had already been executed. [R.3771-
3774, 3857-3858]. Thus, contrary to the trial comt's erroneous finding, the execution of 
the JIB LOI was not an assumption or hypothetical condition. 
c. Cook Did Not Rely on a Zoning Change for the Anchor Pads 
In finding 102(c)(2), the trial court incorrectly found that Cook relied on a zoning 
change for the anchor pads of the Highland Marketplace. [R.3759]. As discussed supra, 
Cook did not actually rely on the zoning change in valuing the Highland Marketplace but, 
instead, appraised the anchor pads as commercial property. [R.3653-3656, 3858-3859]. 
In fact, contrary to the trial court's finding, both Cook and Jorgensen testified that Cook 
"did it correctly for the anchors." [R.3653-3656, 3858-3859]. Instead, Cook properly 
appraised the property in its "as is" state, as unambiguously set forth in his expert report 
and testimony. [R.4187 at 18.2, 18.63-18.66, 3491, 3547-3550, 3568]. Consequently, 
26 Both of SA Group's experts also included assumptions as part of their appraisal. 
[R.3317-3319, 3358-3359]. 
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the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous because it is not only unsupported by the 
record, it is directly contradicted by the evidence. 
d. Cook and Jorgensen Applied the Same Methodology to Pad D 
(Walgreens) 
The trial court's finding 102(c)(3) is based on the erroneous belief that Cook 
improperly relied on the timely construction of a Walgreen's. Once again, as discussed 
supra, both Cook and Jorgensen evaluated Pad Dusing the identical methodology, thus 
requiring that both assumed that a Walgreen's would be constructed in order to properly 
back out costs to determine the actual value of the lease. [R.3595-3596, 3604, 3888; 
R.4187 at 12-7 (noting the assumption based on the Walgreen's lease), 12-26-12-28 
( analyzing construction costs of the Walgreen's)]. Jorgensen even explained that the 
increase in value to Pad D contained in his opinion and that of Cook was not based on the 
hypothetical construction of a Walgreen's, as the trial court erroneously concluded, but 
on the fact that there was an existing lease covering Pad D with Walgreen's that added 
additional value to that piece of property. [R.3869-3870].27 
What the trial court failed to recognize is that the construction of a Walgreen's 
was an assumption that both experts used in order to arrive at the additional value 
27 However, Jorgensen's testimony is also clear that he assumed construction of a 
Walgreen's,just as Cook did, because that is how the valuation of the Walgreen's lease 
should be performed. [R.3887-3893, 3899-3911]. Thus, the trial court's rejection of 
Cook's valuation for assuming construction of a Walgreen's is clearly erroneous because 
Jorgensen took the identical approach. This error appears to stem from the trial court's 
misunderstanding (perhaps based on SA Group's proposed findings) of the proper 
valuation technique for a lease that is in place that still requires construction of a 
building. Indeed, the record makes clear that Cook was not relying on hypothetical 
conditions (just as Jorgensen was not) but was appraising the Property in its "as is" 
condition. 
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generated by virtue of the lease being signed. As a result, the trial court inconsistently 
found Cook's approach to be unreliable but found Jorgensen's approach to be based on 
both reliable and established valuation principles despite the fact that both experts used 
the same methodology based on similar (indeed identical) assumptions. Thus, the trial 
court's determination that Cook's valuation was not done "as is" based on the Walgreen's 
construction is premised first on a misunderstanding of the evidence, which clearly 
establishes the propriety - even necessity - of such an assumption to determine the value 
attributed by the Walgreen's lease, and second, on a complete disregard for the evidence 
establishing that both experts used the same methodology. 
e. Cook's Opinion Did Not Require the Subdivision of Pad I 
In finding 102(c)(4), the trial court found that Cook did not value the Highland 
Property in its "as is" condition because it relied on the subdivision of Pad I into two 
parcels. [R.3759]. However, this finding is a critique without a basis because Jorgensen 
admitted that the subdivision of Pad I was completely unnecessary as a condition to put 
in the proposed Jack-in-the-Box. [R.3881-3883]. In other words, Jorgensen recognized 
that Cook's "assumption" of Pad I being subdivided was not really an assumption at all 
because it did not need to occur for the proposed Jack-in-the-Box to be built. [R.3881-
3883]. Instead, Jorgensen explained that "whether the city approves the subdivision or 
not [is] irrelevant to the analysis." [R.3883]. Despite this clear testimony from SA 
Group's own expert, the trial court erroneously concluded that Cook's valuation was not 
an "as is" appraisal because it was based on the assumed subdivision of Pad I. However, 
because the subdivision of Pad I is "irrelevant to the analysis," the trial court's erroneous 
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conclusion that Cook's appraisal was not "as is" is not supported by the evidence and 
should be reversed. Thus, the trial court clearly erred when it disregarded Cook's 
valuation based, at least in part, on an assumption that was irrelevant to Cook's valuation. 
f. Cook Appraised the Property in its "As Is" Condition. 
Finding 102(c)(7) erroneously states that Cook did not appraise the property in its 
"as is" condition because Cook relied on the entire project being "leased to stabilized 
occupancy." [R.3759]. However, this finding ignores the clear testimony by Cook that 
his appraisal of the Property was an "as is" valuation of the Property, and was not based 
on the stabilized value. [R.3491, 3547-3550, 3568]. In fact, Cook testified that all three 
of the experts performed an as stabilized estimate, but, as with Cook's valuation, the 
stabilized value estimate was not the "as is" appraised value. [R.3491; R.4187 at 11-11 -
11-14 and 10-7]. Consequently, the trial court's finding that Cook did not perform an as 
is appraisal is unsupported by the record and clearly erroneous. 
In sum, the trial court's stated reasons for rejecting Cook's testimony, as set forth 
in finding 102, are wholly unsupported by the evidence. As such, the trial court 
committed clear error because its finding regarding Cook's use of unreliable and 
unestablished methodologies is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 103 REGARDING THE ''LAND REsIDUAL 
MEmoD" IS NOT SUPPORTABLE AND IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The trial committed clear error in finding Cook's valuation unreliable because the 
bases for its findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
In finding 103, the trial court summed up its reasons for rejecting Cook's 
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valuation, stating: 
The Court finds and concludes that Cook failed to use established and 
reliable valuation methodologies, and used, instead, a land residual 
technique not supported in appraisal literature. Cook failed to perform an 
"as is" appraisal of the Highland Property. · He relied upon hypotheticals, 
unsupported and questionable data and facts in reaching his valuation 
which is, therefore, unreliable. 
[R.3759]. As discussed supra, this finding is clearly erroneous. 
First, Cook did not use a disfavored land residual method not supported in 
appraisal literature, but instead used the same methodology as Jorgensen. [See, supra, 
Section G(3)]. Thus, any critique against Cook's methodology applied with equal force 
to Jorgensen's methodology and was not a reasonable basis upon which to reject Cook's 
valuation. 
Second, the finding that Cook failed to perform an "as is" appraisal of the 
Highland Marketplace is directly contradicted by the evidence. [See, supra, Section 
0(4)]. In addition to the evidence directly contradicting this finding, it is also significant 
that neither the trial court nor SA Group's proposed findings provide a single citation to 
the record that would support this finding. [R.3759, 3736]. Indeed, it appears that SA 
Group simply included this argument without any evidence and the trial court adopted it 
without considering the testimony from the third day of trial. Such failure to consider the 
directly applicable and contradictory evidence that Cook did in fact conduct an as is 
appraisal is, in and of itself, sufficient grounds to reverse the trial courts Findings and 
Order. 
Finally, the finding that Cook used hypotheticals, unsupported and questionable 
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data and facts in appraising the Highland Marketplace is wholly unsupported by the 
record. [See, supra, Section G]; [R.3759]. Once again, neither the trial court's Findings 
and Order nor SA Group's proposed findings provide even a single citation to the 
hypotheticals or "questionable" data or facts Cook relied on in appraising the Highland 
Marketplace. [R.3736, 3759]. Indeed, if any experts relied on questionable facts or data 
it was SA Group's experts, who failed to even consider the Walgreen's lease [R.3747] 
until after Cook had already addressed Walgreen's in his rebuttal report. 
III. JORGENSEN'S OPINION OF VALUE WAS BASED ON NON-
COMPARABLE PROPERTIES, REPEATEDLY CONSERVATIVE 
CHOICES, AND OTHER ATTEMPTS TO DRIVE DOWN THE VALUE 
OF THE IDGHLAND MARKETPLACE 
A. DESPITE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, THE PROPERTIES RELIED ON 
BY JORGENSEN WERE NOT COMPARABLE TO THE HIGHLAND 
MARKETPLACE 
Jorgensen's valuation of the Property was also unreliable because it was based on 
properties that were not reasonable comparable to the Highland Marketplace. 
The trial court correctly found that the sales comparison approach is based on the 
principle of substitution, which "requires comparison of an equally desirable substitute 
property." [R.3748]. 
Despite this established principle, Jorgensen selected properties that were not 
comparable to the_ Highland Marketplace, including because they were 20, 40, and 
sometimes almost 50 years older than the subject Property, and were often third 
generation or repurposed buildings that had multiple prior tenants. [R.3454-3457, 3530-
3536, 3554, 3275-3303]. 
49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The most glaring example of Jorgensen's inappropriate comps related to the Taco 
Time parcel. The Taco Time was a brand new build to suit building with an annual rent 
of $130,166 or $56.03 per square foot with very appealing architecture and a modern 
look: 
[R.4187 at 18.70]. 
However, in valuing the property Jorgensen used numerous properties that were 
simply not comparable to the Taco Time. For example: 
• A 30 year old building that was on its second or third tenant and was 
being leased by an independent restaurant called Scaddy's: 
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• 
• 
• 
• A 27 year old building being leased by WingNutz, which was originally 
leased by a flower shop: 
• A thirty year old restaurant called the Blue Finn Sushi Bar that was 
originally a Wendy's: 
[R.4187 at 11-154, 11-156, 11-158]. Obviously, use of outdated and un-comparable 
buildings, with markedly different tenants, and Jorgensen's decision to ignore the most-
comparable property of a contemporaneously constructed Del Taco, was inappropriate . 
[R.3531-3535, 3275-3289]. 
Although none of these properties even pass the look test for being an adequate 
comparable for the Taco Time under the principle of substitution, the dates of 
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construction and rent rates for each of these properties further confirm that Jorgensen 
relied on properties that were not comparable and violate the principle of substitution. 
The below chart compares the rent rates and construction dates of the three 
"comparables" to that of the Taco Time: 
Pro~er(I Rent Per Sg. Ft. Construction Date 
Scaddy's $21.00 1979 
Blue Finn $24.07 1982 
Wing Nuts $22.00 1984 
Taco Time $56.03 2010 
In light of this information, the properties relied on by Jorgensen can hardly be deemed to 
be proper "comparables" for the Taco Time. This is especially true given that the trial 
court found that Jorgensen relied on properties that were older, inferior in appearance, 
and also did not look as modem or as good as the Highland Marketplace. [R.3759-3760]. 
While the trial court erroneously concluded that Jorgensen compensated for these 
variations, such a finding is clearly erroneous because comparables must "be as similar as 
possible." [R.3305-3306]. 
B. JORGENSEN DROVE DOWN THE VALUE OF THE HIGHLAND 
MARKETPLACE BY USING UNSUPPORTED AND UNREASONABLY 
CONSERVATIVE CHOICES 
The trial court also erred in adopting Jorgensen's valuation of the Property 
28 [R.4187 at 11-153 - 11-158]. 
29 [R.4187 at 18.38]. 
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because Jorgensen repeatedly drove down his appraised value by relying on unsupported 
and ultra-conservative choices. By repeatedly making conservative, lender friendly 
determinations of value, Jorgensen's valuation violates the well-established law in Utah 
that the fair market value is "the amount at which property would change hands between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell 
and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Mallinckrodt, 1999 UT 66, 
<j[ 10. 
Although Jorgensen's appraisal is replete with conservatism, and Cook identified 
numerous instances, some examples follow. 
First, in Cook's expert report discussing Jorgensen's valuation, he found that the 
major factors that go into valuing a property all had downward adjustments in 
Jorgensen's valuation, which resulted in a lower fair market value of the Property than 
was credible. [R.4187 at 20.15]. While SA Group challenged Cook's assessment of 
Jorgensen's adjustments during cross examination, suggesting that Cook highlighted only 
the downward adjustments and ignored other upward adjustments, Cook boldly and in 
dramatic fashion challenged SA Group's counsel to "show me one" upward adjustment. 
[R.3597-3598]. SA Group's counsel could not meet the challenge and identify a single 
upward adjustment by Jorgensen. [R.3597-3600]. 
Second, Jorgensen used the rents from each of the outdated buildings discussed 
supra to determine a market rent rate, rather than using the actual rent being paid by the 
Taco Time tenant on the date of the foreclosure sale. Jorgensen concluded that market 
rent was $32 per square foot and completely disregarded the fact that the actual rent 
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being paid by the tenant at the time of the foreclosure sale was $56.08 per square foot. 
[R.4187 at 18.38, 3524-3530, 3288-3289]. 
Third, Jorgensen gave more value to the building of a building ( which can be done 
by any competent contractor), than he did to obtaining a Walgreen's lease (which are 
very hard to come by, and exceptionally valuable).30 Despite recognizing that there are 
any number of general contractors that can build a building and not just anyone can get a 
Walgreen's lease, Jorgensen allocated nearly $400,000 more in value to simply 
constructing a building than to obtaining the lease. [R.4187 at 12-27 - 12-28]. As 
Jorgensen admitted (after some resistance): 
Q, Yep. So any general contractor can build 
a building, but not just anyone can get a Walgreens 
lease. ~ould you agree with that? 
A. Yeah. 
[R.3902-3905]. 
Fourth, Jorgensen further reduced the value of the Highland Marketplace by 
applying a 25% discount to the Walgreen's lease, despite the fact that it called for 
$363,000 in rent over the course of 75 years, and a rational seller would not agree to such 
a discount. [R.3906-3912]. The application of this discount violates the requirement that 
30 As Cook ( and others) testified, and as found by the trial court, the highest and 
best use of Pad D was a Wal.greens; the lease was for 75 years with a monthly rent of 
$30,250, there was a valid lease at the time of the foreclosure sale, the lease "was a 
legitimate marketable right that added value," Walgreens had a market cap of over $34 
billion as of 2012. [R.3747]. Even SA Group's expert witnesses admitted that 
Walgreens was an exceptional and unusually strong tenant. [R.2187, 2699, 4187 atl0-
110, 3460, 3510-3511]. 
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the fair market value of the property be based on a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
reflects in essence a "double counting" of discounts, and reflects yet another attempt by 
Jorgensen to drive down the value of the Property. [R.3458-3460, 3458-3460,3510-
3517]. 
Finally, and ironically, the trial court's decision to ignore Jorgensen's consistently 
downward adjustments is inconsistent with the trial court's critique of Liddell for doing 
the same thing: 
70. The Court finds that each of Mr. Liddetrsjudgments regarding the property were 
conservatively made resulting in an appraised value that is not credible. [See Trial Transcript, at 
299:17•300:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
[R.3751 (emphasis added)]. 
IV. APPELLANTS REQUEST THEIR ATTORNEY FEES IF THEY PREY AIL 
ON APPEAL 
For the reasons noted, this Court should reverse the judgment against Appellants 
in whole. Upon so doing, Defendants would be entitled to all or some of their costs and 
attorney fees below and on appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 57-1-32. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's Judgement 
and Findings and Order, and remand with instructions to allow Defendants to file and 
proceed with the proposed amended complaint. 
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DATED this 7th day of April 20 6. 
ATAXINOS & GREENWOOD 
James E. Magleby 
Kennedy D. Nate 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
Highland Marketplace, L.C.; High Noon, L.C.; 
Solana Beach Holdings, L.C.; Thomas A. Hulbert; 
and Bret B. Fox 
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of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, 
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FILED 
MAY 2 0 2014 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY t 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
SA GROUP PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HIGHLAND MARKETPLACE, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company; HIGH NOON, 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
SOLANA BEACH HOLDINGS, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company; THOMAS A. 
HULBERT, an individual; and BRET B. 
FOX, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Ruling on Motion for Leave to Amend 
and Motion to Extend Fact Discovery 
Date: May 16, 2014 
Case No.: 120401312 
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
---·-------------------------------------
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend and 
Defendants' Motion for Extension of Fact Discovery. For the reasons explained below the 
Motion for Leave to Amend is denied. The Motion for Extension of Fact Discovery is denied as 
moot. 
Litigation Timeline 
The sequential history of pleadings and discovery in this case is relevant to the present 
motion. Plaintiff, SAGP, served the initial complaint on August 20, 2012. The complaint 
alleged breach of the loan agreement and breach of the guaranty agreement. Defendants filed an 
answer to the complaint on September 19, 2012. On March 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion for 
summary judgment. The motion focused on the fair market value of the Highland Property at the 
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time of default and the amount of the debt owed at that time by the Defendants. Prior to the first 
motion for summary judgment, Defendants were represented by Durham Jones & Pinegar. 
Shortly after the summary judgment motion was filed, on March 13, 2013, James Magleby, of 
Magleby & Greenwood, entered an appearance as substitute counsel for Defendants. Mr. 
Magleby prepared the memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
Briefing on the motion for summary judgment was completed on May 14, 2013 and the Court 
heard oral argument on the motion June 21, 2013. Neither party addressed accounting issues in 
the summary judgment briefs or at oral argument. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of the 
affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants. The Court denied in part the motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the affirmative defenses. (Memorandum Decision 7/2/2013). 
Defendants filed the first motion for extension of fact discovery on October 11, 2013. 
Briefing was completed November 5, 2013. The Court granted the motion and extended fact 
discovery to February 28, 2014. (Ruling and Order 11/19/2013). 
The first motion for leave to amend was filed by the Defendants on December 23, 2013. 
The motion was based on discovery received through September 25, 2013 and addressed failed 
draw requests. (Memo in Supp. Of First Motion to Amend at 4). Defendants withdrew the first 
motion to amend after fact discovery had closed. (Notice of Withdrawal of Defendants Motion 
for Leave to Amend 3/5/2014). 
Defendants filed the current motion for leave to amend on March 10, 2014. The motion 
requests leave to amend the Answer filed in 2012 and to assert counterclaims against SAGP. 
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Defendants also filed a motion for extension of fact discovery on March 10, 2014. The motion 
to extend is dependent on the Court granting the motion to amend. On March 24, 2014, the 
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to both the motion to amend the answer and the 
motion to extend discovery. Defendants replied on March 31, 2014 and the Court heard oral 
argument on the motions May 6, 2014. 
Motion to Amend 
After responsive pleadings are closed, "a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." UT. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a). Utah courts consider the following factors in deciding 
whether to grant a motion for leave to amend: ( 1) timeliness of the motion, (2) prejudice to the 
opposing party, and (3) whether the amendment is justified. Swan Creek Viii. Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122, ~20 (Utah 2006); Turville v. J&J Properties, L.C., 2006 UT 
App. 305, ~31. The court can also consider additional factors such as whether the amendment is 
futile or made in bad faith. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 
1282 (Utah 1998). 
Timeliness 
A motion to amend is "typically deemed untimely when it is filed in the advanced 
procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of discovery, on the eve 
of a scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been entered." Kelly v. Hard 
Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, ~29 (UT. App. 2004). The present case was filed August 20, 
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2012. The Plaintiff motion for summary judgment was denied and the affirmative defenses 
asserted by Defendants were dismissed. (Memorandum Decision, July 2, 2013). The Court has 
already granted one extension of fact discovery which ended February 28, 2014. (Ruling and 
Order, November 19, 2013). Expert discovery is currently underway. Although there is no trial 
date set, significant procedural stages in the litigation process have been completed. 
The timeliness prong also requires the court to consider whether the moving party was 
previously aware of the substance of the new allegations and whether the amendment would 
delay trial. Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). The proposed 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim is based on allegedly failed draw requests and a resulting 
failure to make property tax payments. Defendants argue that the amendment is necessary 
because new information on the draw requests was discovered in documents recently produced 
by plaintiff, SAGP. (Memo. in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend at 4). The amended 
answer and counterclaim relies on five documents: (1) the October 28, 2009 Draw Request; (2) 
FCB's Ledger; (3) FCB's Advance Distribution Summary dated 11/4/09; (4) FCB's Loan 
Approval Form dated 12/1/10; and (5) an email string dated April 19-20, 2010 ("2010 Hulbert 
Email"). SAGP produced these five documents between April 9, 2013 and September 25, 2013. 
(Memo. in Opp. to Motion for Leave to Amend and Extend Fact Discovery, Background of 
Relevant Fact No. 30). Defendants reviewed all documents produced through September 25, 
2013, including the five key documents, prior to filing the first motion to amend on December 
23, 2013. (Memo in Supp. Of First Motion to Amend at 4). The memo in support of the first 
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motion to amend is based on "First Community Bank and US Bank's refusal to fund draw 
requests made in August 2010." (Id.) Because the first motion to amend was based on the draw 
request issue, Defendants can not claim that they just learned of the failed payments. Defendants 
were aware of the funding problems as early as 20 I 0, as evidenced by the draw request, loan 
forms, and 20 IO Hulbert Email. This was well before the case began and the Highland Property 
was foreclosed. 
Plaintiff produced documents nine times throughout the discovery period. (Transcript of 
May 6, 2014 Hearing, 8: 11-12). Multiple document productions may make discovery 
investigation more complex, but do not justify the Defendants' failure to assert the counterclaim 
before the present motion to amend. The complaint, answer, and summary judgment arguments 
focused on the "fair market value of the real property subject to foreclosure and on which the 
amount of any claimed deficiency must be based." (Def. Memo. in Supp. Of Rule 56(f) Motion 
at 4). Despite Defendant's knowledge of the failed draw requests, discovery on the draw 
requests was not pursued even after the extension on fact discovery was granted. The motion to 
amend is untimely based on Defendants' previous knowledge of the failed draw requests and the 
completion of significant procedural stages in the case. 
At oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties stipulated to dismiss 
the following affirmative defenses: estoppel and waiver, unjust enrichment, lack of standing, 
failure to mitigate damages and offset, self-infliction of damages and unavoidable circumstances. 
(Memorandum Decision July 7, 2013 at pg.7). The ruling of the Court is the governing law of 
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the case. Defendants argue that because the defenses are supported by the recently produced 
evidence on Draw Request 23 it is proper to reassert waiver and estoppel, unjust enrichment, 
failure to mitigate damages and offset, self-infliction of damages and unavoidable circumstance. 
As explained above, there is evidence that the Defendants knew draw requests had failed prior to 
receiving the most recent discovery. Defendants stipulated to the dismissal of the affirmative 
defenses with knowledge of the failed draw requests. Summary judgment was granted and there 
is insufficient justification to reintroduce the affirmative defenses at this stage in the litigation. 
Prejudice 
The prejudice prong of the analysis requires the nonmoving party to show more than 
simple prejudice or the need for further discovery. Prejudice requires that "the opposing side 
would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated/or which he had not time 
to prepare." Kelly, 87 P.3d 724, ~31 quoting Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 
(Utah 1992). Litigation has focused on two main issues up to this point: ( 1) the fair market value 
of the Highland Property and (2) the amount of the debt owed by Defendants. (See Complaint, 
Answer, Memorandums in Support of and in Opposition to Summary Judgment, and the 
November 19, 2013 Ruling and Order). The motion to amend is accompanied by a motion to 
extend fact discovery. Plaintiff has voiced the need to interview former FCB and Highland 
Marketplace employees, review documents which were previously considered to be irrelevant, 
and conduct additional discovery if the motion to amend is granted. (Plaintiff's Memo in Opp. 
at 22-23). If the Court granted the motion to amend and extended discovery, the case would be 
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further delayed and any potential recovery due the Plaintiff would be postponed. The resulting 
prejudice to the Plaintiff is not unavoidable because an extension would give the Plaintiff time to 
prepare to litigate the new issues. 
The Court can deny the motion to amend even without a finding of undue or unavoidable 
prejudice. "A district court acts within the bounds of its discretion when it denies leave to amend 
for 'untimeliness' or 'undue delay.' Prejudice to the opposing party need not be shown also." 
Kelly 87 P .3d 734, ~42 quoting First City Bank, N .A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F. 
2d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1987). The Defendants had prior knowledge of the substance of the 
claims asserted in the Motion to Amend, fact discovery in the case has already been extended 
once, the Court has issued a ruling on summary judgment, and expert discovery is underway. 
The motion to amend is not timely and can be denied even though the Plaintiff would not 
experience undue prejudice if it were granted. 
Justification 
The justification factor focuses on "whether the moving party had knowledge of the 
events that are sought to be added." Swan Creek, 134 P.3d 1122, ,r22 quoting Kelly. 87 P.3d 
734,132. In addition to a party's prior knowledge, Utah courts consider whether the motion was 
filed as the result of a dilatory motive, bad faith, or unreasonable neglect. Kelly at 138. The 
requirements for finding a dilatory motive, bad faith, or unreasonable neglect have not been 
defined, but the Utah Court of Appeals has determined that "where the party's knowledge was 
minimal, or where it was instead based on suspicious or inconclusive evidence, the party's 
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decision to hold off on pleading those allegations until reliable confirmation could be obtained 
should not serve as grounds for procedural default." Swan Creek, 134 P .3d 1122, ,I22 quoting 
Kelly at ~38. 
There is no evidence that Defendants acted with a dilatory motive or bad faith. 
Defendants argue that there is no unreasonable neglect because "[ w ]bile Defendants were 
obviously aware of some of the events that are implicated in the proposed counterclaim (i.e. the 
fact that some funds were not actually disbursed), they were not in possession of the evidence 
which substantiated the new claims and clarified which draws were not actually funded until 
Plaintiffs recent document productions ... " (Defendants Memo in Supp. at 9). Defendants had 
more than minimal knowledge of the failed payments long before the most recent discovery was 
received. The companies knew that some of the Draw Requests failed as early as 2010. The 
current motion to amend relies on draw requests, loan forms, and emails produced by Plaintiff 
and reviewed by Defendants prior to the first motion to amend being filed in December 2013. 
No further "reliable confirmation" was necessary to include the allegations in a previous 
pleading, yet Defendants did not raise the issue of accounting or draw requests in the answer or 
in response to the motion for summary judgment. The issue of the failed draw requests is not 
new and Defendants acted with unreasonable neglect when the issue was not raised in prior 
pleadings. Based on Defendants previous knowledge, the motion to amend the answer and 
counterclaim is not justified. 
Conclusion 
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Because the Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend is untimely and not justified, the 
motion is denied. The need for extension of fact discovery described in the Motion for 
Extension of Fact Discovery is predicated on an amendment to the pleadings requested in the 
Motion for Leave to Amend. Inasmuch as the motion to amend has been denied, the Motion for 
Extension of Fact Discovery is denied as moot. 
Copies of this Order distributed to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Steven T. Waterman 
Nathan Seim 
DORSEY & WHITNEY 
136 South Main Street, STE 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
James E. Magleby 
Kennedy D. Nate 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, STE 850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Mailed this_ day of May, 2014, postage pre-paid as noted abo . 
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• 
• 
• 
James E. Magleby (7247) 
maqleby@mqpclaw.com 
Kennedy D. Nate (14266) 
nate@mqpclaw.com 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C . 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3605 
Telephone: 801 .359.9000 
Facsimile: 801.359.9011 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
SA GROUP PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Minnesota corporation, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF 
LAW, AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HIGHLAND MARKETPLACE, LC., a 
Utah limited liability company; HIGH 
NOON, LC. a Utah limited liability 
company; SOLANA BEACH HOLDINGS, 
LC., a Utah limited liability company, 
CR V MAIN-MAIN, LP., a Delaware 
limited liability partnership; THOMAS A. 
HULBERT, an individual and BRET B. 
FOX, an individual, Case No. 120401312 
Defendants. Honorable James R. Taylor 
Based upon the pleadings and papers on file with the Court and the evidence 
and arguments presented at trial of this matter, the Court hereby enters these Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (the "Deficiency Action 
Statute"), under which "the court shall find the fair market value of the property at the 
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date of sale," and providing that if the fair market value (or "FMV") of the property at the 
time of the foreclosure exceeds the debt, then the foreclosing party shall have no 
recovery against the borrower or guarantors. See Utah Code § 57-1-32. The 
Deficiency Action Statute is based upon an important public policy purpose ''to protect 
the debtor, who in a non-judicial foreclosure has no right of redemption, from a creditor 
who could purchase the property at the sale for a low price and then hold the debtor 
liable for a large deficiency." Capital Assets Fin. Svs. v. Jordane/1 Dev., LLC, 201 OUT 
App 385, ,I 8,247 P.3d 411. 
The Court has heard evidence relating to the fair market value of the subject 
property from three appraisers, two from Plaintiff SA Group Properties, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or 
"SA Group") and one from Defendants. 
Plaintiff called two expert witnesses to testify regarding the fair market of the 
Highland Marketplace: Kerry M. Jorgensen ("Mr. Jorgensen") and Darrin W. Liddell 
("Mr. Liddell"). As the Plaintiff, SA Group has the burden of proof, but has not met its 
burden. 
Mr. Liddell's testimony did not meet SA Group's burden of proof because (among 
other things) he admitted on cross-examination that he valued the property using only 
the income approach and in a certain way because he was instructed to do so by his 
client, SA Group; that the approach he used was inconsistent with how he would 
evaluate this property 95% of time; that he would have used a different approach if his 
client had not told him what to do; and - critically- that if he had used a different 
approach, the value of the property would have been higher. Mr. Liddell did not use the 
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sales comparison approach, which as explained by Mr. Cook would have shown that his 
valuation was too low. Since fair market value, by definition, incorporates the concept 
of highest and best use and highest value under appraising standards, with these 
admissions the Court cannot rely upon Mr. Liddell's valuation. 
Mr. Jorgensen's testimony did not meet SA Group's burden of proof because 
(among other things) he failed to properly consider the value of an existing lease with 
Walgreen's; improperly substituted a lower "market rent" for existing leases on the 
property; consistently chose comparables that were of a different age, type or use and 
therefore had only marginal applicability as a valuation tool when compared to the new 
construction of the subject property; improperly applied a bulk discount; and consistently 
chose downward adjustments on every aspect of his work. 
Plaintiff's two appraisers reach inconsistent conclusions, further undercutting the 
credibility of their valuation analyses. For example, Mr. Jorgensen levels numerous 
criticisms against Mr. Cook which apply with equal force to Mr. Liddell's analysis, 
including the decision by both Mr. Cook and Mr. Liddell to value the first floor of Building 
A using a market rate analysis instead of the existing but non-arm's length lease. 
Similarly, Mr. Jorgensen critiques Mr. Cook for failing to use the cost approach, but Mr. 
Liddell also did not use the cost approach (and as noted did not use the sales approach 
either). Were the Court to accept Mr. Jorgensen's critique of Mr. Cook, it would reject 
Mr. Liddell's analysis for the same reasons. And the Court cannot accept Mr. Liddell's 
work because, as noted, he admitted that he applied an analysis dictated by the client 
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and which resulted in a lower- but unquantified -value than if he had independently 
chosen how to appraise the property. 
Defendants called Philip Cook ("Mr. Cook") as an expert witness to testify 
regarding the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. The Court finds Mr. 
Cook's analysis thorough and credible, including (among other things) Mr. Cook's 
decision to use the existing leases for valuation purposes (but only after validating this 
conclusion by conducting a separate market rent analysis), Mr. Cook's analysis of 
comparable Walgreen's transactions, and his sales comparison analysis based upon 
the sale of other shopping centers. 
It is also notable that much of Mr. Cook's analysis is supported by Mr. Liddell, 
and that these two appraisers disagree with SA Group's primary witness Mr. Jorgensen. 
For example, Mr. Cook and Mr. Liddell agree that the cost approach is not appropriate 
for the subject property, agree that the highest and best use of the first floor of Building 
A is retail space, and conclude a very similar market rent rate for that property. 
Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof, and the Court accepts Mr. Cook's 
valuation that the Property had a fair market value of $14,710,000, as of May 22, 2012. 
Accordingly, under the Deficiency Action Statute, Plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery 
against any of Defendants, who are the prevailing parties. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Parties and Witnesses 
1 . Plaintiff SA Group Properties, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or "SA Group") is a 
Minnesota corporation and an assignee of U.S. Bank National Association ("US Bank"). 
4 
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2. US Bank is the successor-in-interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, as receiver of First Community Bank ("First Community"). 
3. Highland Marketplace, LC. ("Highland") is a Utah limited liability company 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. High Noon, LC. ("High Noon") is a Utah limited liability company with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Solana Beach Holdings, LC. ("Solana") is a Utah limited liability company 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
6. Thomas A. Hulbert ("Mr. Hulbert") is an individual who resides in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
7. Bret B. Fox ("Mr. Fox) is an individual who resides in Summit County, 
Utah. 
The Highland Marketplace Loan 
8. On or about September 5, 2007, Highland, High Noon, and Solana 
entered into a Construction Loan Agreement with First Community that governed the 
terms of a $28,000,000 line of credit (the "Loan Agreement"). 
9. In connection with the Loan Agreement, Highland, High Noon and Solana 
executed a Promissory Note, dated September 5, 2007, in favor of First Community and 
in the principal amount of $28,000,000 (the "Note"). 
10. Mr. Hulbert entered into a Commercial Guaranty with First Community (the 
"Hulbert Guaranty") pursuant to which he "absolutely and unconditionally guarantee[d] 
5 
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full and punctual payment and satisfaction of the Indebtedness of ... all Borrower's 
obligations under the Note and Related Documents." [Hulbert Guaranty at 1]. 
11. Mr. Fox also entered into a Commercial Guaranty with First Community 
(the "Fox Guaranty"), pursuant to which he "absolutely and unconditionally guarantee[d] 
full and punctual payment and satisfaction of the Indebtedness of ... all Borrower's 
obligations under the Note and Related Documents." [Fox Guaranty at 1]. 
12. Highland, High Noon and Solana executed a Construction Deed of Trust 
dated April 27, 2007 in favor of First Community, as Trustee, and First Community, as 
Beneficiary, to secure certain obligations owing to First Community (the "Original Deed 
of Trust"). [See Original Deed of Trust]. 
13. The Original Deed of Trust contains an express Power of Sale clause and 
was recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office on May 3, 2007, as entry number 
65863:2007. [See id.]. 
14. On or about September 5, 2007, the prior obligation owing to First 
Community by Defendants, as secured by the Original Deed of Trust, was replaced by 
the Loan Agreement and Note, and in connection therewith, the Original Deed of Trust 
was modified by that certain Modification Deed of Trust dated September 5, 2007 (the 
"Modified Deed of Trust" and, together with the Original Deed of Trust, the "Deeds of 
Trust11). [See Modified Deed of Trust]. 
15. The Modified Deed of Trust was recorded with the Utah County 
Recorder's Office on September 21, 2007, as entry number 138163:2007. [See 
Declaration of Timothy N. Scheer ("Scheer Deel."), tJ 17]. 
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16. Pursuant to the Deeds of Trust, Highland, High Noon, and Solana granted 
First Community, among other things, a first position deed of trust lien on certain real 
property located in Utah County, Utah (the "Highland Marketplace" or the "Trust 
Property"), the legal description of which is set forth below: 
PAJlCELl: 
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4'R)Stl4° But 48.6 fea(I; dleace North 41t311n1' East 112.836 &et; tlumm Westffl.OD 
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tu edsdllgllfglnray Stafe Route7.CJ dlacc&atfl4°3G'2'r'Wat(ldpwayl,earlal) 17730 
reetaloilg 181d Waterlyrlgbt ofVfflyfeace Um to polatoftaageacywltla a30.GO-faot 
radbu mrve to tbleft; tlaenee Sndnrestcrly44S rm amgdto arc or_. cane (Notei 
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lOO.lJ reetto.• point 45.GO feet perpeDCUcaladf cllltaDt Nortll.erly ftam said cmdel' Ihle at 
l!Dafneer~ffl+G0.00; 111.eDceSo:atb W40'00-Wat(Jdpwayboarla.t)3S2.58feet 
aloDg a lm.apanDel to said camrol BBC totlleWestedyboudaey of said adln tract; tlleace 
So1dla (oqull lfalnra, South GO 06825-West)l9.69 feet almagald Waterlyboadary line 
ID trio pofatGf'bq:fnnJna 1UlahDWD GD tile Offltla1 Map of said project 01l Diem Ille OfD.ceof 
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Quarter ofSectiina 36, To'fhlSldp 4 Solltl,Ruge I Butt Bait Lake Base &mp; Meridian. 
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atoagsald SolltherlybDIIIUluJ fence Dneto • feace comer; thace codalD1 But (eqaals 
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feet alGq ntd WatcdJ~ofwayfev.cellne to apolntof taApHJwftlla 30.00-laot 
radlasaneto tuldt; tfleaa~4UPfeet alongtlaearcofsaldcane (Note: 
Chord 1:osald cane bean Soldl& 4'7°05'14"Westllr adfstam:e of 40.60 r.)to a polat 58.00 
feet perpeadfctllarly dlsaut Norturt., from tll1 cantrol llu of sald project atlmgfaeer 
Siatfon 296+16.58; dwu:o Soda 8'°40'00-West (highway bemJII) 476.SSfeet afoDg a 11119 
panJW COtald collD'OJ lfAel tbaco&rad& 86048'15" Wesa (llpway bearbla) 100,12 feut to a 
pof:Dt45.IO f'ed perpeadkalaJrlydlstatNoltltrly 6om said ester Ina at Baghtea-Statlon 
291100.IO; illcmt Soldll 8'°40TWeat(ldpwa)'bcarblg) 353.58 fCllal~ a Jiu panDel 
to l&lcl co1ltrol llne tit tb w...i, bcnmdmyof afd enttretract; tbmce SoiltJI (equall 
laiglrftySodl.D°06'25" Wea) 19.6' fNtalDJllsald WestatyhcnQMlary liaeto 111.epmatof 
Ltegfaalna asslowa oa die omdal Map of said proJecto• file bl the Ofllee of the Utah 
J>ep.arfmcnt of Trusporlath,a. 
PARCEL21 
Comme11ctua 2058.93 tectEastumgthe Section 1111G mid 536.52 feet &u•1o a feace comer 
mul SomhS°'I' West2103 fed froal the Northwest Coner of Sedlma 36, Townsbtp 4 SOl1dJ., 
Ran191i£ut,SdLAbBaseadl'tierJdJa;tlltiuceSod.~WestJ14fataloD1•iau:e 
amt 1b West Dae of a :rvad to afimc:ocomer; dlcmeeSollda 89°51'Wcstfff.O fat dmg a 
fella; dllDce Nord& 007' But314flet; thence Norda 89951' Bast 995.S feet to tbe pof:lrtGC · 
beclRnlq 
PAJlCEL3: 
A pared ollaDd f.ocatcd. la Secaioll 3', Towmllp 4 ~Baugo I Ead,Sal&LekeBua ad 
Meridla, commendng at a pol1lt i. d&o Eater)y-ltmdary of 8Coaerf.dp hbdlvilfa, 
aCClGl'dlzlgto tldOftldal Plattbaeof an ma at Cha Of8ceort11ellecenlllr1 Utala Onmty, 
Ut8' tbpobd laelaa tile mt,cncctln or a rma Hao whh tfm &mcrly ba11J1cb.,Ty otsald. 
suhdhtsfan, whlda paint has ~ofXlEat) 1:11 l.f19Jm.52 feet and 'Y' (Noi'tb) a 
'765.015.53 feetJ re&rre41o tie VtahCoordbaafe System, CeatrfllZoue, tl&e pomtalso belas 
Soatla 145.81 feet nd But 1045.19 lecC,,grld dlstaaeel-rtom tle Nonhwest Corner Meridfaa 
(the secdbll &Ge bavblga beadns of Soda 08'13" West, SOlttherly from said sedkm 
conaes-); tbestcel'btls 07'40" West t.Ofi feet aloq m Basterly bomulary of llhlStoaaldge 
Sahdlvlstoa; thence Nonh 11031'2<1" East 218.15 reet aloug tile Easterly bot:mdary or said 
Stoncrldgo SUbdiYWou. to a pdatwldch It Iatemctcd by a feace Dae; thma North 
89021'04" Eut.ao2J>5 lect aJqa fencnllae to a poJJlt (a 51&n rcbar set); tbeuc SMth 
02016"Wat20U9 feet to a ~la tlze.Nor6esty llOJDSdar., oftht CrockdtDIW~ 
b., property (S'ltt relm set); daeace Soutla W)9' West44U7 leetaloJ11tb NOl'tltq 
llomulsrJ.of hid Oodrett Devdopnaaat.lec. property to tie pabat Gf begh,obt& 
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1:-. 416.51 Cut to a poblt or~ 6tate Norttaeastedy a1o111 tbe arc or a30.09 foot 
ndla C111VG to tile left a dim.Dea ot 44.59 fcet(c:tldral aoal• eqoalt 85°09'33" ud loq 
cbOl'a ban Nord&4'°°5'14" But40.60 feet iG a pulDt of tqoc.y on 1le Westerty lfneof 
State JDglwtay74 as It oiats at 54.tO footllalf..widtla; thnce Nortb .f'JO'f7" Etstl76.34 
feet (172.836 feetrecml) atoq adtlWesterlylDeto a point on 1he projedfml of aa exfs&g 
bomulary Dae feace (said hrelipe behagthesame fence as desai!JedJn hrcel I ofdsat 
certain Spedll W:ammtyDcecl recorded 15 Mardi, 1985 aa lnstnlmeDtNo."3'7 ID Baok 
2203 at P11p1 ffl ad 298 oftlae OCldal ltecordl ol'Otall ccnmty, 'Uta.la); tbacD Nortla 
89041100• But 1.49 feet dmgthe proJectloa af wd fencellDe. to llleSolltlaeulerly COl'Pel' DI 
said Special WanutyDeed; dMmc:reNordl 5"01100~ Eut52'.98 feet along said deld lllle 1b 
die boDdarf at A1pla w-, Plal • A.11 S'Gbdl911hm;1bmu:e aloiq salcl Sub41:visloa bOUllltary 
tbttoJJowlqtwo cnnes: Soda ar24t50" Weat14'34 feet to the So11dlwest Comll' 
thereof, aad Nortfl 4°48'50" ~ LU feet• a polat oa the proJectfoo. of 111l mstlDg 
boudaly Ice race; tlaen•Sntla 89021'52" West825.Sl feet ~Ill sa&I a1st1J18 tcmcellne 
to lb• Easterly~ of Stouddp Sabdlvlsloll Plat "A" A.mended; thence aJcmg said 
Eamrly 210.15 feet; Soa6 0°07'40" Kut 315.06 fed; South 8"54'l0" Wea 69.67 feet; and 
Sontk 0o06'W Wat 208.06 f'eettotlao Nordl Imo of State Blgbway '2 u It msts at45.09 
Coot Mlf.wJd.th;111em:e North 8'°40'00" :Eat 61.54 feet a'°"I said Nord& HIie to dte pobltd 
b9DD'nl. 
[See Scheer Deel., 'J 18]; [See also Exhibit 5, at 5-9- 5-12]. 
17. On or about January 28, 2011, the New Mexico Financial Institutions 
Division closed First Community, and FDIC was named as receiver of First Community 
("FDIC-R"). [See Scheer Deel., 'J 19]. 
18. FDIC-R sold substantially all of First Community's assets, including the 
Loan Agreement, Note, Hulbert Guaranty, Fox Guaranty and the Deeds of Trust 
(collectively, the "Loan Documents") to US Bank, such that US Bank obtained the rights 
to enforce the Loan Documents. [See Scheer Deel., 1120]. 
19. On May 21, 2012, US Bank assigned to the Plaintiff in this case, SA 
Group, its interest in the Loan Documents, specifically including the Deeds of Trust, as 
reflected by the Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded with the Utah County Recorder's 
Office on May 22, 2012, as entry number 42508:2012 (collectively, the "Assignments"). 
[See Scheer Deel., 1124]. 
10 
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20. Defendants failed to make certain payments that were due under the 
terms of the Loan Agreement, Note, Hulbert Guaranty, and Fox Guaranty. [See Scheer 
Deel., ,i 25]. 
The Trustee's Sale 
21. On May 22, 2012, the Trustee of the Highland Marketplace sold the 
Highland Marketplace to a third party in accordance with state law and the terms of the 
Deeds of Trust and other loan documents. [See Scheer Deel., ,i 26]. 
22. The Trustee's Deed contains recitals relating to the exercise of the Power 
of Sale contained in the Deeds of Trust and the sale of the Trust Property. [See Scheer 
Deel., ,I 27]. 
23. At the time of the foreclosure sale, the amount owing to SA Group by 
Defendants under the Note and Loan Documents was $14,685,370.37, which consisted 
of$13,390,939.93 in principal, including $246,914.33 for the payment of past due real 
estate taxes; $633, 160.49 in interest; late charges of $655,269.95; costs incurred for 
appraisal and environmental reports in the amount of$6,000.00; plus the additional 
accrual of attorneys' fees and costs as allowed under the Loan Documents. [See Scheer 
Deel., ~ 28]. 
24. At the foreclosure sale, the Trust Property was sold to a third party for the 
amount of $8,565,000.00. [See Scheer Deel., ~ 29]. 
25. Since the foreclosure sale, interest has accrued on the deficiency balance 
owed to SA Group after the sale of the Trust Property at the rate of 6.25%, which rate is 
comprised of: (a) the Prime Index Rate, as set forth in the Note, which rate has 
11 
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remained at 3.25% since December 16, 2008; I plus (b) the additional 3.0% default rate, 
as set forth in the Note. [See Scheer Deel., 1131]. 
26. On or about October 2, 2012, SA Group received $177,896.00 from Len 
Stillman of Stillman Consulting Services, who was appointed the Receiver of the Trust 
Property on December 14, 2011, by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth Judicial 
District Court Judge for the State of Utah, Utah County, Case No. 110403100, and 
which receivership terminated on August 15, 2012. SA Group applied this payment to 
further reduce the principal amount owing to SA Group by Defendants. [See Scheer Deel., 
1132]. 
The Highland Marketplace 
27. The Highland Marketplace is located at the northwest corner of the Alpine 
Highway and Timpanogos Highway in Highland, Utah. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.1]. 
28. The Highland Marketplace has good linkage to 1-15 on the Timpanogos 
Highway and the Alpine Highway runs into American Fork. [See Trial Transcript, at 310:25-
311 :9 (Mr. Cook)]. 
29. Highland is an area with higher end homes, with a population that has 
purchasing power, such that they can afford to go out to dinner and support restaurants 
and retail stores. [ See Trial Transcript, at 311:10-17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
30. Although there is competition from a Kohler's across the street, and 
Highland has Sunday closing laws, if someone wants to do business in Highland they 
have to be at the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 311 :18-312:8 (Mr. Cook)]. 
12 
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31. Highland is a growing city that had a lot of optimism in the market as of 
May 2012. [See Trial Transcript, at 313:11-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
32. The Highland Marketplace was fully entitled as of May 2012 and contained 
the following horizontal improvements: utilities, water, sewer, gas, power, curbing and 
gutters, sidewalks, and roadways. [See Trial Transcript, at 314:20-317:13 (Mr. Cook)]. 
33. The Highland Marketplace also had various vertical improvements, 
including buildings on Lots 3, 7, 8, 9, & 10. [See Trial Transcript, at 317:18-318:6 (Mr. Cook)]; 
[See also Exhibit 18]. 
34. The buildings in the Highland Marketplace are good quality buildings, are 
architecturally pleasing, and typical of what is built today for good quality retail and 
office type buildings. [See Trial Transcript, at 319:2-5 (Mr. Cook)]. 
35. The construction quality of the buildings is good and the condition of the 
buildings is also good. [See Trial Transcript, at 319:5-6 (Mr. Cook)]. 
36. The Highland Marketplace is uniquely located, as it is at the only 
commercial intersection in Highland City. [See Trial Transcript, at 251 :7-10 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
SA Groups Expert Witnesses 
37. SA Group called two expert witnesses to testify regarding the fair market 
of the Highland Marketplace: Kerry M. Jorgensen and Darrin W. Liddell. 
38. Kerry M. Jorgensen ("Mr. Jorgensen") is the principal of Jorgensen 
Appraisal, Inc. Mr. Jorgensen has a bachelor's degree from the University of Utah in 
finance with a real estate emphasis, is MAI certified, and is a Certified General 
Appraiser in the State of Utah. [See Trial Transcript, at 29:19-30:6 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
13 
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39. Mr. Jorgensen has been an appraiser for approximately 36 years. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 31 :13-14 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
40. Darrin W. Liddell ("Mr. Liddell") is the owner of the lntegra Realty 
Resources franchise in Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Liddell has a bachelor's degree in 
finance and a master's degree in business administration, both of which come from the 
University of Utah. [See Trial Transcript, at 180:21-24; 182:7-11 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
41 . Mr. Liddell is also a Certified General Appraiser for the State of Utah and 
is MAI certified. [See Trial Transcript, at 180:23-181 :3; 181 :18-20 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
Defendants' Expert Witness 
42. Defendants called Philip Cook ("Mr. Cook") as an expert witness to testify 
regarding the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. 
43. Mr. Cook is a commercial real estate appraiser with approximately 35 
years of experience and is the principal and owner of J. Philip Cook and Associates, 
LLC. [See Trial Transcript, at 280:13-17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
44. Mr. Cook obtained his bachelor's degree in finance from the University of 
Utah in 1980. Mr. Cook completed an MBA in 1982, also at the University of Utah. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 280:20-25 (Mr. Cook)]. 
45. Mr. Cook has also taught appraisal classes on Real Estate Appraisal 
Principles and Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice for the Appraisal 
Institute, which promulgates education and standards for appraisers and sponsors the 
MAI designation. [See Trial Transcript, at 282:3-19 (Mr. Cook)]. 
14 
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46. Mr. Cook has served in all the local office positions for the Appraisal 
Institute, including as the President of the Utah Chapter of the Appraisal Institute. Mr. 
Cook has also served as a regional representative and sat on the National Board of 
Directors for the Appraisal Institute. [See Trial Transcript, at 283:1-7 (Mr. Cook)]. 
47. Mr. Cook has served as a board member and as Chairman of the Utah 
State Appraiser Board, which works with the Utah Division of Real Estate to oversee the 
licensing and professional oversight of appraisers in the State of Utah. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 283:11-15 (Mr. Cook)]. 
48. Mr. Cook has been qualified as an expert witness on real estate appraisal 
related issues in both federal and state courts, and has appraised such shopping 
centers as Provo Towne Center, University Mall, the Riverwoods development, Fashion 
Place Mall, the City Creek project in downtown Salt Lake City, the Gateway mall, and 
numerous other big box, neighborhood, and strip centers. [See Trial Transcript, at 284:8-
285:4 (Mr. Cook}]. 
The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and 
The Appraisal of Real Estate 
49. The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"} are 
a set of standards promulgated by The Appraisal Foundation that have been adopted by 
Utah into its state appraiser regulations. [See Trial Transcript, at 35:2-7 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
50. USPAP is one of the authoritative publications on appraising real estate. 
[ See Trial Transcript, at 287:14-16 (Mr. Cook}]. 
15 
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51. The Appraisal of Real Estate is the most recognized and commonly used 
treatise by appraisers and is considered authoritative. [ See Trial Transcript, at 287:10-16 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
Appraising Value 
52. Appraisers do not merely appraise the value of real estate. Instead, 
appraisers appraise property rights, including lease rights. [See Trial Transcript, at 466:20-
25, 467:17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
Highest and Best Use 
53. In determining the fair market value of a property an appraiser must 
determine the highest and best use of the property. [See Trial Transcript, at 290:18-25; 
291:14-292:5 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 121]; [See Exhibit 122]. 
54. Highest and best use is defined in The Appraisal of Real Estate as "the 
probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property that is physically 
possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest 
value." [See Trial Transcript, at 290:6-9, 20-22; 291 :14-292:5 (Mr. Cook}]; [See also Exhibit 121]; [See 
Exhibit 122]. 
55. Highest and best use may also consider a zoning change that is 
reasonably probable. [See Trial Transcript, at 60:6-8 (Mr. Jorgensen}]. 
56. The highest and best use of the Highland Marketplace is considered both 
as if vacant and as improved. [See Trial Transcript, at 319:25-320:9 (Mr. Cook)]. 
16 
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• 
• 
57. On an as-vacant basis, the highest and best use for Pad I would be to 
construct a Jack in the Box restaurant consistent with a signed Letter of Intent with Jack 
in the Box. [ See Trial Transcript, at 320:19-321 :6 (Mr. Cook)]. 
58. For the anchor lots, Lots 1 and 2, the highest and best is to develop 
apartments or commercial buildings. [See Trial Transcript, at 321 :7-12 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also 
Exhibit 18, at 18.22]. Although Mr. Cook initially analyzed these lots as containing 
apartment buildings, he also did a separate analysis of Lots 1 and 2 as commercial 
property and concluded that the value of Lots 1 and 2 as commercial property was the 
same as if they included apartment buildings. Stated differently, the extraordinary 
assumption that Lots 1 and 2 could be rezoned and have apartments constructed does 
not affect the appraised value of the Highland Marketplace because the value of the 
land for multifamily or commercial is the same. [See Trial Transcript, at 336:8-337:23 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
59. On an as-improved basis, the highest and best use is to operate the 
center as an integrated economic unit to maximize value because shopping centers are 
typically bought as integrated units. [See Trial Transcript, at 321 :20-322:17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
60. Although Mr. Liddell agrees that the highest and best use of the Highland 
Marketplace is to use it as an integrated unit, he inconsistently treated the Property as 
individual parcels in his appraisal: 
HIGHEST AND BEST USE AND VALUE TYPES 
LiddEII Jorgensen Jor~·="=sen;;.;..R;.a.;ebu= tt=al ___ ---=-
Overall Caiter Sell as individual parcels Operate as a whole Operate part and sell part Operate asa whole 
Building A Retail and office Industrial type fitness center Industrial type fitness center Retail and office 
·_W_al.:;..~een_ s _____ Lea_ sed_ (b_u_t n_ot_leased) Non-exis:ait Possbly leased Leased 
17 
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[See Ex. 103, at 103.1); [See also Trial Transcript, at 330:2-9 (Mr. Cook)]. 
61. The highest and best use is not to sell each building or tax parcel 
separately: ~ 
20 Q. Why not -- or isn't the highest and best 
21 use to sell each building or tax parcel separately? 
22 A. It's not. 
23 Q. Why not? 
24 A. It doesn't maximize value. It doesn't do 
25 anything for you. Shopping centers are typically 
1 bought as integrated units. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 321 :20-322:1 (Mr. Cook) (emphasis added)]. 
62. It is not typical for a shopping center to be valued as separate parcels 
because shopping centers are sold as a whole and most of the time the seller only 
wants to know what the whole property is worth without knowing the individual 
components. [See Trial Transcript, at 228:6-21 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
63. Mr. Liddell admitted that he has used the separate parcel approach only 
about five percent (5%) of the time when appraising shopping centers and that most 
shopping centers are not appraised in individual parcels: 
18 
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• 
. . 
9 A. Host -- most shopping centers that I 
10 appraise, we do not value them in individual parcels. 
11 Q. All right. And , in fact , you would say 
12 maybe about 5 percent of the time you would use this 
13 approach; is that right? 
14 A. That's reasonable. 
15 Q. All right. And is one reason you 
16 typically wouldn 't do it this way is because shopping 
17 centers are sold as a whole? 
18 A. Shopping centers are sold as a whole, but 
19 most of the time they want to know what the whole 
20 thing is worth without knowing the individual 
21 components. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 228:9-21 (Mr. Liddell) (emphasis added)]. 
64. The reason Mr. Liddell used the separate parcel approach in this case 
was because he was instructed to do so by US Bank. [See Trial Transcript, 229:24-230:20 
(Mr. Liddell)]. 
Highest and Best Use of Lot 3, Building A 
65. Both Mr. Cook and Mr. Liddell disagreed with Mr. Jorgensen, and 
concluded that the highest and best use of Building A is as a retail space, not a fitness 
center: 
16 Q. So did you determi ne that the building A 
17 space would have a use other than as a fi tness 
18 center? 
19 A. I felt that the property should be -- on 
20 the main level it should be leased as retail space. 
21 Q. And so you disregarded the Newport Sports 
22 lease as if it did not exi st? 
23 A. That's what I did, yes . 
*** 
19 
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20 Q. With regard to building A. why not use a 
21 fitness center as the highest and best use for 
22 building A? 
23 A. I thought it was more indicative of a 
24 retail space that would be very similar to the other 
25 retail spaces in the center. 
1 
2 
Q. And the one right next door perhaps? 
A. Yes. 
*** 
254 
1 Q. Understood. And have you already told us 
2 what you have to say as to why you determined that 
3 the first floor of building A should be retail as 
4 opposed to a fitness club? 
5 A. Well, I -- fitness club is just a use. 
6 It's not the building. Hr. Jorgensen makes it the 
7 building, and it's not. So it's a retail building 
8 designed for retail use. Sure, you could lease it if 
9 there was an arm's length fitness center that wanted 
10 it at a market rent. You could lease it for that 
11 use, but it's not typical for that. 
12 Fitness centers want mirrors on the walls. 
13 Well, if you've got all this glass on the outside of 
14 that building, you don't have a place to put mirrors. 
15 So it's not a good fit for a fitness center. That 
16 was a stopgap measure, remember. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 192:16-23; 253:20-254:2 (Mr. Liddell); 362:1-16 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 20, 
at 20.9); [See Exhibit 106, at 106.1]. 
66. Both Mr. Cook and Mr. Liddell disagreed with Mr. Jorgensen, and 
concluded that because the lease on Building A was not an arm's length lease, it should 
be disregarded in determining the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 192:21-23; 251 :19-252:5 (Mr. Liddell); 362:1-362:15 (Mr. Cook)]. 
20 
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Highest and Best Use of Lot 6, Pad D 
67. The highest and best use of Pad Dis to construct a building based on the 
Walgreen's lease between Highland, High Noon, and Solana, on the one hand, and 
Walgreen Co. ('Walgreen's"), on the other, that was executed on October 13, 2010. 
[See Exhibit 31]; [See also Exhibit 18, 18.21]. 
68. The Walgreen's lease was for a seventy-five year term. [See Trial Transcript, 
at 353:4-7 (Mr. Cook)]. 
69. The Walgreen's lease called for a monthly rent of $30,250 for a total 
annual rent of $363,000: 
2. 
Tenant.shall pay rent for the Leased Premisea, es follows: 
(a) A fixed rent of $301250.00 per month, commencing on the Posseaion Date (u defined U\ 
Section J(a) hereo.f) and continuing thereafter for the remainder of the Term (as defined in Section 3(a) 
hereof). Fixed rent shall be payable on the first day of each and every month ln advaooe and shall bo 
properly apportioned for any period less than a fuU calendar month. 
[See Exhibit 31, at 31.3 (emphasis added)]. 
70. Although the initial lease required a completed building to be delivered to 
Walgreen's by no later than June 1, 2012, the First Amendment to Lease ('Walgreen's 
Amendment") amended the date by which a building had to be completed and delivered 
to Walgreen's by changing the deadline to October 1, 2013. [See Exhibit 31 ]; [See also 
Exhibit 36]. 
71. The Walgreen's lease is a legitimate marketable right that adds value to 
the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 316:17-21, 466:22-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
21 
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72. Walgreen's is a very credit worthy tenant and was a company with a 34 
and a half billion dollar market cap as of 2012. [See Trial Transcript, at 352:219-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
73. As of May 2012, there was a year and a half left to build the Walgreen's. 
The Walgreen's building would have taken only taken about six months to construct. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 351 :19-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
74. Despite the existence of the Walgreen's lease and the Walgreen's 
Amendment, Mr. Jorgensen did not separately value Lot 6, Pad Dor consider the 
Walgreen's lease associated with that Pad in determining the fair market value of the 
Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 99:15-20 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
75. Mr. Jorgensen admitted that at the time he performed his appraisal he was 
not even aware of the signed Walgreen's lease. [See Trial Transcript, at 99:25-100:8 (Mr. 
Jorgensen)]. 
76. SA Group had the Walgreen's Lease and the Walgreen's Amendment in 
its possession but did not provide it to Mr. Jorgensen for his initial appraisal. [See Exhibit 
31); [See also Exhibit 36). 
77. Although Mr. Liddell was aware of the Walgreen's lease at the time of his 
appraisal, he believed that the lease had expired and did not include any value for the 
lease. Instead, he simply appraised Pad Das vacant land: 
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• 
• 
• 
11 Q. All right. And with regard to the 
12 Walgreens lease, I just want to make sure I 
13 understand. By the time you did your analysis of the 
14 Walgreens pa rcel , you believe the lease had expi red 
15 and so your valuation includes in it the need to go 
16 and get a new lease signed; is that right? 
17 A. Ye..s.... 
18 Q. All right. And so basically ou a raised 
19 it as vacant land usi ng sales comparison: is that 
20 right? 
21 A. In its as-is condition, yes. 
22 Q. All right . And there was no upward 
23 adjustment reflecting the Walgreens lease with regard 
24 to parcel D, correct? 
25 A. I valued the fee si mple interest for 
Sh~et 61 
241 
1 parcel D. 
2 Q. I just want to make sure. So there was no 
3 upward ad justment applied for the Walgreens lease, 
4 correct? 
5 A. ~ That would be a leased fee value. I 
6 gave a fee simple value . 
[Trial Transcript, at 240:11-241 :6 (Mr. Liddell) (emphasis added)]. 
78. SA Group had the Walgreen's Amendment in its possession but did not 
provide it to Mr. Liddell. [See Exhibit 31]; [See also Exhibit 36] . 
79. Mr. Cook is the only expert to appraise the value of the Highland 
Marketplace with the Walgreen 's lease. [Compare Exhibit 18 with Exhibits 10 & 11]. 
Highest and Best Value of Lot 11, Pad I 
80. The highest and best use of Pad I is to construct a building based on the 
Jack in the Box Letter of Intent between Highland, High Noon, and Solana, on the one 
hand, and Vinod Mehta ("Mr. Mehta"), on the other, that was executed on May 14, 2012, 
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shortly before the foreclosure sale. [See Exhibit 75]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 320:19-321 :6 
(Mr. Cook)]. 
81. Mr. Cook performed due diligence on the Letter of Intent and found that 
Mr. Mehta was a franchisee of Jack in the Box, that the base terms of the lease were 
determined, and that the probability that the Letter of Intent would turn into a lease was 
high. [See Trial Transcript, at 360:4-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
82. The Jack in the Box that was the subject of the Letter of Intent would have 
been the first Jack in the Box in northern Utah. [See Trial Transcript, at 361 :9-11 (Mr. Cook)]. 
83. Mr. Jorgensen did not include the Jack in the Box Letter of Intent in his 
appraisal. [See Trial Transcript, at 115:13-15 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
84. Mr. Liddell admitted that at the time he performed his appraisal he was not 
aware of the signed Jack in the Box Letter of Intent. [See Trial Transcript, at 242:10-17 (Mr. 
Liddell)]. 
85. However, Mr. Liddell has used letters of intent to determine the value of 
the Highland Marketplace in previous appraisals, including letters of intent from T-
Mobile and Dollar Cuts. [See Trial Transcript, at 249:3-25, 250:15-20 (Mr. Liddell)]; [See also Exhibit 
15, at 15.173]; [See Exhibit 16, at 16.90]. 
86. Both T-Mobile and Dollar Cuts subsequently became tenants in the 
Highland Marketplace. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
Consistently Conservative Conclusions 
87. Mr. Liddell and Mr. Jorgensen are also consistently conservative in their 
conclusions of the Highland Marketplace's value. [See Trial Transcript, at 299:17-21 (Mr . 
Cook)]. 
88. Mr. Cook summarized Mr. Liddell 's conservative conclusions as follows: 
ISSUE 
\loluolion of tM highest ond best US@ 
al the property 
Ommission of the S,JJes comp.:srison 
opprooch 
Mork<'t Rent - In-line 
Morket Rent - Office 
Morket Rent - F ost Food 
C.pit.lli::.:ition Rote, - In-line, 
C.pibli:.ilion Rote - Walgreen's 
wpit.lli::.:ition Rote - fast Food 
Rent Oifferenti..11 An.ll)'SH 
As Is \lolues - In-line 
As Is \lolue - W.ilgr..,,'s 
Lind \laluolion - Pod Srtes 
Lind VoJu,tion - Anchor P,d 
Bulk Sole 
Subdivision Analysis- \loc:.,nt Llnd 
[See Exhibit 19, at 19.23]. 
INTEGR.\ CONCLUSION SUMMARY 
ff'll:EGRA CONC[USION 
OR T.RfATMENT 
F.1ils. to rkangml:e- th• smgie- 1ntegr.Jte-d economic narure of th• subject .ltld 
volu..s the prop@rty .:u ind,viduol dev<'lopm.nt porC<!ls. follow.d by • bulk 
s.ale discount 
F.1ils to de\<elop th• s.Jles comp.1rison .ippor.Jch for the impro\'ed p.1ds • 
which ln most C:J.SeS, would h.1ve .1ded .lS .1 check .lgJ-inst the .u. is values 
both b.iore ond oilor applying obnormolly high le,..,...up deductions to ~ 
subili:.d volues 
Comp.u.1bles indic.3ted ,1 m.:irket rent .1bove wh.1.t w.ll concluct..d for this 
sn;1ce 
The comp.1r.1.btes. lntegr.1. used suggest .1 m.1tl::et rNit .1bo\ .. what \V.U 
concluded for this spoce 
Most: comp.u.lble.s were not of s.irnil.1t build to suit buildin~ .1nd th•refore 
did not represent the inv..-...tment .1nd e..~ect~d return on the investment 
~Kt.cl in th• le;u.e, r.1t•. 
lndude-s .1 t.J.ble of c.ipit.lli=.J.tion r.1tes th.it bl.lnket V.Jrious rebil investments 
.1.nd concludes to the ,3ver.1ge. Tue most re-cent .1:nd comp.1r.1ble 
c.1pibli.:.ltion r.ote comp.1r.1.bles in the s.ime bble indic-i.1te .1 lowM 
e.10ibli=.:ition rnte. 
Usc,s ol~r salts d.lt.l th.it does not reflc,ct wmml trc,nds, ond oversbles the, 
c.1oiU.li:.1tion r.1te. 
Concludes to .1 c.:iprllli=.J.tion r.J.!e th.1t is higher th.1n suppon:~ by the 
comoorobles. 
Usu on orbitr.:,ry discount r,t~ to esubli>h the, pre<@nl volue of differences 
between contr.1ct Jnd nl.lrket rent hvhich is often undersLJtedt 
Applies • rent loss period "ith no rnorl.et support \\hich olso ex1ends b.)'<>nd 
the sut.d pros!Wdi,•• stn.bili::.:ition dote. 
Foils to ocoount for the v,lue odd.d for ha,ing, signed l•o<@ by Wolgtffn's. 
who is iust w3itina for the buildin~ to be constructed . 
Foils to fullr ~ velop ond undersbnding of the, comp.:uobl..s used ond odjus! 
prope~y fro them_ Also includt'S multiple soles th.it ore not refledh• of pod 
site s.iles. and still concludes be-lO'w their sugge,st-ed v.1llff. 
lnexeusobly volues ~ onchor pod .,. two sepor,te porcels os they .lTe 
le,golly subdi\'ided, .ilthough , buyer ond user of th.lt Llnd would us. them 
togeth<'T. OJ'ld then applies o bulk sole discount_ Concludes \\~II below th<' 
s·-ested \·.1lue, of the, oomo.1r.1bles. 
Suasests thot the proper!)' is not one economic unrt ond furtl,u d iscounts the 
deoressed v.1lues without m.1rket suocx:>rt 
F.1ils to recogni::.• the imporbnce of the .1.nchor p.1-d to the r-t-m.11nd.-r of tM 
de\'elopment .lS well .is the j oint m.1rketing .1nd e~'-J>OSUfe- period tfut could 
be hod bv both the ,nchor ond the pod,. 
25 
DIREcrlON OF 
VALUE FAVORED . 
Do\\nw.ud 
Do•, .. TIW.lfd 
Downw.lf'd 
Do"n·.v.1rd 
Do,,11w.1Td 
Do,,11w.1rd 
Downw.lrd 
Do,,nwJrd 
Down,,-.1rd 
Do\\llWMd 
Do,,nwMd 
Oo,,nwJ.rd 
OO\\TIW J.ld 
Do\\TIW.Jrd 
Do,,nw .ud 
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89. Mr. Cook summarized Mr. Jorgensen's conservative conclusions as 
follows: 
ISSUE 
Valuation of the highest and best use 
of the property 
Land Valuation 
Cost Aooroach 
Income Caoitalizaiton Aooroach 
Market Rent - Pad A 
Market Rent - Fast Food 
Property Rights ·"'djustment 
Sales Comparison Appraoch 
[See Exhibit 20, at 20.1 5]. 
JORGENSEN CONCLUSION SUMMARY 
JORGENSEN CONCLUSION 
OR TREATMENT 
Fails to reconginize that the rear pad retaiVoffice building is just that, and not 
a fitness center although it is currently occupioed by a fitness tenant. Also, 
fails to include the proposed Walgreen's in the valauation. 
Trea.ls subject as raw, unentitled, and unimproved land, ignoring tha.t is fully 
lolatted and imoroved. 
Based on insuooortedlv low estimates of reolacement cost 
Fails to recnonize income from a shmed Walv:reen's lease. 
Analyzes the Pad A building as it is a fitness center. \\11ich is incorrect. and 
concludes a market rent well below the buildings design and potential. 
:\II comparables were not of similar build to suit buildings and therefore did 
not represent the investment and expected return on said investment 
,elected in the lease rate. 
Uses arbitrary discount r.1tes to establish the present value of differences 
between contract and market rent, which is not reflective of the proeprties 
highest and best use and the way properties transact 
Fails to use comparable property sales, specifically with the inclusion of 
fitness center sales. 
DIRECTION Of 
VALUE FAVORED 
Downward 
Downward 
Downward 
Downward 
Downward 
Downward 
DoMnvard 
Downward 
90. Mr. Liddell used cap rates developed from actual income and applied 
I 
them to the market rent concept resulting in artificially low value. [See Trial Transcript, at 
299:17-300:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
91. In addition, Mr. Liddell took an additional ten percent (10%) discount by 
incorrectly applying the bulk sale discount. [See Trial Transcript, at 299:1 7-300:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
92. In short, each of Mr. Liddell's judgment calls were conservatively made 
resulting in an appraised value that is not credible. [See Trial Transcript, at 299:17-300:12 (Mr. 
Cook)] . 
93. Mr. Jorgensen likewise made repeated conservative adjustments, such as 
including a thirty percent (30%) profit discount to the Walgreen's lease when the correct 
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,.::., 
\//JI 
adjustment should have been between five and ten percent. [See Trial Transcript, at 300:13-
301 :14 (Mr. Cook)]. 
94. Mr. Jorgensen then makes another downward adjustment of twenty-five 
percent (25%), which results in an even further reduction in the Highland Marketplace's 
value. [See Trial Transcript, at 300:13-302:7 (Mr. Cook)]. 
95. As with Mr. Liddell's judgment calls, Mr. Jorgensen is consistently 
conservatively in his adjustments, resulting in an appraised value that is not credible. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 300:13-302:7 (Mr. Cook)]. 
96. While Plaintiff challenged Mr. Cook's assessment of the adjustments 
made by Mr. Liddell and Mr. Jorgensen, suggesting that Mr. Cook highlighted only the 
downward adjustments, Mr. Cook challenged Plaintiff's counsel to "show me one" 
upward adjustment. [See Trial Transcript, at 440:6-441 :15]. 
97. Plaintiff did not identify any instance where Mr. Jorgensen or Mr. Liddell 
made an upward adjustment. [See generally Trial Transcript]. 
98. Even if there was such an instance, the Court finds that the consistent 
downward adjustments made by both Mr. Liddell and Mr. Jorgensen undermine their 
appraisals such that their proffered values ~re not credible. 
Scope of the Appraisal 
99. While portions of Mr. Liddell's analysis and reasoning agree with Mr. Cook 
(and disagree with Mr. Jorgensen), Mr. Liddell's ultimate valuation conclusion suffers 
from a critical flaw, based upon the scope of his appraisal. 
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100. The role of an appraiser is to be an impartial market observer or analyst 
who interprets real estate markets and works independently of a client. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 285:23-286:6 (Mr. Cook)]. 
101. Although an appraiser may receive client input, there are limits on the 
amount of direction an appraiser can accept from a client and it is the appraiser's 
responsibility to define the scope of work based on the intended use and the intended 
user or users of the appraisal. (See Trial Transcript, at 235:12-19 (Mr. Liddell); 307:11-19 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
102. This responsibility is set forth in USPAP: 
365 SCOPE OF WORK RULl:j 
366 For each appraisat appraisal re\ie,,\ and appraisal consulting assignment, an appraiser must: 
367 1. identify the problem to be solnd; 
368 2. determine and perform the scope of work necessary to den-lop credible assignment results; and 
369 3. disclose the scope of work in the report. 
370 An apprais.r must properly identify the pJ-oblem to be soh·ed in ordei· to determine the appropriate 
371 scope of work. The appraiser must be prepared to demonstrate that the scope of work is sufficient to 
372 produce credible as~on.ment results. 
(See Exhibit 126, at 126.1 ]; (See also Trial Transcript, at 307:20-308:11 (Mr. Cook)]. 
103. An appraiser may not accept assignment conditions that limit the scope of 
work to such a degree that the assignment results are not credible: 
419 An appraiser must not allow assignment conditions to limit the scope of work to such a degree that the 
4.20 assignment result.s are not credible in the con ten of the intended use. 
[See Exhibit 126, at 126.2]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 308:14-25 (Mr. Cook)]. 
104. Nor is an appraiser allowed to let the intended use of an assignment or a 
client's objectives cause the assignment results to be biased: 
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4:?S An appraiser must not allow the intended use of an assignment or a dienf s obje<"rins to cause the 
429 assignment results to be biased. 
[See Exhibit 126, at 126.2]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 309:1-5 (Mr. Cook)]. 
105. In this case, it was the appraisers' responsibility to research factual and 
market data necessary to support an understanding of the Highland Marketplace, to 
support the highest and best use analysis, and to perform the approaches necessary to 
value the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 309:6-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
106. In addition, 
2. USPAP requires that the scope of work be tailored to the intended use of the appraisal. 
Accordingly, it is critical that the appraiser understand the intended use of the appraisal. In this case, 
the intended use was for "'financing purposes." Although inconsistent with the USPAP requirement 
that market value is always based on highest and best use, the lender may have wanted an ultra-
conservative view of uvalue" and instructed lntegra (inappropriately) on how to value the property to 
get that result. Since it is the appraiser's - and specifically not the client's - responsibility to 
determine the scope of work, lntegra erred in accepting an assignment condition that led to 
misleading results. 
[See Exhibit 19, at 19.5 (emphasis added)]. 
107. In appraising the Highland Marketplace, Mr. Liddell did not determine the 
scope of the assignment but instead did what the client requested: 
25 Q. (BY MR. MAGLEBY) nAnd do you have any 
230 
1 input into whether you think it ought to be by parcel 
2 versus one property maybe with the pad separated out 
3 or do you just do what the client tells you?" 
4 Answer, "I will -- I will do what the 
5 client is requesting with the scope of the 
6 assignment." 
7 Was that my question, was that your 
8 answer? 
9 A. Here, ves. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 229:25-230:9 (Mr. Liddell) (emphasis added)]. 
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108. Despite Mr. Liddell's obligation to determine the scope of the assignment, 
he admitted that but for the Bank's instruction, he would have valued the shopping 
center as one economic unit: 
. . 
17 Q. But for the Bank's instructions, would you 
18 have valued lots 1 and 2 together or the entire 
19 center as one unit? 
20 A. If they only wanted the one project,_!_ 
21 would probably have valued it as a shopping center, 
22 as an economic unit. But since I had the pieces, 
[See Trial Transcript, at 255:17-22 (Mr. Liddell) (emphasis added)]. 
109. Mr. Liddell admitted that he has used the separate parcel approach only 
about five percent (5%) of the time when appraising shopping centers and that most 
shopping centers are not appraised in individual parcels: 
9 . . A: Host -- most shopping centers that I 
10 appraise, we do not value them in individual parcels. 
11 Q. All right. And. in fact, you would say 
12 maybe about 5 percent of the time you would use this 
13 approach: is that right? 
14 A. That's reasonable. 
15 Q. All right. And is one reason you 
16 typically wouldn't do it this way is because shopping 
17 centers are sold as a whole? 
18 A. Shopping centers are sold as a whole, but 
19 most of the time they want to know what the whole 
20 thing is worth without knowing the individual 
21 components. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 228:9-21 (Mr. Liddell) (emphasis added)]. 
11 0. Mr. Liddell violated the principles of USPAP by accepting the instruction to 
value the Highland Marketplace as separate pieces: 
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• 
• 
• 
3 Q. (BY MR. MAGLEBY) Based on the testimony 
4 and what you saw, Mr. Cook , is it your opinion that 
5 Mr. Liddell violated the USPAP? 
*** 
16 A. I -- I believe that it violates the 
17 standard relative to highest and best use, which is 
18 the highest use that -- the highest value number. 
19 There's four tests of highest and best use. The last 
20 one is maximally productive. And by assuming that 
21 this is going to be parcelled off and sold as 
22 individual properties by a buyer -- so a buyer 
23 discounts heavily the price so that the buyer can 
24 make profit by selling individual components is not 
25 in accordance with highest and best use. So I don 't 
Sheet 3 6 
415 
1 believe that it reflects market value. 
2 Q. If -- and if Mr. Liddell made those 
3 decisions based on the client instructions, is that 
4 contrary to your understanding of the applicable 
5 standards or maybe the science part of your analysis? 
6 A. Yes . The determination of scope of work 
7 is left up to the appraiser -- should be. It's the 
8 appraiser's responsibility under USPAP, considering 
9 the intended use and intended users. 
10 And in this case and this intended use 
11 specific to this case, I would say that that's a 
12 violation. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 414:3-5, 414:16-145:12 (Mr. Cook) (emphasis added)]. 
111. Indeed, Mr. Liddell admitted that if he had not appraised the Highland 
Marketplace the way US Bank instructed him to do it, the appraised value of the 
Highland Marketplace would have been higher: 
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11 Q. (BY MR. MAGLEBY) In this instance, 
12 Mr. Liddell, did you do it this way because it was at 
13 the request of the client? 
14 A. To not include any building improvements 
15 on the pad site, yes. 
16 Q. Yes. 
17 A. They wanted me to value as-is with those 
18 pad sites as vacant. 
19 Q. All right. And in addition, I think you 
20 told me you had -- earlier you had valued it a 
21 different way, but they told you to do it this way 
22 this time so you did that way. 
23 A. When you say "this time,n I've appraised 
24 it --
25 Q. I'm sorry. The May 2nd -- the March 2012 
235 
1 appraisal, the May 2012 appraisal. 
2 A. So they wanted it the same as the 
3 September 2011 appraisal, to follow the same 
4 methodology; so going back in time, I'm not sure what 
5 I'm answering here. I'm sorry. 
6 Q. All right. If you had valued it with an 
7 anchor buildin, as the had on occasion asked ou to 
8 do previously, would the value have been higher? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Almost certainly, right? 
11 A. Yes. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 234:11-235:11 (Mr. Liddell) (emphasis added)]. 
112. Mr. Liddell did not, however, offer any testimony or evidence as to how 
much higher the value of the Highland Marketplace property would have been, if he had 
not followed the client's instructions and performed an independent analysis. [See 
generallyTrial Transcript]. 
113. Accordingly, Mr. Liddell's valuation conclusion cannot be relied upon by 
the Court, as under the Deficiency Action Statute the Court must determine the fair 
32 
3693 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
market value of the property, and the fair market value requires an analysis of value 
based on a willing buyer and a willing seller ''that results in the highest value" and 
maximal productivity of the property. [See Trial Transcript, at 290:6-9, 20-22; 291 :14-292:5 (Mr. 
Cook) (emphasis added)]; (See also Exhibit 121]; [See Exhibit 122]; [See Exhibit 11, at 11-62]. 
114. Mr. Liddell does a fair amount of appraisal work for US Bank and its 
related entities, and has been doing so for more than 15 years. [See Trial Transcript, at 
223:16-21 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
115. Mr. Liddell does more than ten and sometimes more than twenty 
appraisals per year for US Bank. [See Trial Transcript, at 223:22-25 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
116. US Bank is a good customer and a steady client for Mr. Liddell. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 224:1-4 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
117. At the time of trial, Mr. Liddell was doing one appraisal for US Bank and 
hopes to get more of US Bank's work. [See Trial Transcript, at 224:15-13 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
Approaches to Value 
118. When appraising real estate there are three approaches to value: the 
sales comparison approach, the cost approach, and the income approach. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 65:20-25 (Mr. Jorgensen); 340:5-6 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 11, at 11-109 - 11-110]; 
[ See Exhibit 1 00]. 
119. In appraising property, an appraiser must develop those approaches to 
value that are necessary to produce credible results, but may also omit an approach if it 
is not necessary. [See Trial Transcript, at 294:15-20 (Mr. Cook}]; [See also Exhibit 124].] 
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120. The income approach is "based on the appraisal principle of anticipation, 
which attests that property value is estimated as the present worth of future anticipated 
benefits accruing to ownership." [See Exhibit 18, at 18.36]. 
121. With the income approach, the value of real property is equal to the net 
operating income ("NOi") divided by the capitalization rate. [See Trial Transcript, at 65:20-25 
(Mr. Jorgensen); 341 :24-342:11 (Mr. Cook)]. 
122. Mr. Cook, Mr. Liddell, and Mr. Jorgensen all agree that the income 
approach is applicable to determining the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. 
[See Exhibit 104.1]. 
123. The sales comparison approach "is based on the appraisal principle of 
substitution and takes into consideration the selling price of improved properties that 
provide utility equal or similar to the subject." [See Exhibit 18, at 18.57]. 
124. The sales comparison approach uses the sales of comparable properties 
to try to predict what the subject property would sell for if it was placed on the market. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 87:14-17 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
125. Both Mr. Cook and Mr. Jorgensen agree that the sales comparison 
approach is applicable in this case and actually applied the sales comparison approach 
to the Highland Marketplace. [See Exhibit 104, at 104.1]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 65:20-25 
(Mr. Jorgensen); 340:19-24 (Mr. Cook). 
126. In contrast, Mr. Liddell did not do a sales comparison approach for the 
income producing property. [ See Exhibit 104.1 ]; [ See also Trial Transcript, at 184:13-18 (Mr. 
Liddell); 418:10-419:12 (Mr. Cook)]; [See Exhibit 19, at 19.23]. 
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• 
127. A summary of the approaches to value used by the appraisers is included 
below: 
COMPARISON OF VALUATION TECHNIQUES 
Jorgensen Jorgensen 
Liddell Aooraisal Rebutta1 Cook 
Land Valuation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cost Approach No Yes N/A No 
Sales Comparison Approach No Yes N/A Yes 
Income Approach Yes Yes N/A Yes 
Individual lot Value Value as a whole; Value Income Approach Methodology valuations; bulk 
as a whole then apply bulk sale as a whole 
sale discount discount selectively 
Stabilized Value Estimate Yes Yes N/A Yes 
As Is Value Estimate Yes Yes N/A Yes 
Discounted Bulk Sale Value Estimate Yes No Yes No 
[See Exhibit 104, at 104.1]. 
The Cost Approach 
128. "The cost approach to value is based on the principle of substitution, 
which affirms that a knowledgeable buyer would pay no more for a property than the 
cost to acquire a similar site and construct improvements of equivalent desirability and 
utility without undue delay." [Exhibit 11, at 11-65]. 
129. Although Mr. Jorgensen performed a cost approach, both Mr. Liddell and 
Mr. Cook agree that a cost approach is unnecessary to determine the fair market value 
of the Highland Marketplace because the cost approach is inapplicable to an income 
producing property. [See Trial Transcript, at 184:12-18, 236:10-22 (Mr. Liddell); 295:19-25 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
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Sales Comparison Approach and the Principal of Substitution 
130. The sales comparison approach is based on the principle of substitution. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 296:1-297:20 (Mr. Cook)]. 
131. The principle of substitution requires comparison of an equally desirable 
substitute property. Stated differently, when applying the sales comparison approach 
the appraiser needs to find sales that are closely enough compared that the comparable 
is truly a substitute property to a prospective buyer and to a prospective seller: 
17 Q. (BY MR. MAGLEBY) And, Mr. Cook, why don 1t 
18 you go ahead and explain the principle of 
19 substitution to us. 
20 A. Well, it is -- I think it's not the 
21 highlighted portion, but it 1s most easily understood 
22 with the first sentence of the second paragraph 
23 there, which says, 11Property values tend to be set by 
24 the price of acquiring an equally desirable 
25 substitute property," which means -- well, appraising 
297 
1 is all about comparison. 
2 We've all had our homes appraised and 
3 we've been irritated that an appraiser selected a 
4 home two miles away when the home two doors away sold 
5 that we think is most similar to our property. It --
6 it's that idea that you want to find sales that are 
7 comparable to the subject, similar enough to the 
8 subject that they -- now, there's no two comparables 
9 that are -- or no two properties are exactly alike, 
10 so we have an adjustment process. 
11 But you need to find sales that are 
12 closely enough compared that it is a truly substitute 
13 property to a prospective buyer, to a prospective 
14 seller. And that's sort of the principle. You have 
15 to find good comparables. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 296:17-297:20 (Mr. Cook) (emphasis added)]. 
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132. Mr. Jorgensen agrees with Mr. Cook, and testified that under the 
substitution principle "a buyer would not pay more than they would expect to pay for a 
substitute" and that an appraiser wants "to have the comparables be as similar as 
possible." [See Trial Transcript, at 147:5-148:4 (Mr. Jorgensen) (emphasis added)]. 
133. Similarly, Mr. Jorgensen testified that when choosing comparable 
properties it is important that an appraiser try to find comparable sales that are actually 
comparable. [See Trial Transcript, at 110:14-17 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
134. In making this selection, some of the things an appraiser should look to 
compare are size, location, age of improvements, and a use that actually matches the 
highest and best use of the subject property: 
14 Q. All right. But in terms of choosing 
15 comps, is it important to try to find comps or 
16 comparables that are actually comparable? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And some of the things that you want to 
19 compare are size: is that right? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Location? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Age of improvements if you're comparing 
24 improvements? 
25 A. Yes. 
111 
1 Q. A use that actually matches the highest 
2 and best use? 
3 A. Yes. 
[ See Trial Transcript, at 110:14-17 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
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135. As noted, Mr. Liddell failed to conduct a sales comparison approach on 
the income producing property. [See Exhibit 104, at 104.1 ]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 184:13-18 
(Mr. Liddell); 418:10-419:12]; [See Exhibit 19, at 19.23]. 
136. Mr. Liddell's failure to do a sales comparison approach on income 
producing property had a significant downward impact on his proffered value of the 
Highland Marketplace because it prevented him from using comparable sales as a 
benchmark for his income based analysis. [See Trial Transcript, at 419:7-12, 295:4-18 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
137. For example, had Mr. Liddell performed a sales comparison on Building A, 
he would have discovered that comparable buildings were selling for approximately $45 
more per square foot than the $80 per square foot listed by Mr. Liddell. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 295:4-18 (Mr. Cook)]. 
138. By failing to do such a check and establish a benchmark, Mr. Liddell 
violated the rule requiring appraisers to develop the approaches to value that are 
necessary to produce credible results. [See Trial Transcript, at 294:13-295:18 (Mr. Cook)]. 
139. Although Mr. Liddell was aware of the Walgreen's lease at the time of his 
appraisal, he did not include any value for the lease and, instead, simply appraised it as 
vacant land: 
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11 Q. All right. And with regard to the 
12 Walgreens lease, I just want to make sure I 
13 understand. By the time you did your analysis of the 
14 Walgreens parcel , you believe the lease had expired 
15 and so your valuation includes in it the need to go 
16 and get a new lease signed; is that right? 
17 A. Yes.... 
18 Q. All right. And so basically ou a raised 
19 it as vacant land using sales comparison: is that 
20 right? 
21 A. In its as-is condition , yes. 
22 Q. All right. And there was no upward 
23 adjustment reflecting the Walgreens lease with regard 
24 to parcel D, correct? 
25 A. I valued the fee simple interest for 
Shee-c 61 
241 
1 parcel D. 
2 Q. I just want to make sure. So there was no 
3 upward ad justment applied for the Walgreens lease, 
4 correct? 
5 A. ~ That would be a leased fee value. I 
6 gave a fee simple value. 
[Trial Transcript, at 240:11-241 :6 (Mr. Liddell) (emphasis added)]. 
140. Similarly, Mr. Liddell appraised Pad I as vacant land despite the existence 
of a Jack in the Box Letter of Intent. Mr. Liddell admitted that at the time he performed 
his appraisal he was not aware of the signed Jack in the Box Letter of Intent. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 242:10-17 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
141 . Mr. Jorgensen violated the principal of substitution by choosing sales that 
were not similar or comparable to the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 297:21-
298:15 (Mr. Cook)]. 
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142. For example, more than one third of Mr. Jorgensen's retail center 
comparable sales were more than twenty years old, with one comparable being over 
thirty years old, and one being forty years older than the Highland Marketplace: 
Market Data Summary 
# Identification/ Sale SF Size Year Anchor 
Overall Price/SF Location Date Built (Yes/No) Cap Rate 
Retail Centers 
1 MIC Retail 5/2008 10,400 2003 No 7.85% $120.19 Layton. Utah 
2 Plum Tree 2/2008 158,599 1 1987 1 Yes 7.75% $126.10 Provo, Utah 
3 1549 North State Street 6/2007 13,104 ~ Shadow 7.97% $144.99 Orem. Utah 
4 Heritage Park 6/2008 7,995 1997 No 7.06% $163.85 Layton, Utah 
5 Plaza 1000 1/2009 9,450 2004 No 8.05% $164.55 Clearfield, Utah 
6 Three Tenant Retail 1/2012 3,547 ~ No 8.84% $184.38 Midvale, Utah 
7 Wallpaper Warehouse 10/2010 7,245 ~ No 8.60% $174.33 Sandy, Utah 
8 West Bench Plaza 4/2009 45,628 1999 Shadow 7.34% $175.33 Magna, Utah 
9 River Park Plaza 1/2012 7. 128 2003 No 914% $186.59 Salt Lake City, Utah 
10 Shops at 9th Street 1/2011 5,004 2007 Shadow 7.50% $306.74 Murray, Utah 
11 33rd Street Station 5/2010 7.792 2008 No 8.70% $334.69 Salt Lake City, Utah 
Subject by Comparison - 05/22/2012 15,839 2008-10 No 7.70% $288.00 
[See Exhibit 11 , at 11-103 (emphasis added)]; [ See also Trial Transcript, at 148:10-149:14, 151 :25-
153:25 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
143. Mr. Jorgensen conceded that the older shopping centers used in his 
appraisal as comparables were not only inferior in appearance, but also did not look as 
modern nor as good as the Highland Marketplace: 
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17 Q. Let's take a look at the photo 11.188. I 
18 call this the money store photo. This is -- is this 
19 the photo of that particular property? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Does that look like the same quality 
22 construction and tenants as we have in the subject 
23 property? 
24 A. The construction quality is similar, but 
25 it's older and it's -- so its appearance is certainly 
Sheet 39 
153 
1 inferior; you know, just doesn't look as modern. 
2 Q. And would you agree that's the case with a 
3 number of these older buildings we've been looking 
4 at? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Thank you. Let's look at comp number 
7 seven, 11 -- 11.184, I think. No. 11.189. 
8 Apologies. Built in about 1991? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. So about 20 years old compared to the 
11 comp. Is that -- or to the subject property, 
12 correct? 
13 A. It's -- it was 19, yeah. 
14 Q. Nineteen. Okay. You're -- appraisers are 
15 always better at math than lawyers. 
16 A. Well, I --
17 Q. At least this lawyer. Let's go to the 
18 next page and take a look at the photo. Wallpaper 
19 Warehouse: is that right? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And, again, would you say this is an 
22 older -- older building, not as new as the subject? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Doesn't look as good, does it? 
25 A. No. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 152:17-153:25 (Mr. Jorgensen) (emphasis added)]. 
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144. Mr. Cook's sales comparison approach, as set forth in his report in Exhibit 
18 and as discussed during his testimony at trial, relies on more comparable properties 
and is the more credible of the experts' opinions and is hereby adopted by the Court. 
Income Approach 
145. The income approach is based on the appraisal principle of anticipation, 
described as follows: 
This approach is based on the appraisal principle of anticipation, which attests that property value is 
estimated as the present worth of future anticipated benefits accruing to ownership. In the subject 
instance, these benefits take the form primarily of monetary factors. · 
[See Exhibit 18, at 18.36-18.37]. 
146. In performing an income approach, an appraiser looks at the market rents 
by studying rents of comparable properties as well as the subject property's rental 
history. [See Trial Transcript, at 71 :24-72:1 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
14 7. However, there is no better comparable than the subject property itself: 
366 
1 A. Well, the only other one that really 
2 stands out is Highland Harketplace. This is the 
3 subject. And this is the T-Nobile space. June of 
4 2011, so it's a pretty recent lease. You had 
5 actually leased for 24.50 per square foot, and 
6 there's no better comparable than the subject itself 
7 as long as 1t 1s supported by other information. 
8 And so that was adjusted to 24.50, and 
9 that's an actual tenant that went into the space. 
10 Q. Understood. So is a -- are you saying an 
11 actual lease is actually also market data? 
12 A. Yes. There's no better data than the 
13 subject property. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 366:1-13 (Mr. Cook) (emphasis added)]. 
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148. In this case, it was undisputed that a large portion of the subject property 
was already leased and generating income; thus, there was credible, real-time evidence 
as to the income from the property, without having to rely upon more speculative 
estimates of market rent. [See Trial Transcript, at 379:13-382:2 (Mr. Cook)]. 
149. The existing leases, with the exception of the lease for the fitness center in 
Building A (discussed below), were the result of arm's length transactions, and were 
entered into prior to litigation. 
150. Just as with the sales comparison approach, when comparing other 
properties as part of the market rent analysis, an appraiser has to find good comparable 
properties. [See Trial Transcript, at 297:11-15 (Mr. Cook)]. 
151. A summary of the differences in the income approaches applied the 
appraisers is included below: 
INCOME APPROACH DIFFERENCES 
Liddell Jorgensen Cook 
Rental Estimates 
Building A - Main Level $ 20.00 $ 11 .50 $ 21.00 
Building A - Top Floor $ 11.00 $ 11.50 $ 11 .00 
lnline Shops $22 to $27 $ 23 .00 $22-$30.46 
Walgreens $ 363,535 O mitted $ 363,000 
Taco Time $ 40.00 $ 32.00 $ 56.03 
Jack-in-the-Box O mitted Omitted $ 58.34 
Vacancy (1) 4.6% 8.0% 5.0% 
Management Fee (1) 1 . 7% 5.0% 3.0% 
Replacement Reserves (1) 0.3% $ 0.15 1 .0% 
Capitalization Rates (1) 7.55% 7. 70% 7.75% 
(1) Liddell 's conclusions are weighted averages 
[See Exhibit 106, at 106.1]. 
43 
3704 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Taco Time 
152. The Taco Time, located on Lot 7, has an existing lease that was 
negotiated at arm's length. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
153. The Taco Time has been operated from its current location in the Highland 
Marketplace since April 2010. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
154. The Taco Time lease is a 15 year lease, with an annual rent of $130,166 
or $56.03 per square foot. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
155. The Taco Time lease is personally guaranteed by the three principals of 
the leasing company, at least one of whom owns 15 other stores. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]; 
[See also Trial Transcript, at 378:16-379:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
156. Like the other existing leases, the Taco Time lease was the result of an 
arm's length negotiation, prior to litigation. [See Trial Transcript, at 378:16-382:4 (Mr. Cook)]. 
157. Mr. Cook ultimately determined to use the existing Taco Time lease in his 
income approach. However, Mr. Cook did not simply assume that the existing Taco 
Time lease was sufficient for this conclusion. [See Trial Transcript, at 378:16-382:4 (Mr. Cook)]. 
158. Instead, in order to evaluate the Taco Time lease, Mr. Cook selected 
various comparable restaurants such as Kneaders, Arby's, and Del Taco to compare to 
the Taco Time restaurant in the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 373:2-374:11 
(Mr. Cook)]. 
159. The Arby's, Del Taco, and Kneaders were built in 2009, 2010, and 2012 
respectively, in close temporal proximity to the subject Taco Time. [See Exhibit 18, at 
18.47]. 
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160. The Del Taco is one of the best comparables because it is the exact same 
age as the Taco Time and it has similar architectural appeal, construction type, and 
quality, as can be seen from a visual comparison of the Taco Time (top) and the Del 
Taco (bottom): 
[See Exhibit 18, at 18.70, 18.145]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 376:22-377:17 (Mr. Cook)] . 
161. Likewise, the Arby's (below) is an excellent comparable to the Taco Time 
(top): 
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[See Exhibit 18, at 18.70, 18.149]; [ See also Trial Transcript, at 376:22-377:17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
162. In his appraisal, Mr. Jorgensen selected properties that are not 
comparable to the subject property because they are 20, 40, and almost 50 years older 
than the Taco Time, are third generation buildings, and are not build to suit like the Taco 
Time. [See also Trial Transcript, at 377:18-378:13 (Mr. Cook)]. 
163. As Mr. Cook explained, when one uses comparable sales such as these, 
they do not comply with the principal of "substitution," requiring that the property "be as 
similar as possible" and that it be a true "substitute property." [See Trial Transcript, at 147:5-
148:4 (Mr. Jorgensen); 296:17-297:20 (Mr. Cook)]. 
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164. Mr. Cook further explained that an appraiser "need[s] to find sales that are 
really similar as a starting point. That's the very most fundamental thing." [See Trial 
Transcript, at 297:11-12-14 (Mr. Cook)]. 
165. While an appraiser can apply adjustments when using buildings that are 
not comparable to the subject property, this approach is inappropriate under the rule of 
substitution because it requires too much subjectivity and results in valuations that are 
simply not credible. [See Trial Transcript, at 298:6-15, 377:23-378:15 (Mr. Cook)]. 
166. For example, Mr. Jorgensen's ninth comparable is an approximately 30 
year old building that is on its second or third tenant and is being leased by an 
independent restaurant called Scaddy's. [See a/so Trial Transcript, at 125:9-12719 (Mr. 
Jorgensen)]. 
167. The Scaddy's (below) is not a build to suit transaction and is not an 
adequate comparable for the Taco Time (top): 
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[See Exhibit 18, at 18.70]; [See also Exhibit 11, at 1 H 54]; [See Trial Transcript, at 127:20-22 (Mr. 
Jorgensen); 297:16-20 (Mr. Cook)]. 
168. Mr. Jorgensen's tenth comparable is a 27 year old building being leased 
by WingNutz, which was originally leased by a flower shop: 
[See Trial Transcript, at 127:23-128:22 (Mr. Jorgensen)]; [See also Exhibit 11, at 11.156]. 
169. Mr. Jorgensen's fifteenth comparable is a thirty year old restaurant called 
the Blue Fin Sushi Bar. The Blue Fin Sushi Bar was originally a Wendy's restaurant 
and is not a custom-built, free standing restaurant like Taco Time: 
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(See Trial Transcript, at 128:24-130:4 (Mr. Jorgensen)]; [See a/so Exhibit 11, at 11.156]. 
170. Mr. Jorgensen based his market rent conclusion of $32 per square foot on 
these properties as well as the others contained in his report. [See Trial Transcript, at 
130:21-131 :25 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
171. The actual market rent for the Taco Time was $56.08 per square foot in 
May 2012. (See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
172. Although Mr. Jorgensen noticed that Mr. Cook used the Del Taco built in 
201 0 as a comparable, he testified that the Del Taco was "not the sort of comparable" 
he was looking for: 
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6 Q. All right. Did you see Mr. Cook's 
7 rebuttal report? 
8 A. Yes . 
9 Q. And did you notice he had a new Del Taco 
10 in Saratoga Springs that he used as a comp? 
11 A. I don't remember that one specifically, 
12 but I·· I know that he had information of that sort. 
13 Q. Well , when you were looking at his comps, 
14 did you have access to the same comps that he chose? 
15 Could you have used those if you had wanted to? 
16 A. I don't·· that's not the sort of 
17 comparable I was looking for, so I can't really say 
18 whether I had that one available to me or not. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 131 :6-18 (Mr. Jorgensen) (emphasis added)]. 
173. Mr. Jorgensen' twelfth and fourteenth comparable properties were not 
entirely free standing and are different than the entirely free standing Taco Time. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 125:1-14 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
Building A 
17 4. Mr. Jorgensen appraised Building A as a fitness center and used other 
fitness centers to determine market rent. [See Trial Transcript, at 64:3-11 , 75:19-21 (Mr. 
Jorgensen)]. 
175. However, both Mr. Cook and SA Group's expert Mr. Liddell agreed that 
the highest and best use of Building A is as a retail space, not a fitness center. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 192:16-23; 253:20-254:2 (Mr. Liddell); 362:1-16 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 20, at 20.9]. 
176. Fitness centers want walls with mirrors and Building A has glass on the 
outside of the building making it a bad fit for a fitness center: 
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[See Trial Transcript, at 362:5-16 (Mr. Cook)]; (See also Exhibit 18, at 18.69]. 
177. Mr. Jorgensen's fifteenth comparable was originally built in 1965 and used 
to be a grocery store: 
(See Trial Transcript, at 139:12-140:18 (Mr. Jorgensen)]; (See also Exhibit 11, at 11-166]. 
178. Mr. Jorgensen's sixteenth comparable was originally built in 1972 and is 
largely dissimilar to Building A: 
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[ See Trial Transcript, at 140 :20-141 : 12 (Mr. Jorgensen)] ; [ See also Exhibit 11 , at 11-168]. 
179. Mr. Jorgensen's seventeenth comparable was originally built in 1981, is an 
in-line building without office space on the second floor, with rent starting out at $3 per 
square foot: 
[See Trial Transcript, at 141 :13-142:11 (Mr. Jorgensen)]; [See also Exhibit 11, at 11-171 ]. 
180. Mr. Jorgensen's eighteenth comparable was originally built in 1981: 
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[See Trial Transcript, at 143:8-144:2 (Mr. Jorgensen)]; [See also Exhibit 11 , at 11-173]. 
181. While Mr. Jorgensen used these older fitness centers, he did not use the 
24 Hour Fitness more recently built in 2004, which paid $19.95 per square foot, in 
determining the market rent for Building A: 
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8 Q. All right. Let's take a look at -- it's 
9 11.17 -- 199. So, again, this was not used --Jmt 
10 did not use this comp when you were doing your 
11 fitness center income approach, correct? 
12 A. Correct. 
13 Q. But obviously this was in your file at the 
14 time? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And it is a 24 Hour Fitness. It is a 
17 fitness center, correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And it was built a little more recently, 
20 2004? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. So only eight years different from the 
23 subject building on the valuation date, correct? 
24 A. It was eight years old, yes. 
25 Q. All right. Was this a build-to-suit 
Sheet 37 
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1 tenant? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Do you know what rent was being paid for 
4 that space? 
5 A. $19.95. 
6 Q. All right. And I believe you have an 
7 opinion the rent was above market? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. But regardless of that, you did not use 
10 this lease as a rent comparable for your income 
11 approach with regard to the fitness center, did you? 
12 A. Well, it's a 2004 lease would have been 
13 one reason, but build to suit is the other. We don't 
14 typically rely on build-to-suit leases as evidence of 
15 market rent. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 144:8-145:15 (Mr. Jorgensen) (emphasis added)]; [See a/so Exhibit 11, at 11-199 
- 11-200]. 
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182. Mr. Cook's income approach, as set forth in his report in Exhibit 18 and as 
discussed during his testimony at trial, is the most credible of the experts' opinions and 
is hereby adopted by the Court. 
Age of the Property 
183. Although Mr. Jorgensen contends that he made adjustments to account 
for the age disparity between his comparables, there is too much subjectivity in 
attempting to make such adjustments and it is therefore an improper application of 
appraisal technique. [See Trial Transcript, at 297:17-298:1 o (Mr. Cook)]. 
184. Instead, Mr. Jorgensen should have found sales that are more similar at 
the starting point, as that is a fundamental element of the substitution principal. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 298:11-15 (Mr. Cook)]. 
Capitalization Rates 
185. Capitalization rates need to be applied to income in the same way they 
were developed. In other words, if an appraiser uses actual income to develop a 
capitalization rate, he must also apply that capitalization rate to the actual income of the 
subject property. [See Trial Transcript, at 298:16-299:9 (Mr. Cook)]. 
186. A capitalization rate can be affected by a property's age, quality, and 
condition. [See Trial Transcript, at 145:25-146:8 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
187. More recent construction projects and newer retail centers sell for the 
highest prices and can typically justify a lower capitalization rate. [See Trial Transcript, at 
146:15-22 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
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188. Mr. Liddell applies a capitalization rate derived from actual income on 
comparable properties to his concluded market rate to individual buildings and to the 
Highland Marketplace as a whole, and then applies a ten percent bulk discount. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 298:16-299:16 (Mr. Cook)]. 
189. In other words, Mr. Liddell uses the wrong capitalization rate twice, which 
results in a substantially lower appraised value. [See Trial Transcript, at 299:1-16; 419:13-21 
(Mr. Cook)]. 
190. Mr. Liddell's capitalization rate also fails to consider the Walgreen's lease 
which further results in a downward impact on value. [See Trial Transcript, at 428:16-21 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
191. As a result of Mr. Liddell's incorrect application of the capitalization rate, 
his overall opinion of the Highland Marketplace's value results in a downward impact on 
the value of the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 299:1-300:12, 419:13-21 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
192. Mr. Cook's analysis, explanation, and application of capitalization rates, as 
set forth in his report in Exhibit 18 and as discussed during his testimony at trial, are 
sound and the more credible of the experts' opinions and his opinion is hereby adopted 
by the Court. 
The Plaintiff's Appraisers Improperly Applied a Bulk Sale Discount 
193. Both of Plaintiff's appraisers applied what was termed a "bulk sale" 
discount in their valuations. [See Exhibit 1 o, at 10-204]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 333:1-4 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
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194. Mr. Liddell, after appraising the Highland Marketplace as individual 
parcels, applied a ten percent bulk sale discount, which artificially reduced the 
appraised value of the Highland Marketplace. [See Exhibit 10, at 10-204]. 
195. "The bulk sale analysis is meant to reconcile the individual retail values to 
one value for a single buyer. This is contrary to highest and best use ... which would 
be to operate it as an integrated shopping center as [Mr. Liddell himselij concludes in 
the highest and best use analysis." [See Exhibit 19, at 19.21]. 
196. It is not industry practice to appraise shopping centers by applying a bulk 
sale discount. [See Trial Transcript, at 416:2-14 (Mr. Cook}]; [See also Exhibit 19, at 19.5]. 
197. Neither Mr. Cook nor Mr. Jorgensen applied a bulk sale discount in their 
appraisals of the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 
416:11-14 (Mr. Cook)]. 
198. Mr. Liddell conceded that a seller of real property would not request that a 
ten percent bulk sale discount be applied to the value of its property because a 
hypothetical seller wants to maximize their value. [See Trial Transcript, at 219:25-220:13 (Mr. 
Liddell}]. 
199. The bulk sale analysis is ordinarily applicable where various parcels or lots 
within a subdivision compete against each other or where there are a bunch of non-
income producing property that have associated carrying costs, such as with residential . 
subdivisions. [See Exhibit 19, at 19.22]; [See Trial Transcript, at 221 :16-222:20 (Mr. Liddell)]. For 
example, in a residential subdivision ru!_the parcels are competing against each other 
and a bulk sale discount is applied to allow the owner to sell all the lots at once so that 
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the owner can avoid the carrying costs associated with selling competing lots over an 
extended period of time. [See Trial Transcript, at 222:21-223:1 o (Mr. Liddell); 323:11-326:9, 326:22-
327:5 (Mr. Cook)]. 
200. In contrast, in the Highland Marketplace, Lots 1 and 2 are vacant, Lots 3, 
7, 8, 9, and 1 0 all have buildings on them, Lot 6 has a signed Walgreen's lease, and Lot 
11 or Pad I has a signed letter of intent with Jack in the Box. However, none of these 
lots or pads compete with each other. [See Trial Transcript, at 326:10-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
201. For example, a potential tenant for the remaining space on Lot 11, such as 
another restaurant or retail space, would not compete with an apartment building or 
anchor tenant on Lots 1 and 2. [ See Trial Transcript, at 326:10-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
202. The different lots in the Highland Marketplace are complementary to each 
other because they operate as an integrated economic unit. [See Trial Transcript, at 332:19-
25, 333:16-18 (Mr. Cook)]. 
203. In addition, Mr. Liddell agreed that the developed lots in the Highland 
Marketplace are income producing and, if sold as an integrated economic unit, the bulk 
discount is inapplicable because the seller is not avoiding any carrying costs. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 223:4-10 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
204. Thus, the bulk sale discount is inapplicable to the fair market value 
analysis of the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 322:18-23 (Mr. Cook)]. 
205. Plaintiff did not cross examine Mr. Cook on his explanation regarding the 
inapplicability of the bulk sale discount to the Highland Marketplace. [See generally Trial 
Transcript, at 278:1-502:11 (Mr. Cook)]. 
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206. Mr. Cook's determination of the highest and best use of the Highland 
Marketplace, as set forth in his report in Exhibit 18 and as discussed during his 
testimony at trial, is the most credible of the experts' opinions and is hereby adopted by 
the Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. 
§ 57-1-32. 
This action is governed by the Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. See Utah Code 
2. Under the Deficiency Action Statute: 
the court shall find the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. 
The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the 
amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of 
the property as of the date of the sale. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. 
3. Under Utah law, fair market value is defined as "the amount at which 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the 
relevant facts.St Mallinckrodt v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1999 UT 66, ,I 10,983 P.2d 566. 
4. Determination of fair market value requires an appraiser to analyze the 
"probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property that is physically 
possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest 
value." [See Trial Transcript, at 290:6-9 (Mr. Cook) (emphasis added)]; [See also Exhibit 122, at 122.1]; 
[See Exhibit 11, at 11-62]. 
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5. The Deficiency Action Statute is based upon an important public policy 
concern, incorporated into the statute. "[T]he purpose of [the fair market value defense] 
is to protect the debtor, who in a non-judicial foreclosure has no right of redemption, 
from a creditor who could purchase the property at the sale for a low price and then hold 
the debtor liable for a large deficiency." Capital Assets, 201 0 UT App 385, ,r 8. 
6. As of May 22, 2012, the date of the foreclosure sale of the Highland 
Marketplace, the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace was $14,710,000. [See 
Exhibit 18, at 18.2]. 
7. The fair market value of the Highland Marketplace exceeded the total debt 
owed to SA Group as of May 22, 2012, therefore there is no deficiency and SA Group is 
not entitled to damages. 
8. As the prevailing party, Defendants are entitled to collect their costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred during the prosecution of this action. See Utah Code 
Ann.§ 57-1-32. 
ORDER 
1. SA Group is not entitled to damages because the fair market value of the 
Highland Marketplace exceeded the total debt owed by Defendants on May 22, 2012. 
2. Defendants are the prevailing party and are therefore entitled to collect 
their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred during the prosecution of this action. 
3. Defendants shall prepare a fee application pursuant to Rule 73 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and provide the fee application to Plaintiff by no later than 
September 15, 2015. 
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4. If Plaintiff and Defendants cannot agree upon the amount of the fee 
application submitted by Defendants, Defendants will file the fee application with the 
Court by no later than October 15, 2015. 
DATED this_ day of ___ _, 2015. 
Honorable James R. Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, 
P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 , and that pursuant 
to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ORDER was delivered to the 
following this 11 th day of August, 2015 by: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[X] Via Electronic Mail 
[X] Via submission to the Utah State Court electronic filing system 
Steven T. Waterman 
waterman.steven@dorsey.com 
Nathan Seim 
seim.nathan@dorsey.com 
DORSEY & WHITNEY 
136 South Main Street, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
/s/ H. Evan Gibson 
62 
3723 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUMS 
c':; :. 
;; . 
' . \~ 
-· ••• • 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
Nathan S. Seim (12654) 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
136 South Main Street, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1685 
Telephone: (80 I) 933-7360 
Facsimile: (801) 933-7373 
E-mail: waterman.steven@dorsey.com 
seim.nathan@dorsey.com 
Attorneys for SA Group Properties, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SA GROUP PROPERTIES, INC., a Minnesota 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HIGHLAND MARKETPLACE, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company; HIGH NOON, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; SOLANA BEACH 
HOLDINGS, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company; THOMAS A. HULBERT, an individual; 
and BRET B. FOX, an individual, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW FOR TRIAL 
Civil No. 120401312 
Judge: James Taylor 
Plaintiff SA Group Properties, Inc. submits the attached proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law for the consideration of adoption by this Court upon the close of this case. 
Dated this 11th day of August, 2015 
1 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
Isl Steven T. Waterman 
Steven T. Waterman 
Nathan S. Seim 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 11, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR 
TRIAL was served via electronic service and email upon the persons named below: 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
James E. Magleby 
Kennedy D. Nate 
170 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Isl Nathan S. Seim 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SA GROUP PROPERTIES, INC., a Minnesota 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HIGHLAND MARKETPLACE, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company; HIGH NOON, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; SOLANA BEACH 
HOLDINGS, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company; THOMAS A. HULBERT, an individual; 
and BRET B. FOX, an individual, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 120401312 
Judge: James Taylor 
On May 26-27 and August 12, 2015, the Court held a trial in this deficiency action. 
Steven T. Waterman and Nathan S. Seim of Dorsey & Whitney LLP appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff, SA Group Properties, Inc. ("SAGP"). James E. Magleby and Kennedy D. Nate of 
Magleby & Greenwood, P .C. appeared on behalf of Defendants, Highland Marketplace, L.C. 
("Highland"), High Noon, L.C. ("High Noon"), Solana Beach Holdings, L.C. ("Solana"), 
Thomas Hulbert ("Hulbert") and Bret Fox ("Fox"). 
At trial, the Court admitted into evidence documentary exhibits (collectively, the 
"Exhibits"), including the stipulated Declaration of Timothy N. Scheer for Trial [Exhibit 28] (the 
"Scheer Declaration"), the reports of SAGP's expert appraisal witnesses, Kerry Jorgensen 
("Jorgensen") and Darrin Liddell ("Liddell"), and the reports of Defendants' expert appraisal 
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witness, Phillip Cook ("Cook"). The Court also heard live testimony from Jorgensen, Liddell 
and Cook (collectively, the "Expert Witnesses"). 
The Court has reviewed and considered the evidence presented, including the Exhibits; 
has heard the testimony of the Expert Witnesses and considered their demeanor and credibility; 
has heard the arguments of counsel; and has researched the applicable law. Based thereon, the 
Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
STIPULATED BACKGROUND FACTS 
The Parties having stipulated to Fact Nos. 1-17, as set forth in the stipulated Scheer 
Declaration, thus the Court finds as follows: 
The Loan Agreement and Note 
1. On or about September 5, 2007, Defendants Highland, High Noon, and Solana 
entered into a Construction Loan Agreement with First Community Bank ("First Community") 
that governed the tenns of a $28,000,000 line of credit (the "Loan Agreement"). 
2. In connection with the Loan Agreement, Highland, High Noon and Solana 
executed a Promissory Note, dated September 5, 2007, in favor of First Community and in the 
principal amount of $28,000,000 (the "Note"). 
3. Also in connection with the Loan Agreement and Note, Defendants Hulbert and 
Fox entered into Commercial Guaranties with First Community, pursuant to which they 
"absolutely and unconditionally guarantee[ d] full and punctual payment and satisfaction of the 
Indebtedness of ... all Borrower's obligations under the Note and Related Documents." 
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The Deeds of Trust and the Highland Property 
4. Highland, High Noon and Solana executed a Construction Deed of Trust dated 
April 27, 2007 in favor of First Community, as Trustee, and First Community, as Beneficiary, to 
secure certain obligations owing to First Community (the "Original Deed of Trust"). 
5. The Original Deed of Trust contains an express Power of Sale clause and was 
recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office on May 3, 2007, as entry number 65863:2007. 
6. On or about September 5, 2007, the prior obligation owing to First Community by 
Defendants, as secured by the Original Deed of Trust, was replaced by the Loan Agreement and 
Note, and in connection therewith, the Original Deed of Trust was modified by that certain 
Modification Deed of Trust dated September 5, 2007 (the "Modified Deed of Trust" and, 
together with the Original Deed of Trust, the "Deeds of Trust"). 
7. The Modified Deed of Trust was recorded with the Utah County Recorder's 
Office on September 21, 2007, as entry number 138163:2007. 
8. Pursuant to the Deeds of Trust, Highland, High Noon and Solana granted First 
Community, among other things, a first position deed of trust lien on certain real property 
located in Utah County, Utah, the legal description of which is set forth on "Exhibit A" to the 
Original Deed of Trust (the "Highland Property"). 
9. On or about January 28, 2011, the New Mexico Financial Institutions Division 
closed First Community, and FDIC was named as receiver of First Community ("FDIC-R"). 
10. FDIC-R sold substantially all of First Community's assets, including the Loan 
Agreement, Note, Hulbert Guaranty, Fox Guaranty, Deeds of Trust and all other documents 
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associated therewith (collectively, the "Loan Documents") to U.S. Bank National Association 
("U.S. Bank"), such that U.S. Bank obtained the rights to enforce the Loan Documents. 
Foreclosure of the Highland Property and Amount Owing to SAGP on the Foreclosure Date 
11. On approximately May 14, 2012, U.S. Bank obtained an appraisal of the Highland 
Property from Liddell [Exhibit 1 O] (the "Liddell Appraisal"), which valued the Highland 
Property, as of April 23, 2012, in the amount of $9,240,000.00. 
12. On May 21, 2012, U.S. Bank assigned to SAGP its interest in the Loan 
Documents, specifically including the Deeds of Trust, as reflected by the Assignment of Deed of 
Trust recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office on May 22, 2012, as entry number 
42508:2012. 
13. Defendants failed to make payments that were due under the terms of the Note, 
Hulbert Guaranty, Fox Guaranty and other Loan Documents. Thus, on May 22, 2012, the 
Trustee of the Highland Property sold the Highland Property to a third party in accordance with 
state law and the terms of the Deeds of Trust and other Loan Documents [Exhibit 9]. 
14. At the time of the foreclosure sale, the amount owing to SAGP by Defendants 
under the Note and Loan Documents was $14,685,370.37, which consisted of $13,390,939.93 in 
principal, including $246,914.33 for the payment of past due real estate taxes; $633,160.49 in 
interest; late charges of $655,269.95; costs incurred for appraisal and environmental reports in 
the amount of $6,000.00; plus the additional accrual of attorneys' fees and costs as allowed 
under the Loan Documents. 
15. At the foreclosure sale, the Highland Property was sold to a third party for the 
amount of $8,565,000.00 [Exhibit 9]. 
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16. SAGP relied on the Liddell Appraisal, and the appraised value of the Highland 
Property set forth therein, in determining the amount of its credit bid on the Highland Property at 
the foreclosure sale. Specifically, SAGP determined that if it purchased the Highland Property at 
the foreclosure sale, it would incur holding and sale costs in the approximate amount of 
$750,000.00 relating to the Highland Property. 
17. On or about October 2, 2012, SAGP received $177,896.00 from Len Stillman (the 
"Receiver"), who was appointed the Receiver of the Highland Property on December 14, 2011, 
by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge for the State of Utah, 
Utah County, Case No. 110403100, and which receivership terminated on August 15, 2012. 
SAGP applied this payment to reduce the principal amount owing to SAGP by Defendants. 
THE EXPERT WITNESSES AND REPORTS 
18. Each of the Expert Witnesses opined on the market value of the Highland 
Property as of May 22, 2012-the date of the foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs appraisers, Liddell and 
Jorgensen, opined that the fair market value of the Highland Property on the foreclosure date was 
$9,240,000.00 [Exhibit 10] (the "Liddell appraisal") and 10,568,000.00 [Exhibits 11 and 12] (the 
"Jorgensen Appraisal"), respectively. Defendants' appraiser, Cook, opined that the fair market 
value of the Highland Property was 14,710,000.00 [Exhibit 18] (the "Cook Appraisal"). 
Darrin Liddell 
19. U.S. Bank retained Liddell to provide a contemporaneous market value opinion of 
the Highland Property just prior to the foreclosure of the Property. U.S. Bank, and subsequently 
SAGP, commissioned and relied on the Liddell Appraisal in determining the amount to credit bid 
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on the Property at the foreclosure sale. As set forth in the Liddell Appraisal, Liddell values the 
Highland Property as of the foreclosure date in the amount of $9,240,000.00 [Exhibit 10]. 
20. The Liddell Appraisal, which is dated prior to the foreclosure sale, and prior to the 
commencement of this case, as well as Liddell's testimony at trial, appear complete, competent, 
unbiased, and persuasive. 
Kerry Jorgensen 
21. Jorgensen was retained to provide a retroactive valuation of the Highland 
Property for purposes of this trial. 
22. Jorgensen's original appraisal values the Highland Property as of the foreclosure 
date in the amount of $9,800,000.00 [Exhibit 11]. Subsequently, subject to the potential of a 
signed lease agreement amendment with Walgreen's, Jorgensen would increase his valuation of 
the Highland Property by $768,000.00, to the amount of $10,568,000.00 [Exhibit 12 at pp. 12-28 
and12-31]. 
23. Jorgensen's valuation of the Highland Property, and his testimony at trial, were 
complete, competent, unbiased, and persuasive. 
Phillip Cook 
24. Cook was retained to provide a retroactive valuation of the Highland Property for 
purposes of helping to defend actions filed against the Defendants. Cook testified that he 
typically reads the pleadings in the litigation action and that he generally understands the issues 
involved in a deficiency action. 1 Cook also testified that he was aware of, and observed a second 
deficiency action that Defendants are involved in relating to the Highland Property with CRV-
1 See May 27, 2015 Transcript, on File with the Court, at p. 445, Lines 3-15. 
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Main Main, L.P. ("CRV-Main"), the mezzanine lender that foreclosed Defendants' interest in the 
Highland Property prior to SAGP's foreclosure.2 Finally, Cook's colleague, Nate Herrscher 
("Herrscher"), "extensively" assisted Cook in Cook's valuation of the Highland Property. 3 
Herrscher, however, assisted in preparing, and certified to, several other appraisals that Liddell 
performed on the Highland Property, which appraisals Cook (and Herrscher) now criticize. 
25. As set forth in the Cook Appraisal [Exhibit 18], Cook values the Highland 
Property as of the foreclosure date in the amount of $14,710,000.00, which is approximately $4 
million more than Jorgensen's valuation, approximately $5 million more than Liddell's 
valuation, and approximately $6 million more than the price paid by an independent third party 
buyer at the sale. 
26. The Court finds that the following factors, among others, caused Cook's valuation 
of the Highland Property to be artificially inflated and less credible than the valuations of Liddell 
and Jorgensen: 
(a) Cook's valuation was based on unsupported and unreliable facts and data. 
For example, Cook relied on non-binding Letters of Intent to value the Highland 
Property, which are generally not relied upon in appraisal practice, including a Jack and 
the Box Letter of Intent that (i) was dated 18 days prior to the foreclosure sale; (ii) was 
signed by Highland as the Landlord, even though CRV-Main owned the Highland 
Property at the time the Letter of Intent was signed; (iii) is addressed to a Mr. Mehta, 
though the purported signature appears to be from a different person; and (iv) does not 
2 See id. at p. 491, Line 20-p. 492, Line 3. 
3 See id. at p. 430, Line 17-p. 431, Line 3. 
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otherwise appear to be a valid and reliable Letter of Intent. Additionally, Cook valued 
the "Anchor Pad" of the Highland Property using the "hypothetical condition',4 that the 
Anchor Pad would be used for multi-family housing, even though (i) the Highland 
Property was not zoned for multi-family housing;5 (ii) the Highland Property was not 
equipped with a sewer system or other necessary infrastructure to handle multi-family 
housing; (iii) Highland City has stated that it is against re-zoning the property;6 and (iv) 
there is no indication, other than Defendants' own statements to Cook, that Highland 
City was ever willing to re-zone the Highland Property for multi-family use. 
(b) Cook's valuation was based on unestablished and unreliable valuation 
methodologies. For instance, Cook valued the Anchor Pad and other pads comprising the 
Highland Property using the "land residual method," which takes the projected future 
value of a hypothetical project on the land (such as multi-family use housing on the 
Anchor Pad), and then deducts the costs ofbuilding the project to reach the value of the 
4 As testified by Cook, a "hypothetical condition" is an appraisal term of art, which means that 
"something is known to be contrary to fact but is assumed for purposes of analysis." See id. at p. 
451, Line 25-p. 452, Line 2. 
5 Cook testified that his zoning assumption with the Anchor Pad was merely an "extraordinary 
assumption," another appraisal term of art that means an assumption "that is unknown. It could 
be right, it could be wrong." See id. at p. 452 at Lines 2--4. Because an extraordinary 
assumption could be true for purposes of an analysis, it is less problematic and controversial than 
a hypothetical condition, which is an assumption known to be false. However, as set forth by the 
appraisal guidelines published pursuant to FIRREA [Exhibit 52], "an example of a hypothetical 
condition is when an appraiser assumed a particular property zoning is different than what the 
zoning actually is." See Exhibit 52 at p. 77472. 
6 See May 27, 2015 Transcript, on File with the Court, at p. 335, Lines 15-17 ("When I talk with 
the City, they say, 'we don't want apartments there."'). 
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land.7 "Courts have shown a clear disdain" for this valuation methodology because small 
variations in the variables used "can result in a dramatic change in the land value 
estimate."8 Further, Cook could not find any support for his methodology for valuing the 
assumed construction and subsequent lease of the Walgreen's pad in the more than 800 
pages of the Appraisal Institute's treatise, The Appraisal of Real Estate 14th Edition.9 
(c) Cook did not value the Highland Property in its "as is" condition as of the 
May 22, 2012 foreclosure date. This is because Cook valued the Highland Property using 
a number of assumptions and hypothetical conditions, including that (i) the relied-upon 
letters of intent would be executed; (ii) the zoning of the anchor pads would be changed; 
(iii) a Walgreen's would be timely constructed; (iv) Pad I would be subdivided into two 
parcels; (v) a Jack in the Box would be constructed; (vi) the fitness club lease would be 
terminated; (vii) the fitness space lease would be converted to retail space; and (viii) the 
entire project would be leased to stabilized occupancy. These assumed factors did not 
reflect the true condition of the Highland Property as of the foreclosure date. The Cook 
Appraisal states: "We have been asked to estimate hypothetical value as if the subject 
improvements were stabilized occupancy as of the effective date of the appraisal. This 
assumes the proposed construction of the Walgreens and the Jack and the Box buildings, 
as well as tenant improvements for vacant space, are complete. This limiting condition 
7 See id. at p. 457, Line 17-p. 458, Line 11. 
8 The Appraisal of Real Estate 14th Edition, published by the Appraisal Institute [Exhibit 22] at 
p. 22.383. 
9 See May 27, 2015 Transcript, on File with the Court, at p. 473, Line 13-p. 478, Line 15. 
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affects the assignment results. " 10 The Cook Appraisal does not comply with the 
requirement that the Property be valued in its condition as of the foreclosure date, but 
assumes a hypothetical condition. 
Fair Market Value ofthe Highland Property 
27. The Court finds that the Highland Property valuations of both Liddell and 
Jorgensen are based on the Property as it existed on the foreclosure date. As such, the Court 
finds that the fair market value of the Highland Property as of May 22, 2012, was no greater than 
$10,568,000.00-the highest value assigned to the Property by either Liddell or Jorgensen. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
28. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 states: 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed ... 
an action may be commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security. . . . Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The court 
may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the 
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the 
sale. 
29. "The meaning of the term fair market value is well settled. It is the amount at 
which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant 
facts." 11 This definition means that the subject property must be valued in its "as is" condition. 12 
10 Cook Appraisal (Exhibit 18) at p. 18.3 ( emphasis added). 
11 Capital Assets Fin. Srvs. v. Jordanelle Dev. LLC, 2010 UT App. 385,, 7,247 P.3d 411. 
12 See id. (holding that foreclosed property must be valued in its current state, subject to superior 
liens and encumbrances). 
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30. Here, it is undisputed that SAGP commenced this action within three months of 
the foreclosure date. It is also undisputed, based on the parties' stipulation, that the amount 
owed to SAGP by Defendants as of the foreclosure date was $14,685,370.37. Thus, the only 
factual issue before the Court is the fair market value of the Highland Property as of the 
foreclosure date, which was opined upon by the parties' respective Expert Witnesses. 
31. Utah R. Evid. 702 provides that an expert witness may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise "if the expert's scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."13 Additionally, 
Rule 702 circumscribes the limits of an expert witness and indicates that the expert may testify 
"only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods that are underlying in the 
testimony (b )(I) are reliable; (b )(2) are based upon sufficient facts and data; and (b )(3) have been 
reliably applied to the facts."14 The required threshold showing is satisfied only if the methods 
used by the expert are generally accepted within the relevant expert community. 15 
32. The Court finds and concludes that Cook failed to use established and reliable 
valuation methodologies, instead using a land residual technique not supported in appraisal 
literature; Cook failed to perform an "as is" appraisal of the Highland Property, instead relying 
upon hypotheticals, unsupported and questionable data and facts in reaching his valuation; and 
Cook otherwise enhanced his opinion of market value of the Highland Property to reach a 
desired result. 
13 Utah R. Evid. 702(a). 
14 Utah R. Evid. 702(a). 
15 Utah R. Evid. 702(c). 
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33. On the other hand, the Court finds and concludes that the valuations of the 
Highland Property by Liddell and Jorgensen are complete, based upon sound data, and based on 
established and reliable valuation methodologies. 
CONCLUSION 
34. The amount owing to SAGP by Defendants under the Note and Loan Documents 
as of the May 22, 2012 foreclosure date was $14,685,370.37. Because the Court concludes that 
the fair market value of the Highland Property on that date was no greater than $10,568,000.00, 
the deficiency balance owed to SAGP as of the foreclosure date was $4,117,370.37 (the 
"Deficiency Amount"). 
35. Since the foreclosure sale, interest has accrued on the Deficiency Amount at the 
rate of 6.25%, which rate is comprised of: (a) the Prime Index Rate, as set forth in the Note, 
which rate has remained at 3.25% since December 16, 2008; 16 plus (b) the additional 3.0% 
default rate, as set forth in the Note. 
36. On approximately October 2, 2012, SAGP received $177,896.00 from the 
Receiver of the Highland Property, which SAGP applied to reduce the principal amount owing to 
SAGP by Defendants. 
3 7. Additionally, SAGP has incurred attorneys' fees and costs in its efforts to collect 
amounts owed by Defendants under the Loan Documents, which costs and fees SAGP is entitled 
to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, under the Loan Documents, and which 
amounts may be later established by an affidavit filed within 30 days of the entry of this Order. 
16 See http://www.fedprimerate.com/wall_ streetjournal _prime _rate_ history .htm. 
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38. Accordingly, SAGP is entitled to judgment against Defendants, jointly and 
severally, in the total amount of$4,747,891.39, as of August 12, 2015, plus attorneys' fees and 
costs to be established by affidavit within 30 days of the entry of this Order, with the further 
accrual of interest at 6.25% and attorneys' fees for collection until paid in full. 
END OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(The Court's signature appears at the top of the first page of this Order) 
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4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
11}y 
SA Group Properties, Inc., 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Highland Market Place. L.C. et al , 
Defendant 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. 
Date: August 24, 2015 
Case Number: 120401312 
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 26-27 and August 12, 2015, the Court held a trial in this deficiency action. 
Steven T. Watennan and Nathan S. Seim of Dorsey & Whitney LLP appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff, SA Group Properties, Inc. ("SAGP"). James E. Magleby and Kennedy D. Nate of 
Magleby & Greenwood, P.C. appeared on behalf of Defendants, Highland Marketplace, L.C. 
("Highland"), High Noon, L.C. ("High Noon"), Solana Beach Holdings, L.C. ("Solana"), 
Thomas Hulbert ("Hulbert") and Bret Fox ("Fox"). At trial, the Court admitted into evidence 
documentary exhibits (collectively, the "Exhibits"), including the stipulated Declaration of 
Timothy N. Scheer for Trial [Exhibit 28] (the "Scheer Declaration"), the reports of SAGP's 
expert appraisal witnesses, Kerry Jorgensen ("Mr. Jorgensen") and Darrin Liddell ("Mr. 
Liddell"), and the reports of Defendants' expert appraisal witness, Phillip Cook ("Mr. Cook"). 
The Court also heard live testimony from Jorgensen, Liddell and Cook (collectively, the "Expert 
Witnesses"). Page 1 of 25 
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The Court has reviewed and considered the evidence presented, including the Exhibits; 
has heard the testimony of the expert witnesses and considered their demeanor and credibility; 
has heard the arguments of counsel; and has researched the applicable law. Based thereon, the 
Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Parties and Witnesses 
1. Plaintiff SA Group Properties, Inc. ("Plaintiff' or "SA Group") is a Minnesota 
corporation and an assignee of U.S. Bank National Association ("US Banlc"). 
2. US Bank is the successor-in-interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as 
receiver of First Community Bank ("First Community"). 
3. Highland Marketplace, L.C. ("Highland") is a Utah limited liability company with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. High Noon, L.C. ("High Noon") is a Utah limited liability company with its principal 
place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Solana Beach Holdings, L.C. ("Solana") is a Utah limited liability company with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
6. Thomas A. Hulbert ("Mr. Hulbert") is an individual who resides in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. ~ 
7. Bret B. Fox ("Mr. Fox) is an individual who resides in Summit County, Utah. 
8. On or about January 28, 2011, the New Mexico Financial Institutions Division closed 
Page 2 of 25 
3741 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Community, and FDIC was named as receiver of First Community ("FDIC-R"). [See Scheer 
Deel., 1 19]. 
9. FDIC-R sold substantially all of First Community's assets, including the Loan 
Agreement, Note, Hulbert Guaranty, Fox Guaranty and the Deeds of Trust (collectively, the 
"Loan Documents") to US Banlc, such that US Bank obtained the rights to enforce the Loan 
Documents. [See Scheer Deel., ,r 20]. 
10. On May 21, 2012, US Bank assigned to the Plaintiff in this case, SA Group, its interest in 
the Loan Documents, specifically including the Deeds of Trust, as reflected by the Assignment 
of Deed of Trust recorded with the Utah County Recorder's Office on May 22, 2012, as entry 
number 42508:2012 (collectively, the "Assignments"). [See Scheer Deel., ,r 24]. 
11. Defendants failed to make certain payments that were due under the terms of the Loan 
Agreement, Note, Hulbert Guaranty, and Fox Guaranty. [See Scheer Deel., ,r 25]. 
The Trustee's Sale 
12. On May 22, 2012, the Trustee of the Highland Marketplace sold the Highland 
Marketplace to a third party in accordance with state law and the terms of the Deeds of Trust and 
other loan documents. [See Scheer Deel.~ ,r 26]. 
13. The Trustee's Deed contains recitals relating to the exercise of the Power of Sale 
contained in the Deeds of Trust and the sale of the Trust Property. [See Scheer Deel., ,i 27]. 
14. At the time of the foreclosure sale, the amount owing to SA Group by Defendants under 
the Note and Loan Documents was $14,685,370.37, which consisted of$13,390,939.93 in 
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principal, including $246,914.33 for the payment of past due real estate taxes; $633,160.49 in 
interest; late charges of $655,269.95; costs incurred for appraisal and environmental reports in 
amount of $6,000.00; plus the additional accrual of attorneys' fees and costs as allowed under the 
Loan Documents. [See Scheer Deel., -;f 28]. 
15. At the foreclosure sale, the Trust Property was sold to a third party for the amount of 
$8,565,000.00. [See Scheer Deel., ,I 29]. 
16. Since the foreclosure sale, interest has accrued on the deficiency balance owed to SA 
Group after the sale of the Trust Property at the rate of 6.25%, which rate is comprised of: (a) the 
Prime Index Rate, as set forth in the Note, which rate has remained at 3.25% since December 16, 
2008; I plus (b) the additional 3.0% default rate, as set forth in the Note. [See Scheer Deel., ,I 
JY]. On or about October 2, 2012, SA Group received $177,896.00 from Len Stillman of 
Stillman Consulting Services, who was appointed the Receiver of the Trust Property on 
December 14, 2011, by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge for 
the State of Utah, Utah County, Case No. 110403100, and which receivership tenninated on 
August 15, 2012. SA Group applied this payment to further reduce the principal amount owing 
to SA Group by Defendants. [See Scheer Deel., ,I 32]. 
The Highland Marketplace 
18. The Highland Marketplace is located at the northwest comer of the Alpine Highway and 
Timpanogos Highway in Highland, Utah. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.1 ]. 
19. The Highland Marketplace has good linkage to 1-15 on the Timpanogos Highway and the 
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Alpine Highway runs into American Fork. [See Trial Transcript, at 310:25-311 :9 (Mr. Cook)]. 
20. Highland is an area with higher end homes, with a population that has purchasing power, 
such that they can afford to go out to dinner and support restaurants and retail stores. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 311 : 10-17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
21. Although there is competition from a Kohler's across the street, and Highland has Sunday 
closing laws, if someone wants to do business in Highland they have to be at the Highland 
Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 311: 18-312:8 (Mr. Cook)]. 
22. Highland is a growing city that had a lot of optimism in the market as of May 2012. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 313: 11-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
23. The Highland Marketplace was fully entitled as of May 2012 for construction as designed 
and contained the following horizontal improvements: utilities, water, sewer, gas, power, 
curbing and gutters, sidewalks, and roadways. [See Trial Transcript, at 314:20-317:13 (Mr. 
IDhok)].The Highland Marketplace also had various vertical improvements, including buildings 
on Lots 3, 7, 8, 9, & 10. [See Trial Transcript, at 317:18-318:6 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 
18]. The buildings in the Highland Marketplace are good quality buildings, are architecturally 
pleasing, and typical of what is built today for good quality retail and office type buildings. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 319:2-5 (Mr. Cook)]. 
26. The construction quality of the buildings and condition or the buildings are good. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 319:5-6 (Mr. Cook)]. 
27. The Highland Marketplace is uniquely located, as it is at the only commercial intersection 
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in Highland City. [See Trial Transcript, at 251:7-10 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
28. Each of the Expert Witnesses opined on the market value of the Highland Property as of 
May 22, 2012-the date of the foreclosure sale. Plaintiff's appraisers, Mr. Liddell and Mr. 
Jorgensen, each opined that the fair market value of the Highland Property on the foreclosure 
was less than the balance due: $9,240,000.00 [Exhibit 1 O] (the "Liddell appraisal") and 
10,568,000.00 [Exhibits 11 and 12] (the "Jorgensen Appraisal"), respectively. Defendants' 
appraiser, Mr. Cook, opined that the fair market value of the Highland Property was greater than 
the debt at $14,710,000.00 [Exhibit 18] (the "Cook Appraisal"). 
Highest and Best Use 
29. "The meaning of the term fair market value is well settled. It is the amount at which 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under 
any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." This 
definition means that the subject property must be valued in its "as is" condition. 
30. In determining the fair market value of a property an appraiser must determine the 
highest and best use of the property. [See Trial Transcript, at 290:18-25; 291:14-292:5 (Mr. 
Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 121]; [See Exhibit 122]. 
31. Highest and best use is defined in The Appraisal of Real Estate as ''the probable and legal 
use of vacant land or an improved property that is physically possible, appropriately supported, 
financially feasible, and that results in the highest value." [See Trial Transcript, at 290:6-9, 20-
20-22; 291:14-292:5 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 121]; [See Exhibit 122]. 
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32. Highest and best use may also consider a zoning change that is reasonably probable. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 60:6-8 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
33. The highest and best use of the Highland Marketplace is considered both as if vacant and 
as improved. [See Trial Transcript, at 319:25-320:9 (Mr. Cook)]. 
34. On an as-improved basis, the highest and best use is to operate the center as an integrated 
economic unit to maximize value because shopping centers are typically bought as integrated 
units. [See Trial Transcript, at 321 :20-322: 17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
35. It is not typical for a shopping center to be valued as separate parcels because shopping 
centers are sold as a whole and most of the time the seller only wants to know what the whole 
property is worth without knowing the individual components. [See Trial Transcript, at 228:6-21 
(Mr. Liddell)]. 
1. Highest and Best Use of Lot 6, Pad D 
36. The highest and best use of Pad D as of the time of foreclosure was to construct a 
building based on the Walgreen's lease between Highland, High Noon, and Solana, on the one 
hand, and Walgreen Co. ("Walgreen's"), on the other, that was executed on October 13, 2010. 
[See Exhibit 31]; [See also Exhibit 18, 18.21]. 
37. The Walgreen's lease was for a seventy-five year tenn. [See Trial Transcript, at 353:4-7 
(Mr. Cook)]. 
38. The Walgreen's lease called for a monthly rent of $30,250 for a total annual rent of 
$363,000: 
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65. Although the delivery date of the completed building to Walgreen's was June I, 2012, the 
deadline was later changed to October 1, 2013 by the First Amendment Lease ("Walgreen's 
Amendment"). [See Exhibit 31]; [See also Exhibit 36]. 
39. The Walgreen's lease was a legitimate marketable right that added value to the Highland 
Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 316:17-21, 466:22-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
40. Walgreen's is a very credit worthy tenant and was a company with a 34 and a half billion 
dollar market cap as of 2012. [See Trial Transcript, at 352:219-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
41. As of May 2012, there was a year and a half left to build the Walgreen's. The 
building would have only taken about six months to construct. [See Trial Transcript, at 351: 19-
351: 19-24 (Mr. Cook)]. 
42. Despite the existence of the Walgreen's lease and the Walgreen's Amendment, Mr. 
Jorgensen did not initially separate the value Lot 6, Pad Dor consider the Walgreen's lease 
associated with that Pad in determining the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 99:15-20 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
43. Mr. Jorgensen admitted that at the time he performed his appraisal he was not aware of 
the signed Walgreen's lease. [See Trial Transcript, at 99:25-100:8 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
44. Although Mr. Liddell was aware of the Walgreen's lease at the time of his appraisal, he 
believed that the lease had expired and did not include any value for the lease. 
Expert Witnesses 
45. An appraiser has the role of an impartial market observer or analyst who must interpret 
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real estate markets independently of a client. [See Trial Transcript, at 285:23-286:6 (Mr. Cook)]. 
46. When appraising real estate there are three approaches to value: the sales comparison 
approach, the cost approach, and the income approach. [See Trial Transcript, at 65:20-25 (Mr. 
Jorgensen); 340:5-6 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 11, at 11-109 - 11-110]; [See Exhibit 100]. 
47. In appraising property, an appraiser must develop those approaches to value that are 
necessary to produce credible results, but may also omit an approach if it is not necessary. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 294:15-20 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 124].] 
Sales Comparison Approach and the Principal of Substitution 
48. The sales comparison approach is based on the principle of substitution. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 296:1-297:20 (Mr. Cook)]. 
49. The principle of substitution requires comparison of an equally desirable substitute 
property. Stated differently, when applying the sales comparison approach the appraiser needs to 
find sales that are closely enough in nature so that the comparable is a true substitute property to 
prospective buyers and sellers. [See Trial Transcript, at 296:17-297:20 (Mr. Cook) (emphasis 
added)]. 
50. Mr. Jorgensen agrees with Mr. Cook, and testified that under the substitution principle "a 
buyer would not pay more than they would expect to pay for a substitute" and that an appraiser 
wants "to have the comparables be as similar as possible." [See Trial Transcript, at 147:5-148:4 
(Mr. Jorgensen) (emphasis added)]. 
51. In making this selection, some factors to consider include size, location, age of 
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improvements, and a use that actually matches the highest and best use of the subject property. 
52. The sales comparison approach "is based on the appraisal principle of substitution and 
takes into consideration the selling price of improved properties that provide utility equal or 
similar to the subject." [See Exhibit 18, at 18.57]. 
53. The sales comparison approach uses the sales of comparable properties to try to predict 
what the subject property would sell for if it was placed on the market. [See Trial Transcript, at 
87:14-17 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
54. Both Mr. Cook and Mr. Jorgensen agree that the sales comparison approach is applicable 
in this case and actually applied the sales comparison approach to the Highland Marketplace. 
[See Exhibit 104, at 104.1]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 65:20-25 (Mr. Jorgensen); 340:19-24 
(Mr. Cook). 
55. In contrast, Mr. Liddell did not do a sales comparison approach for the income producing 
property. [See Exhibit 104.1 ]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 184: 13-18 (Mr. Liddell); 418: 10-
419: 12 (Mr. Cook)]; [See Exhibit 19, at 19.23]. 
The Cost Approach 
56. "The cost approach to value is based on the principle of substitution, which affirms that a 
knowledgeable buyer would pay no more for a property than the cost to acquire a similar site and 
construct improvements of equivalent desirability and utility without undue delay." [Exhibit 11, 
at 11-65]. 
Income Approach 
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57. The income approach is "based on the appraisal principle of anticipation, which attests 
that property value is estimated as the present worth of future anticipated benefits accruing to 
ownership." [See Exhibit 18, at 18.36]. 
58. With the income approach, the value of real property is equal to the net operating income 
("NOi") divided by the capitalization rate. [See Trial Transcript, at 65:20-25 (Mr. Jorgensen); 
341:24-342:11 (Mr. Cook)]. 
59. Mr. Cook, Mr. Liddell, and Mr. Jorgensen all agree that the income approach is 
to determining the fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. [See Exhibit 104.1]. 
60. In performing an income approach, an appraiser looks at the market rents by studying 
of comparable properties as well as the subject property's rental history. [See Trial Transcript, at 
71:24-72:1 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
61. The existing leases, with the exception of the lease for the fitness center in Building A 
(discussed below), were the result of arm's length transactions, and were entered into prior to 
litigation. 
62. Just as with the sales comparison approach, when comparing other properties as part of 
market rent analysis, an appraiser must find good comparable properties. [See Trial Transcript, 
297:11-15 (Mr. Cook)]. 
Taco Time 
63. The Taco Time, located on Lot 7, had an existing lease that was negotiated at arm's 
[See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
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64. The Taco Time had operated at the Highland Marketplace location since April 2010. [See 
Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
65. The Taco Time lease was a 15 year lease, with an annual rent of $130,166 or $56.03 per 
square foot. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]. 
66. The Taco Time lease was personally guaranteed by the three principals of the leasing 
company, at least one of whom owned 15 other stores. [See Exhibit 18, at 18.38]; [See also Trial 
Transcript, at 378:16-379:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
67. Like the other existing leases, the Taco Time lease was the result of an arm's length 
negotiation, prior to litigation. [See Trial Transcript, at 378: 16-382:4 (Mr. Cook)]. 
Mr. Liddell 
68. Darrin W. Liddell ("Mr. Liddell") is the owner of the lntegra Realty Resources franchise 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Liddell has a bachelor's degree in finance and a master's degree in 
business administration, both of which come from the University of Utah. [See Trial Transcript, 
at 180:21-24; 182:7-11 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
69. Mr. Liddell is also a Certified General Appraiser for the State of Utah and is MAI 
[See Trial Transcript, at 180:23-181 :3; 181: 18-20 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
70. The Court finds that each of Mr. Liddell's judgments regarding the property were 
conservatively made resulting in an appraised value that is not credible. [See Trial Transcript, at 
299:17-300:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
71. Although an appraiser may receive client input, there are limits on the amount of 
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an appraiser can accept from a client and it is the appraiser's responsibility to define the scope of 
work based on the intended use and the intended user or users of the appraisal. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 235:12-19 (Mr. Liddell); 307:11-19 (Mr. Cook)]. 
72. Mr. Liddell did not offer any testimony or evidence as to how much the value of the 
Highland Marketplace property would have increased ifhe had not followed the client's 
instructions and performed an independent analysis. [See generally Trial Transcript]. 
73. As noted, Mr. Liddell failed to conduct a sales comparison approach on the income 
producing property. [See Exhibit 104, at 104.1]; [See also Trial Transcript, at 184:13-18 (Mr. 
Liddell); 418:10-419:12]; [See Exhibit 19, at 19.23]. 
74. Mr. Liddell's failure to do a sales comparison approach on income producing property 
a significant downward impact on his proffered value of the Highland Marketplace because it 
prevented him from using comparable sales as a benchmark for his income based analysis. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 419:7-12, 295:4-18 (Mr. Cook)]. 
75. By failing to do such a check and establish a benchmark, Mr. Liddell violated the rule 
requiring appraisers to develop the approaches to value that are necessary to produce credible 
results. [See Trial Transcript, at 294:13-295:18 (Mr. Cook)]. 
76. Although Mr. Liddell was aware of the Walgreen's lease at the time of his appraisal, he 
not include any value for the lease and, instead, simply appraised it as vacant land. 
77. Similarly, Mr. Liddell appraised Pad I as vacant land despite the existence of a 'Jack in 
Box,' Letter of Intent. Mr. Liddell admitted that at the time he performed his appraisal he was 
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aware of the signed 'Jack in the Box' Letter ofintent. [See Trial Transcript, at 242:10-17 (Mr. 
Liddell)]. The Court is of the view that the letter of intent would have added only marginal value 
the property because the Defendants did not have title to the property included in the letter. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Liddell gave the circumstance no credence, at all. 
78. In order to apply the income approach Mr. Liddell used cap rates developed from actual 
income and applied them to the market rent concept resulting in an artificially low value. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 299:17-300:12 (Mr. Cook)]. 
79. The age, quality, and condition of the property can affect a capitalization rate that is used 
for the income approach. [See Trial Transcript, at 145:25-146:8 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
80. More recent construction projects and newer retail centers sell for the highest prices and 
can typically justify a lower capitalization rate. [See Trial Transcript, at 146: 15-22 (Mr. 
Jorgensen)]. 
81. Mr. Liddell applied a capitalization rate derived from actual income on comparable 
properties to his concluded market rate of individual buildings and to the Highland Marketplace 
a whole, and then applied a ten percent bulk discount. [See Trial Transcript, at 298: 16-299: 16 
(Mr. Cook)]. 
82. In other words, Mr. Liddell used the wrong capitalization rate twice, which resulted in a 
substantially lower appraised value. [See Trial Transcript, at 299:1-16; 419:13-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
83. As a result of Mr. Liddell's incorrect application of the capitalization rate, his overall 
opinion resulted in a downward impact on the value of the Highland Marketplace. [See Trial 
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Transcript, at 299:1-300:12, 419:13-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
84. After appraising the Highland Marketplace as individual parcels Mr. Liddell applied a ten 
percent bulk sale discount, which artificially reduced the appraised value of the Highland 
Marketplace. [See Exhibit 10, at 10-204]. 
85. "The bulk sale analysis is meant to reconcile the individual retail values to one value for a 
single buyer. This is contrary to highest and best use ... which would be to operate it as an 
integrated shopping center as [Mr. Liddell himself] concludes in the highest and best use 
[See Exhibit 19, at 19.21]. 
86. It is not industry practice to appraise shopping centers by applying a bulk sale discount. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 416:2-14 (Mr. Cook)]; [See also Exhibit 19, at 19.5]. 
87. Mr. Liddell conceded that a seller of real property would not request the application of a 
percent bulk sale discount to the value of its property because a hypothetical seller wants to 
maximize their value. [See Trial Transcript, at 219:25-220: 13 (Mr. Liddell)]. 
88. The bulk sale analysis is ordinarily applicable where various parcels or lots within a 
subdivision compete against each other or where there are a bunch of non-income producing 
properties that have associated carrying costs, such as with residential subdivisions. [See Exhibit 
19, at 19.22]; [See Trial Transcript, at 221:16-222:20 (Mr. Liddell)]. For example, in a 
subdivision all the parcels are competing against each other and a bulk sale discount is applied to 
allow the owner to sell all the lots at once so that the owner can avoid the carrying costs 
with selling competing lots over an extended period of time. [See Trial Transcript, at 222:21-
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222:21-223:10 (Mr. Liddell); 323:11-326:9, 326:22-327:5 (Mr. Cook)]. 
89. In contrast, in the Highland Marketplace, Lots 1 and 2 are vacant, Lots 3, 7, 8, 9, and IO 
have buildings on them, Lot 6 has a signed Walgreen's lease, and Lot 11 or Pad I had at least an 
apparent letter of intent for construction of a 'Jack in the Box' restaurant. However, none of 
lots or pads competed with each other. [See Trial Transcript, at 326: 10-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
90. For example, a potential tenant for the remaining space on Lot 11, such as another 
restaurant or retail space, would not have competed with an apartment building or anchor tenant 
Lots 1 and 2. [See Trial Transcript, at 326:10-21 (Mr. Cook)]. 
91. The different lots in the Highland Marketplace are complementary to each other because 
they operate as an integrated economic unit. [See Trial Transcript, at 332:19-25, 333:16-18 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
92. In addition, Mr. Liddell agreed that the developed lots in the Highland Marketplace are 
income producing and, if sold as an integrated economic unit, the bulk discount is inapplicable 
because the seller is not avoiding any carrying costs. [See Trial Transcript, at 223:4-10 (Mr. 
Liddell)]. 
93. Thus, the bulk sale discount is inapplicable to the fair market value analysis of the 
Highland Marketplace. [See Trial Transcript, at 322:18-23 (Mr. Cook)]. 
Mr. Cook 
94. Defendants called Philip Cook ("Mr. Cook") as an expert witness to testify regarding the 
fair market value of the Highland Marketplace. Mr. Cook was retained to provide a retroactive 
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valuation of the Highland Property for purposes of helping to defend actions filed against the 
Defendants. 
95. Mr. Cook is a commercial real estate appraiser with approximately 35 years of 
and is the principal and owner of J. Philip Cook and Associates, LLC. [See Trial Transcript, at 
280:13-17 (Mr. Cook)]. 
96. Mr. Cook obtained his bachelor's degree in finance from the University of Utah in 1980. 
Mr. Cook completed an MBA in 1982, also at the University of Utah. [See Trial Transcript, at 
280:20-25 (Mr. Cook)]. 
97. Mr. Cook has also taught appraisal classes on Real Estate Appraisal Principles and 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice for the Appraisal Institute, which 
promulgates education and standards for appraisers and sponsors the MAI designation. [See 
Transcript, at 282:3-19 (Mr. Cook)]. 
98. Mr. Cook has served in all the local office positions for the Appraisal Institute, including 
the President of the Utah Chapter of the Appraisal Institute. Mr. Cook has also served as a 
regional representative and sat on the National Board of Directors for the Appraisal Institute. 
[See Trial Transcript, at 283:1-7 (Mr. Cook)]. 
99. Mr. Cook has served as a board member and as Chairman of the Utah State Appraiser 
Board, which works with the Utah Division of Real Estate to oversee the licensing and 
professional oversight of appraisers in the State of Utah. [See Trial Transcript, at 283:11-15 (Mr. 
Cook)]. 
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100. Mr. Cook has served as an expert witness on real estate appraisal related issues in both 
federal and state courts, and has appraised such shopping centers as Provo Towne Center, 
University Mall, Riverwoods mall, Fashion Place mall, the City Creek project in downtown Salt 
Lake City, the Gateway mall, and numerous other big box, neighborhood, and strip centers. [See 
Trial Transcript, at 284:8-285:4 (Mr. Cook)]. 
101. Mr. Cook testified that he typically reads the pleadings in the litigation action and that he 
generally understands the issues involved in a deficiency action (May 27th, 2015 Transcript, on 
File with the Court, at p. 445). Mr. Cook also testified that he was aware of, and observed a 
deficiency action that Defendants are involved in relating to the Highland Property with CRV-
CRV-Main Main, L.P. ("CRV-Main") the mezzanine lender that foreclosed Defendants' interest 
in the Highland Property prior to SAGP's for foreclosure. (See id. at p. 491, Line 20---p. 492, 
3). As set forth in the Cook Appraisal [Exhibit 18], Mr. Cook valued the Highland Property as 
the foreclosure date in the amount of $14,710,000.00, which is approximately $4 million more 
than Mr. Jorgensen's valuation, approximately $5 million more than Mr. Liddell's valuation, and 
approximately $6 million more than the price paid by an independent third party bidder at the 
foreclosure sale. 
102. The Court finds that Mr. Cook's valuation of the Highland Property was artificially 
inflated and less credible than the valuations of Mr. Liddell and Mr. Jorgensen for the following 
reasons: 
(a) Mr. Cook's valuation was based on unsupported and unreliable facts and data. For 
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example, Mr. Cook gave too much value to the 'Jack in the Box,' Letter of Intent that was dated 
days prior to the foreclosure sale and was signed by Highland as the Landlord, even though 
CRV-Main owned the Highland Property at the time the Letter of Intent was signed. 
Additionally, Mr. Cook valued the "Anchor Pad" of the Highland Property using the 
condition" that the Anchor Pad would function as multi-family housing, even though, (1) the 
Highland Property was not zoned for multi-family housing; (2) the Highland Property was not 
equipped with a sewer system or other necessary infrastructure to handle multi-family housing; 
Highland City has stated that it is against re-zoning the property; and ( 4) there is no indication, 
other than Defendants' own statements to Mr. Cook, that Highland City was ever willing to re-
re-zone the Highland Property for multi-family use. 
(b)- Mr. Cook's valuation was based on un-established and unreliable valuation 
For instance, Mr. Cook valued the Anchor Pad and other pads comprising the Highland Property 
using the "land residual method," which takes the projected future value of a hypothetical project 
on the land (such as multi-family use housing on the Anchor Pad), and then deducts the costs of 
building the project to reach the value of the land. "Courts have shown a clear disdain" for this 
valuation methodology because small variations in the variables used "can result in a dramatic 
change in the land value estimate. 
(c) Mr. Cook did not value the Highland Property in its "as is" condition as of the May 22, 
2012 foreclosure date. MR. Cook did not value the property 'as is' becaue he used assumptions 
and hypothetical conditions, including that (1) the relied-upon letter of intent would be executed 
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and that a 'Jack in the Box' would be constructed; (2) the zoning of the anchor pads would be 
changed; (3) a Walgreen's would be timely constructed; (4) Pad I would be subdivided into two 
parcels; (5) the fitness club lease would be terminated; (6) the fitness space lease would be 
converted to retail space; and (7) the entire project would be leased to stabilized occupancy. 
assumed factors did not reflect the true condition of the Highland Property as of the foreclosure 
date. The Cook Appraisal states: "We have been asked to estimate hypothetical value as if the 
subject improvements were stabilized occupancy as of the effective date of the appraisal. This 
assumes the proposed construction of the Walgreens and the 'Jack in the Box' buildings, as well 
tenant improvements for vacant space, are complete. This limiting condition affects the 
assignment results." The Cook Appraisal does not comply with the requirement that the 
value the Property in its condition as of the foreclosure date, but assumes a hypothetical 
103. The Court finds and concludes that Mr. Cook failed to use established and reliable 
valuation methodologies, and used, instead, a land residual technique not supported in appraisal 
literature. Mr. Cook failed to perform an "as is" appraisal of the Highland Property. He relied 
upon hypotheticals, unsupported and questionable data and facts in reaching his valuation which 
is, therefore, unreliable. 
Mr.Jorgensen 
104. Kerry M. Jorgensen ("Mr. Jorgensen") was retained to provide a retroactive valuation of 
the Highland Property for purposes of this trial. 
105. Mr. Jorgensen is the principal of Jorgensen Appraisal, Inc. Mr. Jorgensen has a 
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bachelor's degree from the University of Utah in finance with a real estate emphasis, is MAI 
certified, and is a Certified General Appraiser in the State of Utah. [See Trial Transcript, at 
29:19-30:6 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
106. Mr. Jorgensen has been an appraiser for approximately 36 years. [See Trial Transcript, at 
31:13-14 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
107. The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USP AP") are a set of 
standards promulgated by The Appraisal Foundation that have been adopted by Utah into its 
appraiser regulations. [See Trial Transcript, at 35:2-7 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
108. USP AP is one of the authoritative publications on appraising real estate. [See Trial 
Transcript, at 287:14-16 (Mr. Cook)]. 
109. The Appraisal of Real Estate is the most recognized and commonly used treatise by 
appraisers and is considered authoritative. [See Trial Transcript, at 287: 10-16 (Mr. Cook)]. 
110. The Court finds and concludes that the valuation of the Highland Property by Mr. 
Jorgensen is complete, based upon sound data, and based on established and reliable valuation 
methodologies. The Jorgensen appraisal, with the added valuation resulting from the Walgreen's 
lease, is adopted by reference as the finding of the Court for the value of the property. 
111. Mr. Jorgensen admitted that at the time he performed his appraisal he was not aware of 
signed Walgreen's lease. [See Trial Transcript, at 99:25-100:8 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
112. Mr. Jorgensen conceded that the older shopping centers used in his appraisal as 
comparables were not only inferior in appearance, but also did not look as modem nor as good as 
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the Highland Marketplace. 
113. However, the Court concludes that Mr. Jorgensen adequately compensated for these 
variations in computing the "as is" market value of the property. 
114. Mr. Jorgensen appraised Building A as a fitness center and used other fitness centers to 
detennine market rent. [See Trial Transcript, at 64:3-11, 75:19-21 (Mr. Jorgensen)]. 
115. Jorgensen's original appraisal valued the Highland Property as of the foreclosure date in 
the amount of $9,800,000.00 [Exhibit 11]. After adjusting to properly account for the valid 
Walgreen's lease at the time of the foreclosure, Mr. Jorgensen would increase his valuation of 
Highland Property by $768,000.00, to the amount of $10,568,000.00 [Exhibit 12]. 
116. The Court finds that the Highland Property valuation of Mr. Jorgensen was based on the 
Property as it existed on the foreclosure date. As such, the Court finds that the fair market value 
the Highland Property as of May 22, 2012, was no greater than $10,568,000.00-the highest 
assigned to the Property by Mr. Jorgensen. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This action is governed by the Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. See Utah Code§ 57-1-32. 
2. Under the Deficiency Action Statute: 
The court shall find the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The 
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of 
the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the 
sale. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. 
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ORDER 
1. The amount owing to SAGP by defendants under the note and loan as of the May 22, 
2012 foreclosure date was $14,685,370.37. The court concludes the fair market value of the 
Highland property on that date was no greater than $10,568,000.00 and as such, the deficiency 
balance owed to SAGP as of the foreclosure date was $4,117,370.37 (the "deficiency amount"). 
2. Since the foreclosure sale, interest has accrued on the deficiency amount at the rate of 
6.25%, which rate is comprised of: (a) the prime index rate, as set forth in the note, which rate 
remained at 3.25% since December 16, 2008; plus (b) the additional 3.0% default rate, as set 
in the note. 
3. On approximately October 2, 2012, SAGP received $177,896.00 from the receiver of the 
highland property, which SAGP applied to reduce the principal amount owing to SAGP by 
defendants. 
4. Additionally, SAGP has incurred attorneys' fees and costs in its efforts to Amounts owed 
by Defendants under the loan documents, which costs and fees SAGP is entitled to recover from 
Defendants, jointly and severally, under the loan documents, and which an affidavit filed within 
days of the entry of this order may later establish. 
5. Accordingly, SAGP is entitled to judgment against Defendants,jointly and severally, in 
the total amount of $4,747,891.39, as of August 12, 2015, plus attorneys' fees and costs to be 
established by affidavit within 30 days of entry of this Order, with the further accrual ofinterest 
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6.25% and attorneys' fees for collection until paid in full. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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SA Group Properties, Inc., v Highland Marketplace et al., 120401312 Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order 8/18/15 
Copies of this Order distributed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Steven T Waterman, watennan.steven@dorsey.com 
Nathan S. Seim, seim.nathan@dorsey.com 
Counsel for the Defendants: James E Magleby, magleby@mgpclaw.com 
Kenney D. Nate, nate@mgpclaw.com 
Mailed this 4ay of~ 2015, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
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